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JOSHUA A. BELL, PAIGE WEST AND COLIN FILER
Across the world indigenous rights activists argue that ‘Land is Life!’ This slogan 
appears on bumper stickers, T-shirts and posters at demonstrations against 
large-scale, capital-intensive forms of industrial development that result in 
indigenous peoples being dispossessed of their customary land-related rights 
and sovereignty. It indexes the fact that the systematic dispossession of such 
peoples from their lands has led to the current situation in which they are often 
living at the very margins of all international indicators of health and welfare. 
It also means much more than simply that land is important to life. For most 
indigenous groups globally, their lands and territories are inextricably tied to 
their ontological propositions about the world and their epistemic practices with 
regard to the world. Land is interwoven with history, memory, belief, practice 
and subjectivity. In this volume, we expand the discussion around indigenous 
peoples and land and argue that in many places in the larger forested nation-
states of Oceania, forests are also life.
Native forests and their health are an enduring source of concern for the 
indigenous communities who have lived with them ‘since time immemorial’. 
They are also a source of concern to many other actors or ‘stakeholders’ interested 
in their conservation or exploitation. Today, much of the news that we hear 
about forests is not good. There is an ongoing global debate about the pace 
of what is nowadays called deforestation and forest degradation, but there is 
widespread agreement that tropical forests are especially vulnerable (FAO 2010; 
FAO and ECJRC 2012; Hansen et al. 2013; Stibig et al. 2014; Kim et al. 2015). 
There is a parallel debate about the factors or drivers responsible for this loss in 
different parts of the world, and about the effects of this loss on local people’s 
livelihoods. Yet there is general agreement that the loss of tropical forests is 
inextricably tied to a corresponding loss of biodiversity values, and this in turn 
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has been linked to a decline in the health and welfare of the people living in and 
around these forests (Geist and Lambin 2002; Boucher et al. 2011). There is also 
a strong connection between the loss of biological diversity and the loss of social 
or cultural diversity, especially when the people affected by it are members of 
indigenous communities (Loh and Harmon 2005; Maffi 2005; Maffi and Woodley 
2010; Gorenflo et al. 2012).
The contributors to this volume explore the ways in which indigenous people 
and other actors relate to the tropical forests of Oceania.1 All but one of the 
chapters deal with this relationship in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Solomon 
Islands, where the recent rate of forest loss has been most extreme. Calls for 
action to counter the process of deforestation have resulted in global monitoring 
plans, international and multilateral policy directives, and national-level laws 
and programs. While these are much needed, our concern is that the focus on 
large-scale solutions too often erases the very people whose lives are intertwined 
with their forests (Tsing 2005; West 2005). The tropical forests of Oceania, like 
those in other parts of the world, have always been constituted through human 
interaction with the natural environment (Groube 1989; Johns 1990; Kirch and 
Hunt 1997; Haberle et al. 2001; Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003; Balée 2006; Hope 2007; 
also Hviding, Chapter 3, this volume).
Our approach is grounded in political ecology, which means that we do not 
accept approaches to environmental degradation that seek to blame the rural 
poor for changes that have been precipitated by external forces, often by 
internationally financed extractive regimes. Based on a set of propositions about 
the ongoing nature of global processes of accumulation and dispossession, 
political ecology seeks to understand the complex relationships between 
changes at different social and ecological scales (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and 
Brookfield 1987; Peet and Watts 1996; Zimmerer and Bassett 2003; Peet et al. 
2011). Furthermore, political ecology is not only concerned with material forms 
of dispossession, but also with the set of semiotic processes that accompany them 
(Biersack 1999). Anthropologists working in this area have also been interested 
in the ecological foundations of human structures of thought and practice and 
the role of these structures in production of the natural world (West 2006; 
Halvaksz and Young-Leslie 2008; Jacka 2010). The present volume sits squarely 
in this tradition of scholarship. Forests are sites where social, ecological and 
economic relationships can be examined within larger political–economic and 
historical contexts (Peluso 1996; Ribot 1998). The chapters in this volume deal 
with a variety of topics already covered in different branches of the political 
ecology literature, including economic development and the commoditisation 
1  The original drafts were presented at successive meetings of a session of the Association for Social 
Anthropology in Oceania between 2009 and 2011. The session was titled ‘Forests of Oceania: Environmental 
Histories, Present Concerns and Future Possibilities’, and was convened by Joshua Bell and Paige West.
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of forests (Peet and Watts 1996; Bryant and Goodman 2004), the role of the 
state in resource dispossession (Bryant and Bailey 1997), the cultural politics of 
environmental transitions (Peluso 1992; Rocheleau and Ross 1995), the place of 
forests in the global commoditisation of nature (Castree 1995; West 2012), and 
the relationship between environmental conservation and environmental justice 
(Hecht and Cockburn 1989; Peluso 1993; West and Carrier 2004; West 2006).
The remaining native forests in the tropical regions of Oceania do not constitute 
a single type of ecosystem, but vary enormously with altitude and climate — 
from coastal mangrove systems at one extreme to high montane cloud forests 
at the other (Paijmans 1976; Gressitt 1982; Whitmore 1990; Hammermaster 
and Saunders 1995; Mueller-Dombois and Fosberg 1998; Bruijnzeel et al. 2011; 
Telnov 2011). In their incredible diversity, these forests have provided local 
communities with an equally wide variety of ‘ecosystem services’. Perhaps most 
central has been the supply of food through the practice of shifting cultivation 
and the harvesting of tree crops, like the sago palm, that are more or less 
deliberately cultivated (Townsend et al. 1978; Clarke and Thaman 1997; Bourke 
and Allen 2009; Sillitoe 2010; Allen and Filer 2015). Although the centrality 
of this role has been diminished in some areas with increasing consumption of 
imported food commodities (Ohtsuka and Ulijaszek 2007), forests remain central 
to the livelihoods and sustenance strategies of many Pacific Island communities, 
even if forest resources are only used as a means of exchange for store-bought 
goods. Forests have also provided the raw materials for the construction of houses 
and canoes, both of which have been essential aspects of the different modalities 
of sociality, personhood, gender, space and time in Oceanic lifeworlds (Munn 
1977; Bonnemaison 1986; Weiner 1991; Carucci 1995; Barlow and Lipset 1997; 
Rensel and Rodman 1997; Stasch 2003; Damon 2008).2 By their very presence, 
forests root local cosmologies in the landscape and connect local communities 
to the places they inhabit (Nero 1992; West 2006; Crook 2007). They are also 
integral to the ways in which people inhabit the world, shaping people’s sensory 
perceptions and aesthetics (Feld 1982; Gell 1995; Weiner 2001; Halvaksz 2003).
This volume explores the multiple ways in which the tropical forests of Oceania 
emerge in and through human action and imaginaries. Exploring the local 
dynamics within and around forests in the Pacific Islands region gives us 
insight into regional issues that have global resonance. Intertwined as they are 
with cosmological beliefs and livelihoods, as sites of biodiversity and Western 
desire, forests in this region have been and continue to be transformed by the 
2  We use the past tense here because ‘bush material’ houses have been widely replaced by houses built 
with cement, milled timber and corrugated iron, while traditional sailing canoes have been widely replaced 
by aluminium dinghies or fibreglass ‘banana boats’.
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interaction of foreign and local entities. As one of the assemblages that form 
global capital, these forests are also sites of the various frictions that accompany 
these connections (Tsing 2005).
The present volume builds on the concerns of scholars and activists about the 
social and environmental impact of a boom in the export of raw logs from PNG 
and Solomon Islands in the 1990s (Gladman et al. 1996; Barlow and Winduo 
1997; Filer 1997; Filer with Sekhran 1998; Dauvergne 2001; Hviding 2003; 
Forest Trends 2006; Wairiu 2007). These concerns were amplified by a raft of 
foreign investment in ‘integrated conservation and development projects’ in 
both countries following their ratification of the 1992 Convention on Biological 
Diversity (Kirsch 1997; McCallum and Sekhran 1997; van Helden 1998; Martin 
1999; Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 2000; Filer 2004; Anderson 2005; West 2006; 
also West and Kale, Chapter 7, this volume). The logging boom was temporarily 
halted by the financial crisis of the late 1990s, and foreign funding for forest 
conservation projects began to decline at the same time. However, the volume 
of raw log exports from this part of Oceania has risen again over the course 
of the past decade, as the previous demand from Japan has been replaced by 
an equally strong demand from China (Dauvergne 1997; Filer 2013). In this 
recent period, the rising rate of timber extraction has not been matched by 
fresh investments in forest conservation, despite the global and national interest 
shown in the prospect of securing such investments for a reduction of carbon 
dioxide emissions from the process of deforestation and forest degradation 
(Melick 2010; Filer 2012; Filer and Wood 2012; Babon et al. 2014; also Filer, 
Chapter 8, Wood, Chapter 9, and Gabriel, Chapter 10, this volume).
Scholarly discussion of the political ecologies and economies of the Pacific Islands 
region has paid rather more attention to the impacts of mining than the impacts 
of logging (for example, Filer 1999; Rumsey and Weiner 2001; Kirsch 2006; West 
and Macintyre 2006; Bainton 2010; Golub 2014). This is partly because of the 
sheer scale and spectacle of big mining projects, but also because of the way that 
mining confronts and challenges the connection that communities have to their 
land. Indeed, the so-called ‘selective logging’ of native forests that is associated 
with the practice of ‘sustainable forest management’ does not typically involve 
the alienation of customary land rights or the dispossession of local landowners; 
it only involves the transfer of timber harvesting rights to logging companies 
for a fixed period of time (Taylor 1997; Filer with Sekhran 1998; Holzknecht 
1998; Montagu 2002; Lea 2005). However, the latest logging boom in PNG 
has been associated with a process of forest clearance, or deforestation rather 
than forest degradation, that does entail a more complete form of dispossession 
because it is justified by plans to establish large-scale agricultural projects that 
are bound to displace subsistence livelihoods (Filer 2011, 2014; Winn 2012; 
Mousseau 2013). Instead of a cycle in which shifting cultivation (or selective 
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logging) alternates with periods of forest regrowth or regeneration, forest 
ecosystems are permanently replaced by cash crop plantations. These could be 
timber plantations (see Hviding, Chapter 3, this volume), but the current crop 
of choice in Melanesia is oil palm (Filer 2010; Fraenkel et al. 2010; Allen 2012; 
Cramb and Curry 2012; Nelson et al. 2014).
Logging and mining can best be understood as two branches of extractive 
industry whose social and environmental effects are historically linked to booms 
and crashes in the value of specific commodities. Recent increases in the values 
of gold, copper, timber and oil palm are not necessarily associated with each 
other, but are each manifestations of the sort of commodity cycle through which 
the tropical forests of Oceania and their customary owners have come to be 
part of the world system over decades and even centuries. In most parts of the 
region, the ebbs and flows of commodity frontiers stretch back to the arrival of 
Europeans in the seventeenth century (Bennett 2000; Beinart and Hughes 2007; 
Newell 2010). In some areas, trade with Asia also has a long history (Swadling 
1996; Spyer 2000; Dove 2011). And forests have not only been implicated in 
the export of specific commodities to Europe, Asia or America, but also in the 
importation of new products or commodities from these same regions, whether 
it be chainsaws in recent years or sweet potato since the seventeenth century 
(Ballard et al. 2005).
The history of the sandalwood trade illustrates these recursive loops and 
frictions. Needing a commodity to exchange for tea, Euro-American merchants 
discovered the value of the sweet-scented wood for the Chinese and quickly 
moved to exploit the groves found in Hawai’i in the early nineteenth century. 
These sources were exhausted by 1830 (Culliney 1988; Cuddihy and Stone 1990; 
Sahlins 1992), but the trade revived in the 1840s once new stands were located 
in the New Hebrides and New Caledonia (Shineberg 1967). During this second 
boom (1841–65), Melanesians, Polynesians and Europeans travelled through 
this area, establishing temporary camps or trading posts before shipping the 
wood to Australian or Asian ports.3 These encounters were partly responsible 
for the creation of the Melanesian pidgin language (Romaine 1992: 34). If the 
conditions of extraction helped to generate new forms of sociality, they also 
helped to disrupt them. Within Hawai’i the sandalwood trade flooded the islands 
with foreign products that inspired contests of conspicuous consumption 
among the indigenous aristocracy (Sahlins 1992: 55–66). Prominent nobles put 
pressure on their tenants to gather sandalwood for the trade (ibid.: 57–82), the 
productivity of local agriculture declined, and the nobles fell deeper into debt. 
3  Along the southern coast of what is now PNG, sandalwood exports did not begin until late in the 
nineteenth century, and continued almost to the time of independence in 1975 (Zieck 1970). Howcroft (1990) 
estimates that a total of 8,150 tonnes of sandalwood (180,000 trees) were sent to Singapore and China from Port 
Moresby before 1971.
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Increased interaction with Euro-American sailors and merchants encouraged 
the transmission and outbreaks of new diseases which, combined with the 
harsh working conditions needed to procure the ever-diminishing supply 
of sandalwood, led to an estimated 25 per cent decrease in the indigenous 
population over a 20-year period (Sahlins 1992: 57; Kame’eleihiwa 1992: 80–2).
It is easy enough to understand the recent concern with the large-scale logging 
industry in the two Pacific Island countries that still boast extensive areas of 
unexploited native forest, but the history of the sandalwood trade should also 
alert us to the fact that specific tree species and much smaller areas of native 
forest have been implicated in profound forms of social and environmental 
change throughout the wider region (see Mawyer, Chapter  2, this volume). 
They were also implicated in such changes in PNG well before the large-scale log 
export industry emerged in the post-colonial period. For example, when Huli 
people in the central highlands saw Europeans cutting down the hoop pines 
that surrounded their sacred sites and using the wood as a building material, 
they concluded that white people must be related to their own ancestors who 
had originally planted the trees, and that European ownership of chainsaws and 
sawmills was itself a sign that Europeans owned the trees themselves (Schieffelin 
and Crittenden 1991: 271). This example shows that the associations of people 
with forests, or the frictions between them, cannot simply be understood as an 
effect of market forces.
Nevertheless, market forces have played a very significant part in the long-
term transformation of these relationships. In the central highlands of PNG, 
the transformation can be seen through the widespread adoption of coffee as 
a smallholder cash crop (West 2012), just as it can also be seen through the 
previous adoption of sweet potato as a subsistence crop. Coffee is only one of 
several cash crops that have worked to transform the relationship between 
forest ecosystems or landscapes and indigenous communities in different 
parts of the region in different periods of recent history. Others include copra, 
cotton, cocoa, tea, sugar and rubber (Bennett 1987; McNeill 1988; Sahlins 1992; 
Lewis 1996; Ogan 1996; Kelly 1999; Tucker 2000). Whatever the specific form 
or scale of cultivation, these crops have jointly contributed to a process that 
Clarke and Thaman (1997) call ‘agro-deforestation’, which involves a reduction 
in the biological diversity of traditional forms of agroforestry. The recent oil 
palm boom in PNG and Solomon Islands is one phase in this long history, but 
the relationship of the oil palm industry to the process of deforestation has some 
novel features that relate to the revaluation of tropical forests as carbon sinks or 
biodiversity hotspots.
While large areas of native forest were cleared in the early years of the industry’s 
development in PNG (Longayroux et al. 1972; Buchanan et al. 2008), the two 
companies that now export palm oil from PNG and Solomon Islands have both 
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made a commitment to avoid any further deforestation as one of the conditions 
of having their products certified by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil 
(Nelson et al. 2010). This matters because the whole of their output is exported 
to Europe, where evidence of ‘sustainability’ attracts a better price. But the 
existing industry’s reputation is now threatened by a raft of new proposals to 
fund the establishment of additional oil palm schemes from the profits to be 
made out of logging the native forest that they will replace, while depriving 
customary landowners of their land rights as well as their timber harvesting 
rights. Some of these so-called ‘agroforestry’ projects may be little more than 
logging projects disguised by agricultural development plans that will never 
be implemented, but even where a new oil palm estate does materialise, the 
operators evidently do not aim to prove their own sustainability. The industry 
has therefore come to be divided between companies that defend and companies 
that attack the same combination of indigenous rights and native forests 
(Filer 2013; Nelson et al. 2014).
The new generation of ‘agroforestry’ projects in PNG may well fit David 
Harvey’s (2004) model of accumulation by dispossession, but the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil illustrates a more recent transformation of tropical forest 
ecosystem services into a sort of commodity that companies can purchase as part 
of their ‘social licence to operate’. Palm oil companies are not the only companies 
attracted to this market; logging companies can also seek to have their products 
certified if they think that this will raise their value for consumers (Atyi and 
Simula 2002; Rametsteiner and Simula 2003; Gulbrandsen 2004), while some 
mining and petroleum companies have shown an interest in purchasing carbon 
or biodiversity offsets to compensate for the environmental damage that they 
cause (Koziell and Omosa 2003; Maron et al. 2012; Virah-Sawmy et al. 2014). 
None of these corporate endeavours has yet had much effect on the relationship 
between people and forests in the Pacific Islands region, yet they reveal the 
capacity of capital to find new ways of doing business with this relationship.
This is not to deny the agency of indigenous people or local communities in the 
changes that actually happen or the way they are represented. Far from it, the 
chapters in this volume show how the peculiar histories of the region’s many 
different types of forest can inform a challenge to policies or practices based on 
the assumption of a single historical trajectory. Together they show how Pacific 
Islanders continue to engage with the various processes at play in and around 
their forests, how the forests continue to generate social relationships, and how 
these relationships warrant the continued attention of anthropologists.
In Chapter 2, Alexander Mawyer discusses a process of rediscovery that is 
by no means uncommon in those parts of the Pacific Islands region where the 
indigenous population fell dramatically as a result of contact with Europeans and 
their diseases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When the population 
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of Mangareva in French Polynesia fell below 500 in the 1870s, parts of the island 
that had once been densely settled and intensively cultivated began to revert 
to forest. The human population stabilised, recovered, and has recently grown 
quite rapidly. As a result, Mangarevans have begun to recolonise these areas of 
secondary forest and, in this process, have been rediscovering material evidence 
of former human occupation. This evidence has not only produced all sorts 
of curious entanglements with their own island’s history; it has also become 
the subject of contemporary political debate about property, civility, sociality 
and identity.
In Chapter 3, Edvard Hviding shows how the indigenous population of New 
Georgia in the Solomon Islands was actively involved in the production of what 
later observers wrongly thought to be ‘virgin’ forests during the period in 
which the population of Mangareva fell so dramatically. Like Mawyer, Hviding 
contrasts the environmental transformations of the nineteenth century with 
those of the recent past, but in the case of New Georgia, the ‘recolonisation’ has 
taken the form of large-scale industrial logging and forest clearance, followed 
by the establishment of commercial tree plantations. What is most interesting 
about this transformation is that it has not involved the dispossession of local 
landowners by foreign investors, but has been organised by an indigenous 
social movement known as the Christian Fellowship Church. The leaders of this 
movement have a quite distinctive understanding of the relationship between 
their religious beliefs, their economic policies, and their position in a ‘nation-
state’ that seems no more substantial than the ‘virginity’ of the native forests 
which they and their followers have removed from the local landscape.
In Chapters 4 and 5, Jamon Halvaksz and Jerry Jacka both examine the fate of 
the forest, or local people’s relationship with local forests, in parts of PNG where 
mining has been a prominent and even dominant commercial activity during 
the colonial and post-colonial periods.
In Chapter 4, Halvaksz shows how Biangai people living in the upper part of 
the Bulolo River catchment in Morobe Province have responded to changes in 
the relationship between the logging and mining industries over a period of 
almost 90 years. While people from other parts of PNG were attracted to this 
area by periodic booms in large- and small-scale gold production, the Biangai 
people retained a close relationship to the towering pine trees that line the 
ridges of their landscape, and obtained more in the way of an income from the 
large-scale cultivation of these species. Their involvement in the social relations 
of compensation from the logging industry has more recently informed their 




In Chapter 5, Jacka explores a somewhat different form of political ecology 
in the Porgera Valley in Enga Province, where mining has been the dominant 
commercial activity since gold was discovered by the Europeans who first 
contacted the Ipili people after World War II. The Ipili people themselves were 
quick to engage in small-scale mining activity, but their relationship to the local 
environment was profoundly transformed when a large-scale gold mine was 
developed in the 1990s and attracted a huge influx of people looking for a share 
of the economic opportunities it provided to local residents. Logging has never 
been a commercial activity in this area, but expansion of the mining industry 
has changed the way in which Ipili people make economic and cultural use 
of the diminishing amounts of different types of forest that have survived the 
process of industrial expansion and population growth.
In Chapter 6, Joshua Bell explores the entanglement of place, history and 
subjectivity in a very different part of PNG — the Purari Delta in Gulf Province. 
This is an area where the logging of native forests over the past two or three 
decades is part of a fractured history of efforts by outsiders to exploit a range 
of local resources, including cultural artefacts and human labour, since the area 
was first colonised in the 1880s. These experiences are central to local people’s 
understanding of the constellation of relations between humans and non-humans 
that collectively comprise the delta’s forests and waterways. Regional narratives 
of cultural loss and distant commodity abundance intersect with people’s 
struggle to gain access to ‘landowner benefits’, including jobs and royalties, 
while dealing with the periodic incursion of police mobile squads searching for 
marijuana, home-made guns and stolen chainsaws. Overt and covert forms of 
violence are thus entangled with local people’s perception of their connection 
with, or disconnection from, the nation-state and the wider world.
In Chapter 7, Paige West and Enock Kale review the history of one ‘integrated 
conservation and development project’ in the central highlands of PNG and 
show how it was unable to survive when some of the local villagers who were 
supposed to benefit from the ‘development’ component decided they preferred 
the prospect of large-scale mining or a petroleum project when this prospect 
began to materialise. While the apparent failure of this project can partly be 
explained by the reduction in funding from foreign sources, West and Kale 
argue that this and other similar conservation projects also failed because their 
neoliberal ‘business models’ placed them in the same game as their competitors 
in the business of ‘development’. In other words, they were doomed to fail by 
their insistence on treating local people as rational economic actors who value 
forests or biodiversity because of their market potential. Nevertheless, West and 
Kale find some source of comfort in the fact that this ‘business model’ coexisted 
with a program of education and training that produced more substantial and 
enduring benefits for other Papua New Guineans.
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The last three chapters deal with various aspects of the push to link forest 
conservation or forest management in PNG with international sources of finance 
for climate change mitigation by means of policies and projects that aim to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from the process of deforestation and forest 
degradation.
In Chapter 8, Colin Filer reviews the history of the one so-called REDD 
(Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) project that 
seems to have survived an international scandal about ‘carbon cowboys’ and a 
‘carbon cargo cult’ that caused acute embarrassment for the PNG government 
in 2009. The April Salumei REDD project in East Sepik Province was adopted 
as a ‘pilot project’ by the PNG Forest Authority because the government had 
already acquired the right to turn a large area of forest into a logging concession 
but was unable to exercise this right because it was impossible to make binding 
agreements with all the different groups of customary landowners in the area. 
Nevertheless, a coalition of national ‘stakeholders’ was able to agree that a REDD 
project was the next best option, partly because it would not entail any further 
disturbance to the forest, but also because the question of how to distribute 
project benefits to local villagers was one whose answer could be postponed for 
some time — perhaps indefinitely.
In Chapter 9, Michael Wood tells the story of another REDD project that 
failed to survive the international scandal, partly because it achieved greater 
notoriety than all the rest. This was the Kamula Doso project in Western 
Province. Wood  shows how the project proponent’s engagement with the 
nascent (or perhaps illusory) ‘national carbon economy’ through the creation of 
exuberant images and narratives was way in excess of any ‘rational’ strategy for 
the acquisition of marketable property rights in forest carbon or the creation of 
a viable forest carbon market. His chapter therefore highlights the contingent 
role of such representations in a new world of connections between capital and 
conservation.
In Chapter 10, Jennifer Gabriel switches our attention from specific areas of 
tropical forest that are subject to specific forms of conservation or exploitation 
to the one big multinational company that has dominated PNG’s logging 
industry for the past 25 years. She shows how Rimbunan Hijau has constructed 
an intricate web of power and meaning that aims to promote a corporate 
version of ‘sustainable forest management’ that can now be represented as an 
‘ethical market solution’ to the problem of climate change. If Crater Mountain 
represents the failure of one neoliberal business model in the business of forest 
management, companies like Rimbunan Hijau have another type of neoliberal 
business model that continues to exert a lot more influence at different levels of 
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2. Wildlands, Deserted Bays 
and Other Bushy Metaphors 
of Pacific Place
ALEXANDER MAWYER
It is not only in the modern imagination that forests cast their shadow of primeval 
antiquity; from the beginning they appeared to our ancestors as archaic, as 
antecedent to the human world (Harrison 1992: 1).
In French Polynesia’s Gambier Islands, contemporary Mangarevans have a 
disconcerting relationship with their islands’ imputable wilds and forested 
spaces. Traditionally and generically referred to as the vao, these nature spaces 
were radically altered by a series of transformative ecosocial projects undertaken 
by Catholic missionaries beginning in the 1830s. These islands concurrently 
experienced a massive depopulation in the following decades. As a result, many 
previously densely inhabited and cultivated bays, and the slopes upland from 
them on Mangareva and other islands in the Gambier archipelago, acquired a 
shaggy veneer in categories of local understanding as no-longer and not-quite 
domestic terrain. A century later, regional government-sponsored forestry 
efforts only enhanced and amplified the landscape’s transformation. If this is 
a pattern familiar in anthropological literature across the Pacific, it is nowhere 
more evident than in some of the Polynesian island groups of the eastern Pacific, 
where the demographic, social and cultural consequences of European contact 
were particularly stark (Dening 1988; Kirch and Rallu 2007). I suggest that the 
unfolding of this history at the intersection of these islands’ nature spaces and 
its legacy in various aspects of local experience and understanding has been 
a process of de- and fraught re-domestication that casts a peculiar shadow on 
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such ecosocial conceptions as ‘forest’ or ‘wilds’. This chapter thus contributes 
to the observation in the works collected here that the forest in Oceania is not 
only an object of contemporary resource management, exploitation and human 
processes playing out over the long timescales of slow-life trees and their mature 
ecosystems, but also a historically inflected site of cultural being, social identity 
and the politics of the everyday with dynamic features over time.
Although it is hoped that some points raised here may be relevant to 
considerations of the forest across the region, my focus is solidly centred in 
the French pays d’outre-mer of eastern Polynesia and particularly in their 
southernmost group, the Gambier Islands. French Polynesia is an aqueous 
quasi-autonomous French dependency in the south-eastern Pacific. Its territory 
comprises five island groups, each distinct by geography, language, culture and 
history. The Society Islands are the regional centre, comparatively favoured by 
land area and population. Most of the Society Islands are high and lush with 
large lagoons that separate their main islands from the barrier reefs that encircle 
them. The regional capital, Pape’ete, on Tahiti, is in the windward south-east of 
the group and is now home to the vast majority of the territory’s population, 
currently growing upwards of 270,000 (ISPF 2011). The Tuamotu Archipelago, 
previously called The Dangerous for its treacherous currents and submerged 
recifs, is the largest group by number of islands, nearly 80 atolls. Seen from 
the sky, these are circles of low coral islets on reefs that define large lagoons. 
The widely dispersed Austral Islands to the far south of the region are partly 
out of the tropics and famous for their artisanal productions and pre-contact 
ridgetop fortifications. Further to the north-east, and north of the Tuamotu, 
lie  the well-known Marquesas, made famous by Melville’s romantic tale of a 
sojourn in Taipivai Valley on Nuku Hiva and Gauguin’s fauvist escapism on 
Hiva Oa. These are high islands with sheer and rugged coastlines but without the 
coral reef structures found elsewhere in French Polynesia — sometimes argued 
to have encouraged a high degree of isolationism and inter-valley conflict. To the 
south-east of the Tuamotu are the Gambier Islands, once an articulated volcanic 
structure in ages past, now several island fragments of which Mangareva is the 
largest within a single large reef structure notable for numerous low coral islets 
at different points along the reef.
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Figure 2.1 The Gambier Islands.
Source: Anderson et al. (2003: 120).
The Gambier rise from the oceanic deeps 1,700 kilometres south-east of the 
Society Islands. They are eight high islands amounting to 27 square kilometres 
of land surface and numerous motu (sand islands) or islets encircling a 
90-kilometre barrier reef enclosing a vibrant coral lagoon. One notes that even 
such small islands as these have non-trivially varied micro-ecologies. Terrains 
including high grassed peaks, upland pine forests, complex traditional and 
neo-traditional downslope forests and highly varied near-shore house gardens 
and plantations. Motu on the fringing reef evidence well-established coconut 
plantations. Before  contact with Europeans, all the islands of the chain were 
densely occupied, as were the sandy barrier islands, relative to their limited 
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freshwater lens and the outlying atoll Temoe to the east of the group (Buck 1938; 
Laval 1938). Only the three islands of Aukena, Akamaru and Mangareva were 
inhabited between 1999 and 2009, the years between my first field visit and 
my last. Other islands in the group were home to a few families until the 1960s, 
while Aukena and Akamaru are home to only a few families today.
Today, however, the Gambier’s population is burgeoning and beginning to 
push back into these formally (un)inhabited spaces, yielding encounters 
that can be both surprising and disconcerting in their historical inflections 
as families — whether youthful or mature couples — clear land for the first 
time in many decades, or in a century. What are contemporary wilds can turn 
out to have been someone’s kaiga (domesticated lands) containing a house 
platform, boundary-marking sitting stone, or stonework structure of unknown 
utility. Apparent gnarly woods can also contain one or more charming French 
provincial quarried stone houses from the height of the Catholic instauration 
in the mid-nineteenth century, long abandoned and often forgotten, alongside 
stone ruins of earlier cultural complexes. Encounters with the material facts 
of historical displacements,  discontinuities and gaps, lead contemporary 
Mangarevan landowners to ponder uncanny questions of historic loss over 
several different periods.
Moreover, the signs and sediments of history (Douglas 2009; Jolly 2009) are 
not limited to the artefactual or the architectural. Plant cultures too, often 
literally beneath one’s feet should one walk along contemporary roads or into 
house gardens in any direction, or apperceived in the increasingly resplendent 
verdure of the quotidian, also reflect the struggles and counter-struggles of 
individuals in the receding past to make and remake the world-space of their 
home islands from the era of early European contacts, through the height of 
the colonial, and into the present through cultivation and gardening practices. 
This is visible not only in domestic landscapes surrounding today’s ’akairiga 
(cohabiting family) homes; the contemporary wilds are also woven with cultures 
of the past, floral as well as material.
For instance, here and there in splendid isolation across the now wooded and 
bushy spaces of the high islands, often near visible remains of past dwellings 
or other structures, one finds aged coffee stands, a raspberry tangle deep in 
woods, soaring breadfruits, small groves of mature lychee trees, or surprisingly 
durable wild orange trees among other more modest food plants from mangoes 
to starfruits to tamarinds, many now evidently entangled in their use-rights. 
When these signs of past domestication are found on the back (tua) side of 
Mangareva, or in the bays of the smaller islands in an archipelago tragically 
depopulated a century earlier, their presence can be more than striking. 
With  Douglas (2009) one notes that they offer enduring, hardy signs of the 
islands’ histories and perhaps counter-histories at the intersection of plant and 
2. Wildlands, Deserted Bays and Other Bushy Metaphors of Pacific Place
27
human cultures in the eastern Pacific. Individual fruit trees, berry tangles or a 
small stand of citrus or coffee in the midst of bush stand as silent sentinels of a 
prior social and ecological order.
Drawing on fieldwork in the Gambier since my own first arrival in these islands 
in 1999, when I participated in a land-clearing and restoration party organised 
by the Catholic Church on the then-uninhabited island of Akamaru, to working 
with two different households’ land clearing, planting and home-planning 
practices in the summer of 2009, I suggest that Mangarevan understandings 
of the relationship of de-domesticated terrains and lands, te vao (the wilds), 
to domestic spaces, punui (habitation centres, towns), is in a period of significant 
flux if not confusion. An ambiguous quality of the landscape reveals something 
about the character of contemporary social life and culture in the Gambier, the 
active roles of the past in the present, and implications for the consideration of 
forest and other ontological objectifications of nature in the eastern Pacific.
By way of foreshadowing this chapter’s subsequent sections, this work joins 
others that have articulated a profoundly warranted scepticism of the status of the 
category ‘nature’ across cultures and certainly in the eastern Pacific. As Descola 
(1996) and others have noted, critically in the Oceanic context by Hviding 
(1996, 2003), the broader concept of nature has a spectacularly overdetermined 
and thorny history in Western intellectual traditions in which some conceptions 
of nature are highly privileged, both universalised and, to hazard a low-hanging 
pun, naturalised (Collingwood 1945). Harrison (1992) alludes to this conceptual 
tangle in the epigraph above, observing the dualistic Western approach to 
forest as nonpareil stand-in for the category of nature in Western thought, the 
fundamental ontology of the forest as other-than-human, while simultaneously 
capturing the critical anthropological position that ontological categories of 
natural kinds are socially constructed as well as culturally construed. This is no 
less true in the Pacific where the concept of nature has a rich treatment in regional 
studies. Consider Smith’s (1985) classic unravelling of the representation and 
conventionalisation of nature and the natural in the age of early European Pacific 
encounters. Famously, he noted that early European encounters in the Pacific 
imposed the perspectival and representational frames of voyagers on islands 
while simultaneously contributing to the emergence of new Western romantic 
and scientific naturalisms (Smith 1985). Attention to Pacific literature suggests 
that individual authors, both scholarly and otherwise, have often bumped 
into the obscure and distorting character of putatively universal categories 
and characteristics of ‘nature’ because of the evident murkiness of their place 
or quality in historical encounters. Notably, such attention has not generally 
percolated down to more material scales nor yet penetrated academic works 
across disciplines often relying heavily on ontological concepts such as beach, 
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bay, lagoon or forest as natural categories in their sense-making about Oceania 
(Hviding 2003: 249). What, then, must be done to bring insular ecosocial kinds 
into critical awareness?
Ordering the Gambier
The kinds of forests dealt with … belong to several different orders 
(Harrison 1992: 107).
While there are many distinct spaces of nature, and certainly a number of different 
understandings of and sentiments about nature in the Gambier, in company with 
the other works in this volume I focus on the ecosocial and ecocultural category 
of forest (forêt) or tiarakau because of the particular entanglement of imputable 
forested spaces in a range of critical collective issues in contemporary life. 
For instance, even something as fundamental as what counts as forest now has 
an active role in social processes in which Mangarevans construct and negotiate 
the making of selves and others. At the same time, the evident significance of 
the ambiguity of the underlying question of the object itself — what is forest? 
— reminds one of the continuing need for critical appraisals of ‘nature’ in the 
Pacific. Is forest a natural kind, that is to say, an ontological real? Or is forest 
an unnatural kind, yet another cultural imposition distorting anthropological 
attempts to make sense of Pacific lives and histories in terms of the material facts 
of the floral environment in the lives of the women and men for whom these 
islands exist as an immemorial home? Is there any such thing as forest in the 
Gambier, many copses and collectivities of trees notwithstanding? What might 
otherwise forest-seeming places be if not forest?
The concept of ‘cultivated bay’ is one starting point for considering the place 
of forests in anthropological sense-making in some islands of the eastern Pacific 
where upland slopes have sometimes figured (in European representations) 
as virtual deserts or, if perceived as forested, as undomesticated wildlands.1 
One notes the privileged position of this ecosocial category as a way to frame 
the intersection of culture and nature in Pacific archaeology, anthropology and 
history, and as the calibrating model of social order and island emplacedness. 
In  the Mangarevan case, this is evident in Te Rangi Hiroa’s (Sir Peter Henry 
Buck’s) superlative Ethnology of Mangareva:
1  Alternatively, one might start with the concept of ‘beach’. Indeed, just as forest is the nonpareil stand-
in for ‘nature’ in Western ecosocial conception, so beach might be argued to be the nonpareil stand-in for 
island natures in much Pacific anthropology and history. That so much superlative work has been devoted 
to recognising and remaking the understanding of the beach as a site of social and cultural encounter from 
Malinowski (1984 [1922]) to Dening (1988) and beyond, as in Jolly et al. (2009), perhaps only underscores 
the need for further examination of its ontological status as a site of and in nature in its own terms, while 
highlighting the need for attention to other ‘natural’ spaces of the islands.
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The bay lands, desirable as sites for dwellings and beaching places for canoes 
and rafts, with the introduction of cultivable food plants became extremely 
valuable, for it was only in such alluvial ground that the breadfruit, coconut, 
and banana could thrive. Such land was limited in extent and became vastly 
desirable. The desire for its possession created innumerable struggles and, apart 
from blood feuds, the dominant motive among chiefs and warriors was to obtain 
a share of cultivable land to give them a richer food supply. The introduction of 
cultivable food plants raised the standard of living for those fortunate enough 
to acquire cultivable lands, while the wild plants of former days formed the 
complement (kinaki) to fish for the poor and the masses. The desire for better 
vegetable foods led fishermen to the economic pursuit of exchanging fish for 
preserved breadfruit. Cultivable foods, kaikai ’akariki (foods of kings or high 
chiefs), and wild foods, kaikai a te oge (foods of the hungry) became associated 
with the cleavage in social position between landowners or cultivators and the 
common people who were without cultivable land. (Buck 1938: 199)
On one hand, Buck offers nothing less than a penetrating anthropological model 
of the intersection of nature, culture and social order, well supported by the 
facts on the ground in numerous works from across Oceania. On the other hand, 
one might ask how does and does not ‘cultured bay’ map onto locally significant 
paradigms of human dwelling-in-place as the intersection of locally salient 
formulations of the spatial relation of nature and culture as gnati (bay, tribe), 
nuku (maternal lands) and kaiga (personal lands) in which the biosocial and 
the genealogical is mapped into the geophysical terrain that extends past the 
perceived-as-cultivated limits of bay spaces? How do such models as Buck’s 
ignore or displace the margins of both cultivated and evidently non-cultivated 
spaces, boundaries between ecosocial zones to which a category of forest in 
eastern Polynesia may in some ways belong? Are they ethnographic objects to 
which sufficient attention has been paid in their own terms?
The area of cultivable land was small in comparison with the size of the islands, 
and lands and their produce were held by the ruling families and landowners 
who had been rewarded for services rendered in war. A large number of the 
common people having no cultivable land at all were thus denied direct access to 
vegetable foods, such edible wild plants as grew on the promontories and hillsides 
beyond them was the sea, which they tilled assiduously. A large portion of the 
commoners depended for the necessities of life on fish, shellfish, crustaceans, 
and such edible wild plants as grew on the promontories and hillsides beyond 
the boundaries of the cultivable lands. (Buck 1938: 197)
Again using Buck as a stalking horse — with no intention of suggesting his 
work as anything other than exemplary of a standard model of the nature–
culture intersection from his anthropological era to the present — one might 
conclude that although wild land (including ‘forest’) is present in his model, 
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its presence is largely context for a foundational position on human mastery and 
dominion over the landscape, centred on cultivated bays and ocean spaces in 
contrast, if not opposition, to imputed island-interior wildlands.
The flora of Mangareva is disappointing. The steep slopes of the hills combined 
with the rocky soil are not conducive to luxurious growth. The scarcity of the 
flora is stressed by traditions that, when first peopled, the land was bare of trees 
from the beach to the foot of the hills, and that trees as well as cultivable food 
plants were introduced later by Tupa. (Buck 1938: 8)
While Buck addresses the situation and character of plant cultures early in his 
studies, his focal arguments rest on a native/introduced division of flora, and by 
the social relationships mapped onto distinctions in access to lands producing 
kaikai ’akariki, the chiefly foods cultivated in near-shore plantations owned by 
togo’iti elites in the pre-contact Gambier, as opposed to kaikai a te oge, six wild 
foods found on the upland and, from his point of view, non-domesticated spaces 
of these islands, normally only consumed by commoners.
Following the position established by Hau’ofa (1993) in other analytical 
domains, nature in the eastern Pacific perhaps seems meagre or too thoroughly 
domesticated and controlled, hence easily bracketed relative to continental 
chauvinism and the infelicitous baggage of Western intellectual traditions. 
For instance, that island spaces have diverse histories of use has been long 
evident in the anthropological literature. Yet a pervasive myth of the pristine 
hovers over many island spaces, a perverse legacy of the history of the Western 
romanticism of Pacific nature implying that domestication of the island ceased 
at some more or less arbitrary social boundary beyond which were wilds, and 
that many or all of these ecosocial spaces were fixed in extension or duration on 
the landscape.2 In fecund reality, Pacific landscapes and ecologies were and are 
highly varied and may too often have been conceived in reductionist terms, as 
in Buck’s categorisation of the Gambier’s vegetable biofacts (Table 2.1).
The presence of a floral chauvinism evident in the history of the interpolation 
of the Gambier into Western scholarship via Buck’s Mangarevan work is a case 
in point with his insistent focus on economic flora and human domestication. 
Notably, what makes some flora economic is nowhere defined. The utility of 
‘utility’ as an analytic is taken as a given. Foremost, it offers Buck the means 
to undergird his interpolation of Mangarevan forms of rule and sociopolitical 
identity into a comparative anthropology, ultimately by grounding the 
distinction between common and uncommon classes in society in large part 
in terms of their relations to land and its produce. Landowning cultivators 
are ragatira or togo’iti (Buck 1938: 200), social elites who are authorised and 
2  See also Hviding, Chapter 3, and Bell, Chapter 6, this volume.
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legitimate possessors of useful, economic plant cultures largely imported during 
settlement periods and long domesticated. Contrastively, ’urumanu (commoners) 
subsist on the fruits of the sea and what Buck labels kaikai a te oge, foods of the 
hungry, during lean times and good. Commoner engagements with, and use of, 
wildlands is relegated to an afterthought despite the evident significance of that 
part of the landscape in regularly supporting the many (Buck 1938: 215).
Table 2.1 Buck’s categorisation of the Gambier Islands’ vegetables.
Native plants
’ara: Pandanus sp. pokea: Portulaca lutea
gegie: Suriana maritime potini: an edible fern?
kokini tekeo: Tephrosia purpurea to’ira: Cyperus pennatus
koueriki: Terminalia koariki
Plants introduced by Polynesian settlement
’au: Hibiscus tiliaceus miro: Thespesia populea
ere’i: Cocos nucifera (coconut) nono: Morinda citrifolia
eute, pure: Broussonetia papyrifera (paper 
mulberry)
pia: Tacca pinnatifida (arrowroot)
rama: Aleurites oluccana (candlenut) gatae: Erythrina sp.
rautea: Ipomoea sp. kape: Alocasia macrorrhizos (taro)
rega: Curcuma longa (turmeric) katiru: Cucumis sp.
tamanu: Callophyllum inophyllum ke’ika: Eugenia malaccensis (mountain apple)
taro: Colocasia esculenta var. antiquorum ko’e: Schizostachym glaucifolium (bamboo)
ti: Cordyline terminalis to: Saccharum officinarum (sugar cane)
kumara: Ipomoea batatas (sweet potato) tumei, mei: Artocarpus incisa (breadfruit)
’uatu: Musa sp. (plantain) meika: Musa sp. (banana)
u’i: Dioscorea bulbifera (yam) konini kai (edible creeper, not collected)
aoa: Ficus umbilicata (banyan) kaka’o: Miscanthus japonicus (cane)
Source: Buck (1938: 9).
What might be thought of as forest as an ecosocial kind, in the normal sense of 
woodlands and wilds, a site for a certain kind of human encounter with nature 
in the Gambier, is thus in some sense defined out of existence despite the evident 
significance of wildlands to commoners (and togo’iti in lean times) after the 
early settlement period commencing with the arrival of the culture-hero Tupa, 
but before contact with European cultures. Lands are figured as either fully 
domesticated or fully wild (i.e., not economic, not playing a role in supporting 
social status). This is a characteristic dichotomy that I suggest deserves further 
examination across the eastern Pacific and Polynesia more broadly in classic 
works as well as more recent examinations of island ecologies.
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Reordering the Gambier
The story of the Catholic instauration in the Gambier, a putative theocracy 
that re-architected these islands from the foundations up, has been told and 
retold since the mid-nineteenth century (Delbos 2002). The basic outline of 
the European interpolation of the Gambier into the nineteenth-century world 
system and Catholic development of Mangarevan society and lands, prefiguring 
effects on nature, can be quickly summarised. Within years of the 1834 arrival 
of evangelical and evidently extraordinarily charismatic priests, including the 
infamous Péres Laval and Caret along with an Irish lay brother, Catholicism was 
embraced by one of the main chiefly parties of the era, and used to solidify and 
consolidate the rule (ao) of the archipelago in a period of significant tensions 
between different chiefly families as well as within the royal line of the ’akariki 
nui. This consolidation of power under the renewed paramount authority of the 
singular ’akariki Te Maputeoa was spectacularly good for the mission and, if too 
transiently, for Te Maputeoa. The new order resulted in imputed improvements 
to the material infrastructure of the islands as well as the establishment and 
regulation of authority over the numerous traders, merchants, beachcombers 
and pearl exploiters, who had been arriving in ever-greater numbers, year after 
year, since the 1820s.
Practically, for Europeans arriving in the Gambier in the mid-1840s, the 
instauration then still in progress seemed a Pacific miracle, as if a provincial 
French village had been transported to the eastern Pacific, about as far from a 
continental landmass as is possible on this terraqueous globe. The impressive 
list of architectural feats achieved over mere decades by the population probably 
does little to convey the experience of then contemporary arrivals. The 2,000-
seat cathedral in Rikitea, four other stone churches each capable of seating 
many hundreds, a two-storey, many-roomed college and seminary, the convent, 
prison, king’s tower, chapels, stone-paved roads, quays, numerous follies 
including massive triumphal arches, and over 50 massive hand-quarried, faced-
stone homes on a French provincial style, many of two storeys (Vallaux 1994).
The arrival of new food crops was, for Mangarevans at least, no less spectacular. 
Indeed, a key feature of the re-architecture of the islands was the establishment 
of new plantations, often in cultivation zones not previously used for what 
Europeans recognised as agriculture, the so-called wilds where kai oge or ono oge 
were harvested by ’urumanu. Parts of the island not previously domesticated, 
as the term might have been conceived by Buck, were transformed or, perhaps, 
re-domesticated. Simultaneously, and perversely, parts of the islands previously 
highly domesticated, gnati sites of settlement, were de-domesticated, moved out 
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of the category of punui village spaces into vao wilds or mataeina’a3 (agricultural 
spaces) as the demographic tragedy of the decades between the 1820s and 
1860s played out. These transformations contributed to, or played a role in, 
revaluations of ideas about domesticated and wild spaces in the archipelago.
With retrospective acuity, Delbos in his excellent La Mission du Bout du 
Monde: La Fantastique Aventure des Bâtisseurs de Cathédrales dans l’Archipel 
des Gambier (2002) argues that the Catholic spiritual instauration, the social 
and political reorganisation of the population, the implementation of the 
rule of law, and the stabilisation of the pearl trade were all a by-product of 
the architectural mission. It is as if the organisation of labour necessary to 
erect the edifice of the mission was self-fulfilling in realising the mission as a 
reordering of the social relations of the tribal groups along Western lines. Ati, as 
labouring units, no longer were to be conceived as established or grounded 
by their ritual and practical connection to specific kaiga and the breadfruit 
groves and storage pits ritually maintained therein, but by their orientation to 
and material maintenance of particular church structures in particular districts, 
including new plantations. Importantly, the massive cathedral was conceived 
and achieved as a collective labour by competitive work groups drawn from 
across the ati. The re-architecting of the legal realm operated to support and 
bolster the reorganisation of the social realm around labour rather than around 
kin relations within ati and shared connections to breadfruit groves and specific 
terrains, named and collectively utilised and literally incorporated into/as 
descent groups. Importantly, the reordering privileged more varied personal 
or individuated gardening around homesteads (’are ’akairiga) as well as greatly 
expanded cultivation.
The more the mission built, the more it required the fabric of Mangarevan 
culture, society and land to shape itself to the building of the mission, and 
the more the mission could build.4 The more it cultivated, the more it could 
cultivate — culminating in the establishment of orange groves, a significant 
raspberry plantation and widespread coffee plantations, among other wildly 
new cultivars. Within years of its instauration, Mangareva was widely discussed 
in a number of maritime and Catholic and mission journals and papers, especially 
3  Modern, borrowed from Tahitian.
4  There were many forms of spatial transformation parallel to the translation of previously vao spaces 
into newly ‘domestic’ plantations. For instance, the chief’s dwelling was reconstructed as a king’s tower and 
palace (conserving the structures of power within the same line of descent while transforming the tokens and 
conceptions of that power along European lines), the traditional circum-island ara was cobbled and converted 
into the Ara Nui (privileging island traffic along a mua/roto axis as never before) and part of the terrain of and 
below the royal nurseries Te One was converted into the convent Rouru (maintaining while transforming the 
gender and sanctity of the land).
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after d’Urville’s visit, and praised for the rapidity and totality of the mission’s 
achievements — compare Goyau’s (1928) summary of the vast and varied 
nineteenth-century commentary.
Delbos (2002) draws attention to the process by which Mangareva, a ‘New 
Paraguay’ as it was seen by visiting dignitaries beginning with d’Urville, 
Moerenhout and others not a decade after the commencement of the mission, was 
effected because of the curious dovetailing of the architectural and engineering 
skills, presumably coincident to their spiritual talents, possessed by several of 
the key figures of the early mission. The mechanics of the transition from a stone-
age society to a model Catholic community, he argues, were concretely achieved 
as architectural project. Mangareva became, as he puts it, a land of bâtisseurs 
(builders). This may well have been the case, but I note it was also becoming a 
land of jardiniers (gardeners) — compare Laval (1968) for numerous anecdotes 
regarding the influence of introduced cultivars on the overall success of the 
mission. Thus the westernisation of the islands was also a re-domestication, a 
process of reordering nature in culture that was characteristically individuated 
(non-collectivist), democratised (the disestablishment of chiefly privileges 
over kai ’akariki alongside the vast expansion of available cultivars), and an 
expansion of domestic lands and subsequent if temporary diminishment of the 
wilds. Initially vao spaces became domestic plantations for new foodstuffs that 
greatly expanded and enhanced the kinds and numbers of domestic groves on 
the island even as traditional socially foundational near-shore breadfruit groves 
receded in significance and collective utility and were eventually abandoned.
But the autopoietic success of the mission as a total reinstitution of Gambier 
society was not without its dark irony. Even before the beginning of the 
instauration, and continuing throughout the entire middle of the nineteenth 
century, the Mangarevan population declined dramatically. By the time the 
last bricks were being installed at the tops of the cathedral and church towers, 
the keystones placed, the arches erected, the new plantations of coffee and 
raspberry and orange established, there were scarcely persons enough to fill 
one of the four churches, much less the cathedral (Vallaux 1994; Kirch and 
Rallu 2007). Meanwhile, commercial interests on the island, centred on the 
pearl and reprovisioning trades for passing navigation, began to chafe under 
the impositions of the Code Mangarévien — essentially a Western legal support 
to the total architectural institution of the mission which sought among other 
things to co-opt labour for the slightest material or spiritual transgression. 
Ultimately, and almost simultaneously, the mission project and the chiefly ao 
(rule) of the Gambier collapsed under the tensions of the demographic tragedy. 
New wilds grew up and subsumed all of these works, architectural or vegetable, 
engendering new forms of ecosocial space. Lands only just (re)domesticated over 
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the previous decades now returned to, or became, wilds or vao. What might 
have seemed an expansion of wildlands appears a process of de-domestication of 
previously thoroughly human spaces.
Wildlands and Forests
During the early middle ages the northern forests of Europe were vast, stretching 
across the continent like domes of darkness and the indifference of time. 
Interspersed throughout them were smaller or larger settlements lost in the 
shadows of antiquity’s decline. With respect to the medieval social order that 
was reorganizing itself on the basis of new feudal and religious institutions, the 
forests were foris, ‘outside’. (Harrison 1992: 61)
The extensive anthropological literature on culture and ecology in the Pacific 
has generated a number of enduringly potent arguments. Yet, a centring 
glimpse forward and back from exemplary mid-century texts such as Goldman 
(1955,  1957, 1958) or Sahlins (1958) suggests that external commentators 
have privileged the adaptive, ecologically canny, masterful character of the 
human–ecological interface on many remote Pacific islands with respect to the 
role of ecology in political and social organisation, particularly complexity 
and stratification. Professional and amateur observers alike have often been 
profoundly influenced by and made much of such claims along the lines of ‘look 
what they have done with so little’ from the age of early contacts with European 
voyagers, through the ecological turn in mid-century Pacific anthropology, 
and certainly such perspectives are shot through contemporary archaeological 
framings of the region. Moreover, such a perspective is often imbued in works, 
including by the same authors (cf. Kirch and Sahlins 1994), that considered 
the sociocultural and political transformations engendered by the sandalwood 
rush in the eastern and central Pacific in the early nineteenth century, the first 
post-contact era inter-island interpolation of Pacific forests into global trade, as 
exemplary of human dominion over island natures.
Certainly this position has its attractions. Who would not thrill to the story of 
the (pre/post) Lapita conquest of ocean and its lands and seaways (Kirch 1989, 
2002)? But it may also be a remarkably enduring form of romanticism, a framing 
narrative that directs the kinds of questions we ask of others, of our field data, 
of our works. As has now been thoroughly discussed, Western scholars of 
others’ cultures project our fundamental ontological categories of nature space 
at significant analytical risk (Descola 1996; Selin 2003; Lotz 2005; Escobar 2008). 
Broadly circulating invocations of nature as where man is not or where culture 
is not and of island spaces aside from ‘cultured bays’ as wildlands, abcultural 
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or boundary-cultural spaces useful only for purposes of resource extraction 
of famine (undomesticated) foodstuffs and certain material resources, place 
anthropological analysis at particular risk.
In conversation with this literature — importantly Hviding (1996: 170), who 
notes that a wild/tame analytical pair can be enhanced by a sensitivity to 
degrees of domestication — this chapter has been drawing attention to the 
analytical utility of locally diverging notions of used and unused, inhabited and 
uninhabited, cultivated and uncultivated spaces, significant in the fashioning 
of place and person, as a potential amelioration of the ontological challenge 
of mediating ‘nature’ and ‘forest’ in anthropological sense-making. In the 
Gambier, the paired terms punui and vao, domestic space and wilds, offer a 
meaningful distinction that can perhaps serve to tease out a meaningful sense of 
forest among other contemporary vao spaces. The relevance of this pair is that 
it can be evaluated in terms of a domesticated–undomesticated distinction with 
an imputable pan- or meta-cultural interpretability. Acknowledging that the 
presence of humans on the landscape (or seascape) fundamentally disestablishes 
claims that nature, or forest for that matter, is where man is not (Vogel 1996; 
Hull 2006), I note that domestication offers a gradient, non-absolute, conceptual 
framework for making sense of nature’s spaces in and across cultures. In essence 
a process, not a static state, as an analytical framework, domestication reflects 
the reality of biological and human cycles in time.
In the Gambier, contemporary Mangarevan understandings of the relation 
between highly charged social spaces and equally charged absocial island 
spaces are categorised in the punui/vao pair. The category of punui is relatively 
unproblematic: (1) a village, a town; the chief settlement or capital (Tregear 
1899) or n. ville, village; endroit principal d’un pays (Rensch 1991). The word vao, 
however, is somewhat more nuanced: (1) uninhabited lands; lands unplanted 
and uncultivated, (2) a plain; open country without trees, (3) relationship; 
family (Tregear 1899).5 Or, in Rensch’s (1991) French/Mangarevan dictionary: 
Vao n. champ, endroit; terre non habitée et non plantée; clan, tribu. Intriguingly, 
punui does not appear to contain a semantic field relation to the concept of 
consubstantial sociality or group membership, while the category of vao does. 
In this sense the semantic pair for vao is ati/gnati — a Mangarevan synonym 
that means at once ‘bay and people’.
Here is the rub. How can both domesticated space and undomesticated space 
overlap with semantic conceptualisations of a human group, an ‘us’? How does 
this semantic inconsistency complicate such nature–society divisions as evident 
in Buck’s model above? The possibility that vao society was constituted by ati 
5  Vao ke, not to be of the same race or family (Tregear 1899).
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disposed of desirable domesticated baylands and forced only to live on kai oge, 
meagre wild foods, is specifically excluded in all ethnographic accounts of the 
archipelago, including those by Buck. The answer, I learned from a number of 
senior Mangarevans, is still very much in memory and, somewhat, in practice. 
Traditionally, vao would not be used to refer to one’s own group or to the groups 
of others in polite conversation. Vao space is ‘other space’, both in the sense of 
Buck’s putatively undomesticated wild and in the sense of other people’s lands 
to whose domestic fruits one is not entitled. Wildlands call into mind, from the 
perspective of some discursive context in which questions of personhood and 
collective belonging is at question, wild others. One’s own group is always and 
only one’s ati (gnati).
That Mangarevans’ notions of domesticated/undomesticated lands were 
also mapped onto differences between human groups is highly consistent 
with Hviding’s argument that a lack of cognitive dichotomy between the 
human/non-human characterises Oceanic views of ‘nature’ (2003: 259) and is 
ethnographically comparable to the Morovo case, in other ways culturally quite 
distinct, among whom the notion of puava (territory) ‘does not constitute a 
distinct realm of “nature”’ (1996: 170) vis-à-vis notions of collective identity, 
group membership or being butubutu (gens).
When I asked a group of friends in the summer of 2009, senior fixtures in 
Mangarevan society, e aha te makararaga o te ’u teito o te vao? — what are 
the thoughts of the ancestors about the vao? — two very different comments 
emerged over the course of an interesting conversation. First, as one man put 
it, a tau ara (at that time) Mangarevans ‘lived so close to nature, there was no 
difference’.6 He explained that a group somehow equates to its vao, its place 
in nature; a sense that the people of the past were in such a relation to their 
lands as to be categorically themselves others, in effect not his people. This 
is an extraordinary claim, I believe, one that is highly revelatory about his 
sense of contemporary practices and relations to the landscape as alienated 
from some imagined more authentic connection with lands now somehow 
displaced. Other participants pointed to another sense. As another man put it, 
‘crossing lines is dangerous’, e tinai ona; one can be struck and killed, further 
highlighting the implied distance — in time, space, social relation — between 
the honoured tupuna (ancestors) and their contemporary inheritors. Vao spaces 
were a metaphorical line between the culture of one’s own people and the 
dangerous other, whether human or natural or divine.
6  Note that my informant used ‘they’, not ‘we’, as he often did when speaking of tupuna ancestors.
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Displaced Natures
If it is true that the post-Christian era detaches itself from the past, frees itself 
to some extent from the inertia of tradition, ‘comes of age’ under the auspices of 
reason, it is also true that it experiences its freedom as a deprivation as well as a 
gain. Early in the last chapter we saw how freedom from the past implied freedom 
for an enlightened future. The countercurrent of Enlightenment’s drive to inherit 
the future is nostalgia. As the ancestors fall silent in their graves; as the age-old 
traditions and landscapes of the past recede into vanishing horizons; and as the 
sense of historical detachment begins to doubts its original optimism — nostalgia 
becomes an irrevocable emotion of the post-Christian era. (Harrison 1992: 155)
Long before the mantle of the nuclear age was draped — in French red, white 
and blue — over the Gambier in the 1960s, with various sorts of fallout once 
again altering the local understanding of social–human spaces and wild–
natural–dangerous spaces in the Gambier, these islands were already sacrificed 
with other east Polynesian archipelagoes on the altar of history. Ship-to-shore 
vectored diseases, the transformation of social organisation during the Catholic 
instauration and increased mortality from commercial pearl diving all bespeak 
a nearly unimaginable human tragedy. But even in the absence of a concrete 
accounting of demographic casualty, we can be quite certain that the population 
saw a 40-year decline beginning in the mid-1820s, when a difficult to estimate 
population would have been reduced by more than 60 per cent and perhaps 
greater than 90 per cent (Kirch 2007; Kirch and Rallu 2007). Careful records of 
Mangarevan births and deaths were instituted in the heyday of the mission and 
record the population decline in great detail until the 1870s, after which the 
population largely stabilised. For instance, a population of approximately 1,500 
in 1863 had become 446 by 1881, and one notes there had already been several 
major epidemics before 1863, including one prior to 1834 which may have killed 
half the population at that time (Laval 1968). Also, it is not clear in the missionary 
census records — the chief source of pre-1881 demographic information — 
whether Rapa Nui and other Polynesians who at various post-contact periods 
constituted a significant portion of Gambier society were ever enumerated, 
although European, Chinese, Demi and non-Polynesians generally were.7
By the 1860s, about 500 persons still lived in the archipelago, some of whom 
had started life elsewhere in the eastern Pacific. Notably, this remained the 
stable population point until the 1980s, when the total number of inhabitants 
began to increase. At times, chatting with friends and other informants, it 
7  Thus, while empirical, the question of whether the numbers in the early records indicate the actual 
Mangarevan population or all ‘native’ Polynesians remains intractable. If the recorded population figure 
includes all Polynesians living on the island, the specifically Mangarevan population must have been very 
small indeed.
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seemed my fieldwork in a period of rapid demographic expansion was a post-
apocalyptic anthropology, as the visual, auditory and even tactile trace of a 
past that had somehow not become the present regularly confronted me, so 
many memento mori in the words of informants, particularly when working 
with folks to clear a plot of forest for a house site, garden, old roadway, lands 
around one of the useless beautiful stone churches, or for aesthetic purposes. 
One might well say that contemporary Mangarevans, like their cousins on Rapa 
Nui and in the Marquesas, are uncertain descendants of survivors of the end 
of a world and at times in everyday conversations they seem conscious of it, 
and no more than when confronted in the bushy landscape by the architectural 
ruins of the Catholic mission alongside even more ancient stone ruins of the 
pre-Christian era(s).
Indeed, by the time the French nuclear test establishment, the Centre 
Experimental du Pacifique, established a large footprint in the Gambier in 
the mid-1960s, identified by Mangarevans as a critical watershed in their 
relationships to their island’s ecospaces, the hand-cut stone pavements of the 
cross-island roads were showing immense neglect, few families lived outside the 
two punui previously constituted as competing high chiefdoms but consolidated 
after European arrival, and many people were already living exclusively in 
Rikitea. The watershed was much earlier, however. At some point after 1920, 
the traditional corporate descent groups called ati, which served as the primary 
frame of social organisation, finally dissolved into a small number of closely 
related families — today, a proverbial witticism suggests there may be only 
three. By the 1920s, dusk had settled on the marvels of the Catholic instauration 
that had earned the Gambier international fame in the mid-nineteenth century, 
the abbey finally emptied, the college abandoned, and the draughty and ageing 
stone houses left for newer ‘plantation’ style wooden houses. These houses 
were in turn abandoned in the last decades of the twentieth century for more 
contemporary concrete structures, although two or three of the dilapidated 
wood structures can still be seen, including the mothballed childhood home of 
the French Polynesian president Gaston Flosse.
One result has been that Mangarevan understandings of the relationship 
of non-domesticated space and lands, te vao, to domestic spaces and human 
places, te punui, have changed. For much of the past two centuries, many of this 
archipelago’s spaces have increasingly been perceived as ‘brousse’, ‘scrub’, ‘bush’ 
or ‘forest’. This process peaked when the establishment of the French nuclear test 
regime in the nearby atolls Mururoa8 and Fangataufa in the 1960s saw the end 
of any remaining intensive plantation agriculture along the de-peopled coasts. 
Concurrently, the population was reconcentrated in a single village adjacent 
8  Also, sometimes, Moruroa Atoll.
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to a hastily erected nuclear fallout shelter after fallout events in 1966, results 
of France’s Pacific nuclear establishments (CESCEN 2006). At  the same time, 
many of the previously densely inhabited and cultivated bays, and the slopes 
upland from them on Mangareva and across the archipelago, were subjected 
to an intensive and dramatically efficacious forestation project promoted and 
partially implemented by the regional administration’s Service de l’Agriculture 
(Vallaux 1994: 127). In less than four decades, as visible in Figures 2.2 to 2.6, the 
long unfolding de-domestication of a substantial portion of the archipelago was 
finally consummated by a forestry project that seeded many of the upper slopes 
of the islands with successfully invasive pines, and sometimes more colourful 
Albizia lebbeck and Albizia falcata, greatly decreasing the ease of travel between 
bays or across the spine of the mountainous ridgeline and literally obscuring the 
face of the land.
Figure 2.2 Scene of near-shore cultivated bay lands on Mangareva at the 
time of d’Urville’s visit to the Gambier, by Louis Le Breton, 1842. The rich, 
readily recognisable near-shore domestic plantations contrast with the dry, 
low-coverage upland slopes on all the higher islands of the Gambier at 
that time.
Source: Plate no. 42 in the Atlas Pittoresque of J. Dumont d’Urville’s Voyage au pole sud et dans l’Oceanie 
sur les corvettes l’Astrolabe et la Zelee.
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Figure 2.3 Mount Duff, Mangareva Island, early twentieth century. 
The village Rikitea in the great bay is just out of site on the right. One notes 
the near-absence of trees, commented upon by both Buck (1938) and his 
Bishop Museum colleague Kenneth Emory, and an important context to 
Buck’s discussion of Mangareva’s ecology.
Source: Photo by Te Rangi Hiroa (Sir Peter Henry Buck). From New Zealand Electronic Text Collection 
under a Creative Commons licence, nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/BucViki-fig-BucViki_P017a.html.
Figure 2.4 Mount Duff with Rikitea village and bay in foreground, just after 
mid-century yet prior to the massive forestry work of the territorial Service 
de l’Agriculture.
Source: Photo by Roger Curtis Green, 1960. From DigitalNZ archive under a share licence, www.digitalnz.org/
records/32431161?search[page]=3&search[text]=mangareva.
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Figure 2.5 While near-shore cultivated gardens and bays retain a traditional 
verdure, Mount Duff and downslope plateaus are now heavily forested, 
largely as a result of the regional agricultural forestry service’s efforts.
Source: Photo by Alexander Mawyer, 2002.
Figure 2.6 While the vertical face of Taraetukura (Mount Duff, Figure 2.5) 
evidences a significant shift towards coverage, the island’s spine and 
downslope ridgeline from Mount Duff’s peak, running north-east, are now 
remarkably forested and the change is striking relative to any point earlier 
in the twentieth century.
Source: Photo by Alexander Mawyer, 2003.
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Now the Gambier’s population is burgeoning — 1,337 as of 2007 (ISPF 2011) — 
and families are beginning to push back into the de-domesticated (previously 
cultivated) bays, producing all sorts of curious entanglements with history, 
since the contemporary ‘bush’ turns out previously to have been someone’s 
house platform, imputed marae or papa sitting stone or backyard. Sometimes it 
turns out that the bush is covering up one or more charming French provincial 
quarried stone houses from the height of the Catholic instauration between 
1834 and the 1870s, long abandoned and generally forgotten, leading the 
contemporary Mangarevan landowners to ponder questions of historic loss 
over several different periods — not only the loss of tradition but of modernity 
around 1850, which somehow did not last and was absorbed into vao space. Such 
layerings of historical complexes are not restricted to the architectural. The old 
coffee plantations and the most incredible raspberry plantation on the back 
of Mount Duff similarly reverted to a historically murky bush quality, as did 
the remaining orange trees isolated across the archipelago and closely observed 
in their use-rights. Together, these all reveal a quality of Tsingian weediness 
(Tsing 2005)9 in which these wooded terrains have become not only physically 
bushy, but also conceptually murky, socially fraught and affectively tangled.
In consequence of these histories, the ecosocial setting of the Gambier Islands, 
the relations between the places of the past and wild spaces, nature spaces, forest 
and bush, is not now easily disentangled. This tangled, weedy quality of the 
local understandings of the normative relations between Mangarevans and their 
islands’ non-domesticated spaces became more visible in the years between 1999 
and 2009, which were remarkable for the emergence of a new wave of highly 
domestic labour organised at the level of the ’akairiga (the household family), 
which began during these years to take back the vao, the de-domesticated 
spaces of the islands abandoned over the past 150 years and notable for the 
overgrown ruins of the Catholic instauration and the all but impassable tropical 
gnarl that surrounded them. Land-clearing work parties in which I participated 
on four islands — with individual families, ’akairiga, within groups of families 
claiming descent from the same ati, and with church groups representing the 
whole community — in 1999, 2002–03 and 2009 may have differed in the 
kinds of terrain from shore plots, to bay interiors and upland plateaus, and 
different historical distances from last moment of former habitation, but all 
shared a characteristic sort of conversation. Discussions of these de-built and 
de-cultivated spaces frequently and tangibly produce anxiety in many speakers 
at many ages of life, centred on the question of what the facts of de-domestication 
and wilding of previously domesticated lands imply for their own Mangarevan 
9  ‘Weeds have been of little interest to conservationists; we think of them only as indicators of disturbance’ 
(Tsing 2005: 174).
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identity and what might be called the descent-of-belonging or the inheritance 
of us-ness in conjunction with the, now generally, legal establishment of title to 
lands and the use of their resources.
Thus many folk in the Gambier today, old and young, have a complex 
relationship with the different sorts of island spaces common sense tells me 
to see as now-established forest with which they must engage in order to craft 
new homes on old lands. The issue, as differently positioned persons seemed 
to experience it, was thus the way that de-domestication seemed to erase or, at 
least, damage the descent through time of linkages to the past and its peoples 
— particularly their quality of true or authentic tika, Mangarevan-ness, with 
the unsettling implication that contemporary persons are vao ke, that is, social 
others. Again and again I have heard such questions posed: What should be 
understood of the decaying coffee plantations running up the ridges in the backs 
of the inhabited valleys of the main towns, the punui? What of the former church 
raspberry plantation, today difficult to reach, and free to all for the price of the 
effort to reach it, on the back of the island, i tua? What of the remaining orange 
trees, signs of futurity past here and there, each priceless? The ‘ownership’ of 
coconut groves, no longer cultivated? The few, modestly economised lychee? 
The actual vao rakau, wild, tangled, imposing? What is the place or role of the 
wild spaces in everyday life in the local conceptualisation of being-an-us, being 
Mangarevan? To whom do useful trees (coffee and orange, breadfruit, hau and 
miro) belong? To whom belong the forest-enclosed cultivars such as raspberry, 
signs of past domestications, from an era of collective possession and collective 
use? To whom belong those material things, legacies of past domestications, by 
forest obscured?
As in Harrison’s epigraph at the start of this section, there was a historical 
collapse in the Gambier. But not of traditional Polynesian culture or society as 
Diamond (2005) would have it, and certainly not of Mangarevan culture of the 
longue durée. Rather, what collapsed was the post-contact colonial–theocratic 
order(ing) of things. Stone houses collapsed into ruins. Ancestors became others, 
plantations became plants, the vao became wilderness.
Other People’s Kaiga
It is hard for us to imagine, several millennia later, how the return of the forests 
was experienced as a cataclysm by many of our stone-age ancestors [after the last 
ice age] (Harrison 1992: 197).
Everyday life in the Gambier rests on a fabric of labour in the various sites, 
commercial and domestic, sacred and civic, terrestrial and maritime, that make 
up the manifest of human practices in these islands — this is the kernel of 
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the long-enduring sense of domestication in its anthropological interpolation, 
that the human is a technologist, a reworker and remaker of an unruly nature, 
a pacifier of the world as given. We dwell in worlds of our own modification 
as Homo domesticans. Sociality can be loosely characterised as a function of 
work layered over a patina of private familial activities and occasional, generally 
predictable, civic activities annually centred around the summer cultural festival 
Te Tiurai.10 So much for the thrum and throb of everyday life, social relations 
coalescing out of institutions of encounter and engagement in these various 
sites. Underneath all of this activity, Mandeville’s buzzing hive, rests kinship, 
land and the social relationships affirming or denying shared rights to its use, 
particularly the use of its plant resources, the literal fruits of the land.
That land is politics is a banality that hardly requires comment. Since the 
unfolding of the rule of Western law beginning during the nineteenth-century 
administration of the Mangarevan kingdom (Code Mangarévien 1870), French 
land law was increasingly imposed on the Gambier. But the legacy of pre-
contact and nineteenth-century land tenures, informal understandings between 
individuals and the church about rights to lands and their products, and the 
changing biofacts of the island’s ‘natural’ spaces have resulted in a murky 
situation bearing on the practical dimension of the domestic–undomesticated 
distinction, the use of lands and the vegetable resources found on them.11 
The slippage between these two land tenure systems offers another perspective 
on undomesticated space. Nature’s spaces, the contemporary wilds, are as 
contested now as they were in the centuries before contact with Europeans vastly 
expanded the variety and kinds of domestic foodstuffs available for cultivation 
in the Gambier, while coincidentally leading to the depeopling, deculturation 
and de-domestication of many of the archipelago’s bays. In  contemporary 
moments of everyday heightened significance, land disputes and land clearing, 
and construction and development, lead to personal and often intimate 
reflections on Mangarevan society, its generational and genealogical cohorts, 
and the meaning of the past in the present. The fallout is that kith and kin, to 
say nothing of neighbours almost inevitably more or less related (contemporary 
proximity predictably indicates past, if not present, kinship affinity), are 
10  Te Tiurai (July) is preferred here to Te Heiva, which has specifically Tahitian overtones, locally 
problematic in the politics of inter-island personhood.
11  In principle, today a finite number of regional and national statutes govern land ownership and rights 
of use, property and propriety with respect to the lands of others. In practice, the situation is complicated 
and can be confounding. For instance, among other factors, the cultural order bearing on names of lands 
and names of persons may be more important to individuals thinking about the meaning of land and their 
rights to the products of the land. As a judge on Mangareva in 2002 as part of a multiyear process of settling 
title on Gambier lands affirmed, it is by no means certain that even the latest statutes which in theory have 
modernised the registration of property in French Polynesia will be resolvable by the courts within the time 
frame of five to ten years as anticipated by the Territorial Assembly. ‘Perhaps’, he wondered, ‘thirty years will 
not be enough.’ Until then, land tenure and the politics of the everyday that revolve around it will remain, he 
suggested, entangled in the legacy of multiple understandings, codes and practices.
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caught in a web of increasingly fraught relations as shared connections to 
nuku, ‘maternal lands’, are transformed, as the land itself is being transformed 
by increasingly successful legal regimes into kaiga — mere ‘land’ in a legal 
sense. Such transformation further heightens for contemporary cultivators and 
domesticators their sense of a disconcertingly uncertain relation to legitimate 
inheritance or descent.
Conclusion
In response to the concept of forest in Oceania, this chapter suggests that at 
least part of the significance of this category can be its role in contributing to 
a critical reappraisal of nature spaces at the intersection of local and extra-local 
understandings of self and other, past and present, in the contemporary Pacific. 
As Hull (2006) notes in his intriguing Infinite Nature, there are myriad ways 
that people can relate to nature. The category of forest, forêt, tiarakau, is but 
one, as is vao, and attention to such categories does more than articulate how 
it is that nature is socially constructed, but offers a lens onto human practical 
relationships (themselves domesticated and undomesticated) with their lands 
and personhood.
Aside from its role in framing a dark romanticism in European literature and art 
(à la Melville or Gauguin), the forest in eastern Polynesia has been something 
of a categorical nullity. I suggest that this is surprising given the established 
importance of the early nineteenth-century sandalwood trade on some of this 
region’s islands in establishing early structural conditions upon which many 
later social and political developments rested. Meanwhile, across archipelagoes 
of this region such as the Gambier, the critical ecosocial role played by breadfruit 
groves and the surrounding highly domesticated seaward lands prior to contact 
with European cultures appear rarely to have been perceived or anthropologically 
interpolated as forested in favour of conceptions of domesticated plantations 
for ‘economic’ trees and wildlands for all other ecosocial spaces in the islands. 
Uplands were seen as more or less undomesticated wilds of last resort, non-
economic, regardless of whether they were wooded or not.
This chapter suggests that the categories undergirding the process of sense-
making of nature spaces in these island contexts (both local and extra-local) have 
gotten bushy, or weedy in one of Tsing’s (2005) senses. The changing biofacts 
of nature in the Gambier Islands have not merely resulted in the obscuring 
of the land under a patchwork of verdant weediness due to depopulation, 
de-domestication and late-twentieth-century new forestry projects, they have 
also resulted in an obscuring of locally salient intimate understandings of selves 
and others. The character of relatively non-domesticated forest as natural in 
the Western conceptual sense as a place where man is not is ultimately suspect 
2. Wildlands, Deserted Bays and Other Bushy Metaphors of Pacific Place
47
in the Gambier, as it is perhaps elsewhere in the Pacific (if not everywhere 
humans have dwelt over the tumbling millennia). Significantly, local cultural 
understandings of nature spaces draw meaningful distinctions between kinds 
of domains with significant implications for human sentiment, practice and 
experience along domestic–wild categories.
That the concept of forest poses an ontological question in the Pacific is, as 
I think all of the pieces in this volume demonstrate, well established. That the 
fact of the forest poses a practical problem, or a matrix of issues, challenges 
and contestations, also seems evident. Like many readers across disciplines, 
I have been influenced by Harrison’s (1992) superb reflection on the unfolding 
character of the forest for actual human populations and experience in European 
history, both for its particularity and applicability to the encounter with the 
foris, the outside, the verdant wilds, elsewhere and elsewhen. I argue that a 
central, and as elsewhere in the eastern Pacific too little discussed, aspect of 
the experience of the Gambier Islands since cultural contact with Europeans 
from the early nineteenth century has been a transformative process of de- and 
re-domestication. I propose that attention to the cyclical, dynamic character 
of this model of Pacific nature, including Pacific forests, can contribute to 
the disestablishment of too-narrow linear narratives of island development 
both before and after contact. Since that period, the process of the de- and 
re-domestication of the Gambier has been experienced in dimensions eminently 
symbolic, requiring conceptual adjustments as well as pragmatic responses.
The use of fruiting trees, bushes and vines, the sense of their place in the 
landscape, or their present use and rights thereto, even where they are and 
what they mean, is today erupting into everyday conversations and practices 
and informing varying intense encounters in the micropolitics of intra-island 
society. Discussion of the meaning of such de-built and de-cultivated spaces 
hinge everyday conversations to politically heightened issues of civility, sociality 
and Mangarevan identity. The Mangarevan word for forest, tiarakau, points 
more or less to land planted with trees, with an emphasis on agency, utilisation, 
use-value and other degrees of domestication somewhat at odds with core 
features of the category ‘forest’ in Western and, I think, much anthropological 
conception. In this chapter, I have drawn attention to the social significance of 
what otherwise might appear to be forest in the Gambier as vao, an outside that 
is in structural tension with the inside, the Mangarevan ‘we’, both practically as 
a matter of land-use and property rights, and conceptually in the way in which 
a sense of self undergirds collective existence put at stake. In this part of the 
Pacific, as perhaps elsewhere in the region, the enduring absence of a categorical 
or conceptual dichotomy between lands and persons, as metonymical between 
nature and culture, yields a characteristic form to this problem. What is the vao 
now? Are our spaces our own? Are we who we thought we are when our woods 
are wildlands?
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3. Non-Pristine Forests: A Long-Term 
History of Land Transformation in the 
Western Solomons1
EDVARD HVIDING
Forests of New Georgia: Understanding 
the Long Run
The rainforests of the large mountainous islands of Melanesia are routinely 
assumed by outside observers to be an example of last remaining wilderness, 
high in biodiversity, valuable to humankind in general, and somehow largely 
undisturbed by humans until logging operations escalated in recent decades. 
But the fact that most Melanesian islands have substantial numbers of people 
living inland, or at least had inland populations until quite recently, would 
undermine such assumptions. As Bennett (2000:  18–26) expresses in her 
1  This chapter builds on a larger multidisciplinary study of the long-term dynamics of human interactions 
with the rainforest in the Marovo Lagoon area of the Western Solomons, carried out with Tim Bayliss-Smith 
and the late T.C. Whitmore from 1996 onwards (Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 2000; Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003; 
Bayliss-Smith and Hviding 2012, 2014a, 2014b). Details of this study will be given below. As anthropologist, 
geographer and forest botanist, the three of us were able to share our field observations and insights from 
the Solomon Islands ‘logging boom’ of the 1990s, as well as to relate our longer-term experiences from the 
scenes of forestry and land use in Solomon Islands, in Whitmore’s case reaching as far back as to his work as 
a government forest botanist in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in the 1960s (Whitmore 1969). I am 
grateful to Tim and Tim for all those inspiring discussions in Cambridge and elsewhere. In this context I also 
would like to express my deep respect for the late T.C. Whitmore’s continuous insistence as a botanist on the 
human factor in rainforest dynamics.
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history of human interactions with forests in Solomon Islands, the rainforests 
encountered by the first settlers of the archipelago were ‘opened up’ by them 
tens of thousands of years ago: ‘To the ancestral Melanesians and their more 
recent counterparts, the forests were a huge garden, with some part, for a time, 
being more intensively used than others’ (ibid.: 19). From the ‘arboriculture’ 
and modest modifications by early human settlers, through the development 
of shifting agriculture based on burned clearings to present-day large-scale 
land transformations, the forests of the Solomons (and elsewhere in Melanesia 
and Oceania more widely) have histories that are closely interconnected with 
human habitation and activity in those forests (e.g., Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003). 
The continuous human agency in the long run of forest history has interacted 
ecologically with the fluidity and dynamic characteristic of the tropical 
forest itself, including its ability to regenerate after significant disturbance 
(cf. Whitmore 1990).
The forests of the New Georgia group of the Western Solomons, which are the 
focus of this chapter (Figure  3.1), have remained of particular interest both 
to logging operators and conservationist organisations, while consistently 
providing the majority of timber exports from the country since the 1980s. 
In New Georgia, the Asian (and increasingly Melanesian) protagonists of the 
Solomon Islands ‘logging boom’ that accelerated in the 1990s (Bennett 2000; 
Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 2000), as well as their colonial British precursors, saw 
islands with scattered seashore habitation, modest areas of forest clearance for 
shifting cultivation on the coastal slopes, and no inland villages. Dense rainforest 
still extended from coast to coast across steep ridges, extinct volcano craters, 
limestone pinnacles and mountain peaks, some reaching 800–1,000 metres 
above sea level. This, obviously, was also the deceptive scenery encountered by 
the conservationist adversaries of the loggers.
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Figure 3.1 The New Georgia Islands, Solomon Islands.
Source: K.H. Sjøstrøm, University of Bergen.
What was not evident to outside observers was that the forests of New Georgia 
were in no pristine natural state when large-scale logging commenced. Despite 
the apparent intact quality in the 1980s of the New Georgian rainforest canopy, 
the forests were ecosystems in which the interaction with, and transformational 
influence of, human populations had played a major role through thousands 
of years. In fact, until the end of the nineteenth century the vast inland tracts 
of rainforest that were to become the subject of so much contestation were 
lands under extensive shifting cultivation and intensive river-fed irrigation, 
supporting large populations of inland dwellers. The assumedly undisturbed 
natural forests of late twentieth-century New Georgia had therefore regenerated 
from widespread, continuous human disturbance that only abated in the late 
nineteenth century (Bayliss-Smith et  al. 2003). In this observation from the 
Western Solomons lies a challenging but potentially fruitful analytical interaction 
in the study of long-term land use, between separate paradigms of political 
ecology and historical ecology (see Blaikie and Brookfield 1987; Balée 1998; 
Robbins 2004). In the case of the New Georgia Islands, with obvious bearings 
for much of the Melanesian region, the understanding of the complex present-
era politics of resource use and related conflict through ‘political ecology’ needs 
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to rely more strongly on the truly long-term perspectives of ‘historical ecology’ 
concerning human–environmental interactions. Insights from botany are also a 
required element in the deepened understanding of rainforests as non-pristine.
Let me shift to recent political issues for the Western Solomons, New Georgia and 
the Marovo Lagoon. These are well-known fields of contestation that represent 
a common pattern in contemporary Melanesia. It is in fact not only the logging 
companies that have hit the forests of the Western Solomons in recent decades. 
While in the 1990s, Asian companies made rapid inroads into forests that 
seemed untouched except for tracts of land that had already been logged over 
to some degree by a colonial company called Levers Pacific Timbers, a plethora 
of international conservation organisations also descended on the islands and 
their forests: particular attention was given to the famous Marovo Lagoon in 
south-east New Georgia, a lagoon that covers about 700 square kilometres and 
is fringed by a unique double chain of raised barrier reefs and by the high 
volcanic islands of the eastern half of the New Georgia group (Hviding 1996a). 
The collective agenda of these organisations, which among them had the major 
international players WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) and Greenpeace as 
well as smaller non-governmental organisations that were in fact more or less 
extended arms of Australian and New Zealand government interests, was to 
present to the world the idea that Solomon Islands in general, and the lands 
surrounding the Marovo Lagoon in particular, were places of pristine, some 
would say virgin, rainforest that had never been significantly disturbed by 
human activity (Hviding 2003a). But were those forests pristine? Or, as asked 
in general terms by a team of tropical forest ecologists: how ‘virgin’ is virgin 
rainforest? (Willis et al. 2004).
My own continuing work since 1986 in the Marovo Lagoon and surrounding 
islands has been inextricably tied to the increasingly complicated contestations 
surrounding the forests of the area. When I first arrived there, I was thrown 
straight into the aftermath of the conflict that resulted in the final departure 
from the Solomons of colonial survivor Levers Pacific Timbers. That company 
had been operating ‘scientific forestry’ (which frequently seemed to be a poor 
disguise for agendas of clear-felling) for several decades in the Western Solomons, 
mainly on land obtained by the colonial administration as ‘forest estate’ through 
purchase from customary, kin-based landholding groups referred to throughout 
New Georgia as butubutu (see Hviding 2003b). But in the 1980s, only a few years 
after Solomon Islands gained independence in 1978, Levers Pacific Timbers 
operations ground to a halt after the company shifted its operations to customary 
land, having exhausted the tracts of ‘forest estate’. Forceful local opposition was 
met with in northern New Georgia. As I got to know the notoriously stubborn 
and independently minded people of a prophet-led rural movement called the 
Christian Fellowship Church (CFC) who had the distinction of having made 
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life for Levers Pacific Timbers unbearable, I quickly learned that they had not 
burned bulldozers, menaced company labourers (non-violently), taken a hand 
in provincial politics and ultimately caused the fall of this transnational giant’s 
operations in New Georgia out of conservationist sentiments. Instead, they had 
done so in defence of their own autonomy as rural landholding groups, and in 
defiance of a colonial regime and a young national government that were seen to 
be conspiring with Levers to gain access to timber on customary lands in clever 
legalist ways aimed at bypassing the legal privilege of customary landowners 
(Hviding 1996a: 316–20).
Surely, if the eyes of the powerful international lobby of rainforest conservation 
and indigenous rights activism had been focused on the Solomons in the mid-
1980s, the people of northern New Georgia, and especially the colourful and 
exotic CFC movement — with its powerful prophet the Holy Mama, who so well 
mixed traditionalism, modernist development aspirations, United States Army 
inspirations from World War II and singular worship practices — might have 
entered centre stage on the global scene as prominent tribal conservationists, 
perhaps alongside Amazon Indians. But the major international organisations 
had not then arrived in the Solomons. And the fact that New Georgians never 
really saw themselves as occupants of the tribal conservationist slot was amply 
demonstrated when in 1989 the leaders of the CFC, in their capacity as managers 
of vast forests, invited an Indonesian company to enter their lands and log that 
which Levers had left.
Since then, the northern and western parts of the island of New Georgia have seen 
massive land transformation through selective logging and, in designated areas 
subject to clear-felling, the development of large, locally owned tree plantations 
where Eucalyptus, Gmelina, teak and mahogany are grown in conjunction 
with garden crops. The development of teak plantations has been particularly 
extensive. But at the opposite end of the Marovo Lagoon, the large island of 
Vangunu has experienced a chaotic multitude of logging by many operators, and 
a large tract of government land on the island’s south-eastern side, alienated in 
colonial times, has been clear-felled for the ostensible purpose of establishing a 
Malaysian-owned oil palm plantation which never became operative. The forests 
of New Georgia that in the 1980s and early 1990s appeared to outside observers 
as pristine, with dense canopies covering the land from coast to coast across 
mountain ridges, have been forever changed (Hviding 1996a; Hviding and 
Bayliss-Smith 2000). This process is, however, not difficult to grasp through 
the eyes of the Marovo people, in whose history there is a long and continuous 
record of transforming that which is ‘wild’ (piru) and outside the human domain 
into the condition of ‘domesticated’ (manavasa). Neither of these two states are 
regarded in Marovo as definite — thus ‘wild’ forest is not a timeless wilderness, 
but usually forest that has reverted from being ‘domesticated’ (Hviding 1996b). 
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At the edge of the ‘domesticated’, Marovo people have always seen new ‘wild’ 
spaces to be drawn into the former sphere by human activity. The scale of such 
transformation has escalated in recent and present times, though. But, as will 
be shown below, larger-scale permanent land transformation has increasingly 
become part of the local land use repertoires in the twenty-first century, as the 
people of Marovo Lagoon and wider New Georgia have devised new approaches 
to managing lands whose forest has been radically changed through logging. 
In the present, external and indigenous agendas for land transformation have 
merged, but this has taken place against a background of quite extraordinary 
forest modification in the past.
Forests and People in Old New Georgia: Cultural 
History and the Evidence of Botany
Over the past 30 to 40 years a new paradigm for rainforest ecology has been 
developed, in which forest disturbance is given a central role in the maintenance 
of botanical diversity. Gaps that are created in the forest canopy are seen as 
generating a range of different microhabitats, while forest tree species can be 
classified along a continuum from light-demanding to shade-tolerant, according 
to how much sun they require for regeneration. Two broad classes of tree are 
significant in this ‘gap-phase’ paradigm: pioneer species and climax species. 
Pioneer species germinate and establish growth only in full light in a gap 
after its creation, and their seedlings are not found growing below a full and 
undisturbed canopy (Whitmore 1984, 1990, 1998). In this view, rainforests reach 
their highest levels of species richness when they are in an intermediate stage of 
recovery from disturbance, or when disturbance is at an intermediate intensity 
or frequency. In these intermediate states the forest will contain the fullest 
repertoire ranging from pioneer species to climax species, and its biodiversity is 
at a maximum (Connell 1978).
How can the gap-phase paradigm be made relevant for interpreting the dynamics 
of forests so easily construed as ‘natural’ or ‘virgin’ in the snapshot insights 
of outsiders? The Marovo area lends itself well to such discussion owing to 
inherent contradictions. Until the early twentieth century the Marovo Lagoon, 
like its political counterpart and oftentimes enemy Roviana Lagoon further 
west, was the scene of large-scale maritime exchange and predatory warfare, 
as well as the hub of a regional economy based on the large-scale irrigation of 
Colocasia taro (talo) in pondfields (ruta) constructed in the forest (Bayliss-Smith 
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and Hviding 2012, 2014a).2 The contradictions in question are grounded in 
both the pre-colonial and the post-colonial. On one hand, the Marovo area has a 
complex history of centuries of agricultural intensification, inter-island contacts 
and sociopolitical transformations, yet on the other, the lagoon’s catchments and 
its forested islands have in recent decades figured in international media as a 
prominent example of pristine tropical wilderness. It is well known that Marovo 
has on several occasions been proposed for permanent conservation, even as a 
possible UNESCO World Heritage site (Hviding 2003a).
The distinguished rainforest botanist T.C. Whitmore, who not only developed the 
gap-phase paradigm but also was the undisputed authority on the vegetation of 
the Solomon Islands, noted that the islands’ forests below 300 metres are in many 
ways similar to forests throughout South-East Asia and New Guinea. However, 
Solomon Islands forests are lower in height, have fewer emergent trees but more 
epiphytes and climbers, and are impoverished in species diversity. In the forests 
of the Western Solomons specifically, the canopy, which is 30–45 metres tall but 
lower on steep slopes and at higher altitudes, is locally broken by gaps filled 
with climbers and thickets of smaller trees. The key to understanding some 
important long-term processes in these forests is a 30–50 metre tall tree called 
Campnosperma brevipetiolata. From his extensive surveys in the 1960s of forests 
in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Whitmore noted that, especially 
in the New Georgia Islands and on Santa Isabel, large areas of lowland forest 
were almost totally dominant at canopy level by this tree. Since Campnosperma 
is a light-demanding species that requires gaps in order to grow, any forest 
dominated by it must be the site of considerable canopy disturbance. At the 
time, Whitmore attributed this rather strange vegetation pattern to significant 
human disturbance in the areas concerned up to the end of the twentieth century, 
noting for vast tracts of southern Isabel where 45 per cent of large trees were 
Campnosperma that ‘this particular area may well date from the abandonment of 
cultivations following the decimation of the local people by raiding parties from 
New Georgia across the Sound, which is known to have occurred within living 
memory late last century’ (Whitmore 1969: 265). Later, his influential voice in 
the botanical understanding of Solomon Islands forests changed into proposing 
a relationship between recurrent tropical cyclones and a predominance of 
Campnosperma at canopy level.
2  In this paper vernacular terms are given in the Marovo language, which is a secondary doctrinal language 
of the CFC and of the United Church, and a primary one for the SDA Church. The latter is the numerically 
dominant denomination in the Marovo Lagoon. Marovo is also the field language I use. The coexistence in 
New Georgia of the two closely related languages Marovo and Roviana thus is strongly connected to mission 
history as well as to geographical distinctness, but on an everyday basis most adults in New Georgia, wherever 
they live and whatever church they belong to, are able to speak both languages.
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This is where my own work on the political ecology of forests in the Marovo 
Lagoon intersected with Whitmore’s observations, mediated through a 
mutual friend and colleague, geographer Tim Bayliss-Smith. Conversations in 
Cambridge led to collaborative work of longer scope. In 2000, Bayliss-Smith and 
I published the book Islands of Rainforest, where we took up Whitmore’s old 
argument that Campnosperma-dominant lowland forest indicated past human 
disturbance. We used this insight to interpret exquisitely detailed forest-
type maps produced in late colonial times, and we concluded that a canopy 
dominance of Campnosperma characterised areas that were known from oral 
history and from personal observations to be sites of substantial past settlement 
and extensive irrigated taro cultivation. Thus there seemed to be no doubt that 
this type of species-poor forest, so characteristic of much of New Georgia, was 
a messenger of widespread forest transformation up to the late pre-colonial and 
early colonial years. From about the end of the nineteenth century, as the systems 
of exchange and tribute that governed relationships between the coastal and 
inland dwellers of New Georgia collapsed with the end of inter-island warfare 
and head-hunting and with the arrival of British naval power, Christian missions 
and other sweeping changes, inland settlements and their associated irrigated 
taro pondfield systems (ruta) were gradually abandoned. By  the late 1930s 
few ruta were left in operation anywhere in New Georgia.3 When the coastal 
villagers of Marovo retreated into the bush in 1942 in fear of the oncoming war 
machines of Japan and the United States, pondfields were already so overgrown 
as to discourage any attempt at returning to growing wetland taro, and wild 
yams instead became the staple diet. With the abandonment of pondfields the 
heavily modified forests with broken canopies regenerated, but into a particular 
Campnosperma-dominated ecological configuration.
Bayliss-Smith, Whitmore and I soon embarked on a collaborative study for which 
we combined a range of botanical, ecological, archaeological, demographic 
and anthropological materials to conclude once and for all that the lowland 
forests of New Georgia as they appeared just before logging accelerated in the 
late twentieth century were not in any way ‘virgin’. Instead, they were a low-
diversity form of secondary growth, rich in large timber species, produced by 
continuous human intervention over many generations up to the late nineteenth 
century, or in some forests even more recently. This analysis allowed us to use 
the finely detailed colonial forestry maps to estimate the extent of land under 
dryland and irrigated cultivation around 1870–80, as well as to propose a number 
of demographic scenarios for the undoubtedly substantial inland populations 
3  Wetland taro cultivation in small pondfields along tributaries of major rivers has continued on a very 
small scale, but as an unbroken practice, in a few locations in northern New Georgia inhabited by traditionalist 
people of the CFC. They are also believed to carefully preserve small intact stocks of talo ruta or ‘pondfield 
taro’ growing in water even where there are no pondfields. Here and there along riverbanks in these parts of 
New Georgia, this form of wetland taro can also be found in feral condition.
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of bygone days. The population estimates made for the main area of Marovo 
Lagoon in the period 1870–80 gave ranges from about 12,000 to about 22,000 
people, compared to the 1986 population of less than 7,000, which has increased 
to a 2010 population of about 15,000 (Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003: 348–51; see also 
Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 2000: 138–40).
Tales of the Past, Misconceptions of the Present
That the empty inner lands of the New Georgia Islands were well settled in 
the past is not contested. Most customary landholding groups (butubutu) 
today maintain repertoires of stories about inland settlements, ancestral 
shrines, ceremonial grounds and old groves of Canarium nut trees, framed 
in a genealogical perspective. Indeed, such stories are becoming all the more 
significant in the present-day context of inter- and intra-group disputes over 
customary rights to land — there is a direct correlation between recognised 
entitlements to customary land and the current flow of timber royalties from 
logging companies. In that sense, then, tales of the past inland settlement of 
one’s landholding butubutu may feed straight into the realm of bank accounts 
for royalties and into conspicuous consumption.
Not many generations span the time from when the inland forest became disused 
except for occasional forays for feral pigs; most of the interior of the New Georgia 
Islands was not entirely abandoned until the early twentieth century. From his 
work in the Marovo Lagoon as a surveyor for the Royal Navy in the 1890s, 
Lieutenant H.B.T. Somerville reported on a cautious expedition in 1893 that 
ventured quite far inland and uphill on the northern part of Vangunu Island. 
Most surprising to the Royal Navy representative was the inland population his 
party encountered:
This small expedition into the bush … points out that (1) Most of the people of 
this district live away from the sea coast. (2) That, however, they are probably in 
the habit of visiting the coast for trade etc. (Somerville 1893: 5)
In a somewhat later, more lurid missionary’s tale, an account is given of how three 
young boys of a group of ‘saltwater people’, recently converted to the Seventh-
day Adventist (SDA) faith (but later to become leading missionaries in their own 
right and tell their boyhood tale to the writer in question), experienced the 
inner lands of south New Georgia during a forced bushwalk in 1915 back from 
the mission station at Viru Harbour:
Trekking through the dense jungle, the three youths crossed parts of New Georgia, 
carefully bypassing strange villages, devil-dancing grounds, and piles of sacred 
spirit stones in the forest groves. They were out of their territory and among 
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enemies. They had no desire to provoke the wrath of the people or their spirit-
gods. Happily they found the coast and from a friendly old woman borrowed a 
canoe and paddled across the lagoon to their own shores. (Were 1970: 26)
As boys of a coastal group with little experience of life in the interior, they 
are likely to have been acutely aware of the strange world they encountered. 
The continuing existence of a number of interior settlements in Marovo and in 
northern New Georgia as late as 1910–15 is in line with the conventions of oral 
history in the area, as well as with some eyewitness accounts by missionaries 
and travellers.
But in most of New Georgia the interior had been depopulated by the turn of 
the century. As the inner lands were abandoned by all those people indicated 
by our population estimates — numbers that may have been decimated because 
of epidemic diseases known to have had locally devastating consequences 
from around 1870 — old settlements and finely engineered pondfield systems 
for taro were left to the encroaching forest. Concurrently a new form of land 
transformation took place from the early years of the twentieth century in areas 
closer to the lagoon coast. This was the very first intervention of the global 
political economy into the forests of the Western Solomons, and it preceded 
the logging boom of the 1990s by almost 100 years (Hviding and Bayliss-Smith 
2000: 150–9). The rapid build-up of a coconut economy throughout New Georgia 
caused large areas of shoreline forest, sago palm stands and mangrove vegetation 
to be cleared and replaced by coconut groves. The hillsides closest to the 
growing coastal villages were now placed under intensive shifting cultivation of 
food crops, and the only interior forest features still receiving attention from a 
people now fully coastal were old groves of Canarium nuts, still tended through 
the regular removal of undergrowth and invading climbers. The massive tracts 
of remaining inland forest were simply left to regenerate, with the inevitable 
dominance of Campnosperma brevipetiolata in many of those areas that had been 
most heavily modified by centuries of pondfield construction and maintenance. 
This, then, was the forest scene encountered by loggers and conservationists 
alike in the late twentieth century — a robust-looking forest with a dense 
canopy and an abundance of tall trees festooned with climbers and orchids, 
seen by the former as timber-rich and by the latter as pristine/primary/virgin. 
Gregarious creepers, climbers and herbaceous forest floor shrubs hid most signs 
of past human habitation from those not in the know, but for locals who did 
know, the history of human habitation and forest modification were there to see.
Quite a different, and markedly less dynamic, interpretation has been presented 
by agents of forest conservation, who have seemed to be reluctant to consider 
anthropogenic disturbance as a ubiquitous feature of the forests in places like 
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Solomon Islands. For example, as the logging boom was gaining momentum, 
a New Zealand conservation organisation presented its case to the Australian 
government, the principal aid donor to Solomon Islands, as follows:
The proposed protected area [i.e., the forests of Marovo Lagoon] has been little 
disturbed: hurricanes are infrequent and of low intensity, and human impact 
has been limited to gardened land and some timber removal on Vangunu and 
Nggatokae. The result is a region of extensive primary forest cover, including 
undisturbed forest community transitions from the sea to mountain tops. 
(Lees et al. 1991: 95)
Let this quote stand as representative for an environmentalist view not 
informed by either cultural history or by rainforest ecology. A contrasting view 
of those same forests not as ‘undisturbed’ at any time would focus instead on 
their ecological resilience under successive stages of transformation, not only 
after centuries of regular disturbance for settlement and agriculture, but even, 
and notably so, in the face of modern logging operations. Observations by 
Tim Whitmore in the mid-1990s in fact indicated successful regeneration of 
logged forests, even in northern New Georgia where clear-felling by Levers 
Pacific Timber had resulted in a long delay of regeneration as degraded areas 
were invaded by creepers such as Merremia. Fourteen years after this most 
severe disturbance, Campnosperma and Pometia trees had pushed their way 
through the carpet of creepers to reach a height of 13 metres (Whitmore 1995). 
Whitmore argued that a succession back to mixed forest seemed to be assured 
given no additional human disturbance. It is a fact that, unlike Levers, few of 
the Asian companies operating in New Georgia since the 1990s have had 
agendas of clear-felling. Instead they have preferred to work over often volatile 
logging concessions on customary land in a quick and often confused manner, 
crisscrossing the land with dirt roads and skid tracks and ripping out as many 
valuable trees as possible before any trouble with landowners arises. Ironically, 
this rough and rapid approach leaves far more vegetation standing than the 
scientifically informed clear-felling carried out by Levers. Total forest loss 
through the planting of oil palms in logged areas remains a sinister possibility, 
though, and was indeed envisaged for the notorious tract of government land 
on Vangunu clear-felled in the 1990s by Silvania Products of Malaysia, although 
it never happened. More diverse post-logging trajectories have been evolving 
in local hands.
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Transforming the Forest: Logging, ‘New Life’ 
and Multiple Trajectories
As the twentieth century drew to a close, new scenarios were to be developed in 
the historical and political ecology of New Georgia’s forests. While logging by a 
bewildering range of companies in central Marovo proceeded in a chaotic fashion, 
creating scars in both landscape and social life, the northern areas under control 
by the CFC, once the bane of Levers Pacific Timbers, followed a different course. 
From 1989 until today, logging in the area has with few exceptions been carried 
out by only one company — Golden Springs International of Indonesia (where 
it operates as Sumber Mas, of which ‘Golden Springs’ is a translation). Golden 
Springs operations have been managed in close consultation with the leaders 
of the CFC, whose organisation functions as a corporate tool for combining the 
control over several dozen tracts of customary land throughout northern and 
western New Georgia held by the constituent kin groups of the movement. 
The encompassment of church leadership, since the days of the Holy Mama, 
of land rights vested with a large number of individual butubutu throughout 
New Georgia, constitutes the movement’s main corporate power base (Hviding 
2011: 9–10). Although exact details of the agreements between company and 
church are elusive given the secretive nature of the CFC, it is a well-known fact 
that its royalty rates are far higher than for any other logging operation in the 
Western Solomons, and probably the highest anywhere in Solomon Islands. It is 
my impression that the willingness of Golden Springs International to provide 
substantially higher royalty rates over several decades is directly tied to the 
benefits the company receives from its extraordinarily long-term presence in 
the land.
Leaders and adherents of the CFC, as well as informed non-CFC observers, make 
no bones about the considerable wealth accumulated by this movement over 
the years. Indeed, wealth accumulation is an integrated aspect of a doctrinally 
central concept of ‘New Life’ to be attained for followers. The financial system 
of the CFC manages flows of logging-generated revenue from the periphery of 
customary landowners (on whose land logging operations take place) to the 
centre of church leadership. This accumulation is a centralised one that keeps 
timber royalties virtually outside the village economy and instead supplies 
villages with services such as schools, health facilities and transport. This can 
be seen as a new twist on old Oceanic patterns of chiefly redistribution, and 
was a strategy not least significant at the dawn of the twenty-first century when 
the already meagre government services to rural areas were disrupted during 
the so-called ‘Tension’ — a condition of limited civil war (mainly on the island 
of Guadalcanal) leading to a collapse of both government and national economy 
(Moore 2004; Allen 2013). More specifically, the CFC consolidates fragmented 
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kin-based authority over land by collectively organising customary landowning 
groups in large-scale ways that lack parallels elsewhere in the Solomons. A range 
of self-initiated economic development projects are operated by the various 
arms of the CFC organisation, through an approach that avoids collaboration 
with non-governmental organisations and refuses most outside aid, instead 
relying on its own funding in the form of accumulated logging royalties.
With its somewhat peculiar forms of worship, and its insistence that its leader is 
the earthly manifestation of the Holy Spirit, the CFC has, since it was established 
through a breakaway from the Methodist Mission in the 1950s, been regarded 
with distrust by many Solomon Islanders. Thus knowledge of its singularly 
successful way of adapting to the logging boom remained limited. The public 
image of the CFC in Solomon Islands was improved and national-level knowledge 
of the movement expanded with the unexpected media coverage given in 2005 of 
two high-level visits to the CFC headquarters at Duvaha in North New Georgia, 
first by the prime minister, then by the governor-general. Further national 
media attention was given later that year with the bestowment of a knighthood 
by Queen Elizabeth II upon the CFC’s spiritual leader, the Reverend Ikan Rove, 
who visited London for the occasion. Known to CFC adherents as the Spiritual 
Authority, Reverend Rove is the son of the Holy Mama, who founded the 
movement and brought it into a recognised state as an independent, indigenous 
church by 1960. Since succeeding his father, Reverend Rove has seen it as his 
foremost mission to promote economic development for his people, moving 
them into a new era he has designated the ‘time of development’ (kolokolo 
divelopmen). In line with this, the large-scale development by the CFC since 
2000 of huge tree plantations on customary land logged and clear-felled by the 
Golden Springs company, particularly the communal planting of what must 
be hundreds of thousands of teak trees, has caught attention in the national 
search for post-conflict options for rural development, although being seen as 
somewhat of an enigma by foreign proponents of ‘community development 
projects’ (e.g., Makim 2002; see also Hviding 2011).
In the Western Solomons, environmental histories of forests are, as will be 
clear by now, closely connected to the different paths followed by the three 
church denominations of these islands: the CFC, the United Church (formerly 
the Methodist Mission), and the SDA Church.4 When the Asian logging boom 
hit Solomon Islands in the early 1990s, the CFC was ready to take the fullest 
advantage of its already existing corporate system of amalgamated customary 
4  See Hviding (1996a: 118–24) for mission history and more recent developments in Marovo Lagoon and 
McDougall (2008) for more general comparison of the potential roles of different denominations for generating 
rural development in the Western Solomons. Hviding (2011) gives a comprehensive analysis of the history 
of the CFC and the movement’s most recent accomplishments. The account that follows is based on seven 
separate field visits throughout New Georgia between 2003 and 2012.
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land under centralised authority. As logging accelerated, many SDA groups of 
central Marovo and northern New Georgia found themselves at an advantage 
as major landowners through their long-term history as ‘bush people’ whose 
previous generations had lived and worked in the interior. In contrast, the 
original strongholds of the SDA faith in the Solomons remained largely landless, 
determined by their history as sea- and reef-holding coastal or ‘saltwater’ groups 
of central Marovo Lagoon, easily contacted by the pioneer SDA missionaries. 
As logging gained momentum, the inequalities among New Georgia’s SDAs in 
terms of landholdings, coupled with the bilaterality of kinship throughout 
Marovo and Roviana, generated massive land disputes that were further 
deepened by the fact that ‘saltwater’ people with limited primary rights to 
land remained the most influential in church matters. Nevertheless, a great 
number of logging operations commenced on SDA land, but with the majority 
of landholding butubutu having no resident chief (since most younger chiefs 
had become urban elite), a lack of planning has resulted in a chaotic picture 
where almost every SDA butubutu with significant landholdings has engaged 
its ‘own’ logging company. This chaos is inscribed on the SDA lands of central 
Marovo — known as the Bareke hills of northern Vangunu — where a dense 
and confused pattern of logging roads and shipment ponds mar the hills and 
coastlines. In 2007 I observed approximately one log shipment pond for every 
4 kilometres of coastline in central Marovo, whereas in the CFC areas of northern 
Marovo the log shipment ponds were up to 20 kilometres apart and the logging 
road network was much more orderly.
A similar contrasting picture characterised the financial side of logging. I have 
already described the CFC system of keeping timber royalties out of the village 
economy, centralising and accumulating the funds, and carrying out regular 
redistribution to church members in the form of subsidies of school fees, tax 
obligations and rural infrastructure. Among the SDAs, timber royalty rates 
have generally been lower than those of the CFC, owing to the poor bargaining 
situation of fragmented butubutu and weak internal leadership. Still, a large 
number of logging operations on SDA land have generated substantial income, 
much of which has been disputed through court cases. Whatever the outcome 
of these cases, the final recipients of royalties among the SDA groups have spent 
most of the money on consumption goods, short-lived investments such as 
outboard motors, and a profusion of not always durable houses of permanent 
materials. Apart from a number of very impressive church buildings now 
standing more or less finished in villages of central Marovo (reflecting an 
emphasis among Adventists and Methodists on large churches as rural status 
symbols), few enduring results are to be seen today from 10–15 years of huge 
windfall profits from logging. The lands are devastated by the unplanned use of 
logging machinery, and subsistence gardening suffers. Typically, the SDAs (who 
for sectarian reasons have always refused to have government-operated schools) 
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still have to pay substantial annual school fees for their children at primary 
and secondary schools, and the quickly evaporated royalties have not assisted 
families in this arduous task.
While the Methodist (or United Church) villages of Marovo and of New Georgia 
more widely all have government schools and so are not burdened with school 
fees at the level of the SDAs, they have otherwise lost out on most scenes of 
contemporary political economy in the Western Solomons, dependent as these 
scenes are on the attainment and management of windfall profits from logging. 
Geographically squeezed in between the huge landholdings of the CFC to the 
north and of the ‘bush’ SDAs in central Marovo, United Church groups with 
their more limited lands were disadvantaged in concrete terms, while most of 
their villages shared the problems of erosion of customary authority shown 
among the SDAs. In the Roviana Lagoon area of western New Georgia problems 
were centred on the polarisation between an economically declining United 
Church and a financially expanding CFC, once a detested breakaway movement. 
The level of land disputes among United Church people has been staggering, 
nowhere as much as in the old heartland of the church in west-central Roviana. 
As among the SDAs, timber royalties have been largely wasted on consumption 
and short-term benefits. In the most recent years, the United Church has been 
hit even harder by the emergence of a new breakaway movement that claims to 
represent the true Wesleyan faith.
And so the forests and the land, the people, their social life and rural economies 
have been transformed in recent decades all over the Western Solomons, as in 
so many other parts of Melanesia. What is notable from the vantage point of 
New Georgia is the way in which three very different church dominations, each 
of which pervades most dimensions of everyday life in its adherent villages, 
have followed strongly diverging paths in relation to the complex local–global 
entanglements of the forests that grow on their customary land. The diversity 
of strategies and outcomes from both local and global agents defy any simplistic 
image of rural Solomon Islanders as passive victims of ruthless foreign companies, 
although invariably the Asian companies make by far the most money from the 
trees that are felled and exported as round logs.
The New Anthropogenic Landscape and the 
‘Time of Development’
The ragged and chaotic post-logging condition of much of central Marovo has 
certainly prevented the place from ever again approaching World Heritage 
listing, and the efforts of international conservationists in the area seem to have 
been without much result. There is much current uncertainty among the SDA 
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and United Church villagers of the area as to the future of the forest. Perhaps 
the likely scenario is one of gradual regeneration through disuse and neglect 
— a  somewhat extreme case of Whitmore’s gap-phase paradigm, made more 
difficult by the environmental destruction that has taken place through the 
compacting and erosion of soil. This is not so in the northern areas under CFC 
control, where the government’s Standard Logging Agreement (in most cases 
blatantly ignored by companies once signed) has been largely adhered to owing 
to the close connections between companies and church leadership: forest near 
water catchments is left undisturbed, no logging is carried out on high slopes, 
and roads are gravelled.
More significantly, the forest landscape that is now emerging after logging 
in the areas controlled by the CFC represents a new stage in New Georgia’s 
anthropogenic forest; another transformation across the piru–manavasa (‘wild–
domesticated’) continuum. On both sides of logging roads that run parallel to the 
coast a few hundred metres inland are family-operated blocks of tree plantations 
where some food crops are also grown in interspersed fashion. These are the 
lands now known throughout the Solomons to support huge, rapidly growing 
stands of teak, the valuable harvest of the future, and from the point of view 
of the leaders and working people of the CFC the fast-growing tree plantations 
amount to a sustainable enrichment of customary land. That argument does not 
go down well with conservationists who point out that lowland rainforest was 
actually removed to make room for the stands of teak, but those arguments do 
not go down well with the people of the CFC. It has in fact been pointed out 
to me in conversations with eager tree planters of the CFC that this as good as 
permanent transformation of parts of the lowland forest into ‘something more 
useful’ is not unlike the permanent ‘domestication’ of inland forest that took 
place in the old days, when gentle slopes near streams were cleared and became 
the sites for large assemblages of stone terraces for taro irrigation.
Two key locations of the CFC today display the highest degree of planned land 
and forest transformation anywhere in the Western Solomons. In a sheltered inlet 
on the exposed Kusaghe coast of north-west New Georgia lies Paradise, a large 
village founded in the 1950s by the Holy Mama, on the grounds of a former village 
called Menakasapa. Paradise was for several decades the very demonstration 
site for the CFC’s successful and disciplined communal life. Houses there are still 
organised in orderly rows, and somewhat stricter regulations apply to everyday 
life here than elsewhere within the CFC movement. The flat coastal land around 
the village and inlet is fully planted with coconuts. When travelling the choppy 
seas of the ‘Kula Gulf’ between Kusaghe and Kolobangara, a sweeping view 
can be had of the slopes behind Paradise, which are totally planted with 
well-circumscribed sectors of Gmelina, Eucalyptus and teak trees (Figure 3.2). 
This is where, over a few days in 2000 in a now legendary event, hundreds of 
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people cleared the entire hillside of residual post-logging vegetation and rapid 
regrowth, then planting thousands of tree saplings. In this capacity Paradise 
entered the twenty-first century as the CFC’s demonstration site for the new era 
of tree plantations, although no longer the headquarters of the movement.
Figure 3.2 Tree plantations at Paradise village: Gmelina, Eucalyptus and 
teak in distinct blocks.
Source: Photo by Edvard Hviding, 2005.
The Paradise event, with minor modifications, has informed commonplace 
procedure for the CFC when transforming hillside rainforest to tree plantations. 
Usually, to take advantage of machinery, the logging company operating in an 
area destined for a new plantation is requested by the CFC to fell more than its 
usual repertoire of trees, and to clear away debris with bulldozers. The large-
scale communal clearing and planting, with the participation of church 
members from a wide area, then becomes a rapid process, after which the local 
landholders will have the task of maintaining the growing trees and keeping the 
plantations clean from encroaching vegetation. Often, to maximise usefulness, 
new hillside tree plantations behind CFC villages combine as food gardens with 
the dense growth of selected garden crops (sweet potato, cassava, pineapple, 
etc.) protecting the plantation soil from the blazing sun.
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From about 1990 the CFC has had its headquarters at Duvaha, the site of a large 
primary boarding school, on the mangrove-fringed lagoon coast of North New 
Georgia, and centrally placed in the Kalikolo area, which is the CFC’s historical 
heartland (Figure  3.3). In and near Duvaha are several large modern houses 
belonging to the CFC leadership, and behind the village area at an elevation of 
about 50 metres are the former logging roads lined with lush tree plantations 
about 100  metres to each side, divided into family-held bloko or ‘blocks’. 
The children who attend the boarding school come from several villages and 
hamlets throughout the Kalikolo and Kusaghe areas, and their families take 
turns to live at Duvaha and care for the entire school through food production, 
cooking and communal work. While there, they also tend to allocated work 
in the tree plantations, whether their own or those of relatives. Today’s CFC 
strongholds like Paradise and, particularly, Duvaha, demonstrate a level of work 
organisation and a level of development ambition and leadership allegiance 
echoing Methodist Mission strongman Reverend J.F. Goldie’s ‘industrial 
mission’, in which New Georgians were taught ‘that the development of their 
land is a Christian duty and that labour is honourable’ (in Bennett 2000: 45). 
Given that the Holy Mama claimed to have inherited the Holy Spirit from 
Goldie, these connections in thought and practice are not surprising — but 
today’s ‘development’ is firmly in local hands.
Figure 3.3 ‘The Time of Development’: Duvaha, North New Georgia.
Source: Photo by Edvard Hviding, 2012.
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Duvaha also demonstrates other approaches to recreating the land. A few hundred 
metres along the mangrove-fringed coast is one of the large log shipment ponds 
of the Golden Springs company, in all its grimness visualising the intimate 
relationship between church and company in the Spiritual Authority’s designated 
‘time of development’. Further ahead, accessible through a crocodile-infested 
mangrove channel, footpaths lead to the most recent land transformation by the 
CFC at a place called Kelehae: a huge food garden for the Duvaha population, 
covering all the slopes of a low, circular crater-like basin that is hidden from the 
lagoon by a low coastal ridge. This singular topographical form, until recently 
covered by coastal forest interspersed with some small swiddens, has been 
fully cleared and thoroughly domesticated under the leadership of the former 
provincial secretary of the Western Solomons, Mr Narcilly Pule. This massive 
effort has produced a food garden of a scale not seen in New Georgia for a 
very long time, echoing the so-called chigo lavata or ‘huge communal swiddens’ 
cultivated by the bush dwellers of the old days. Integrated with irrigated ruta 
pondfields in a continuous ‘wet-and-dry’ cultivation system, chigo lavata were 
used to build up large surpluses of yams and dryland taro for cyclical feasts. 
At Kelehae, the radically transformed land reflects the CFC’s revival of selected 
practices of the past.
The impressive rural machinery of the CFC has been significantly altered in 
recent years through the long illness of the Spiritual Authority. Having suffered 
from several strokes, he remained largely immobile and unable to speak after 
2010, leading a secluded yet itinerant life on board his ship MV Silent One, a 
former research and live-aboard diving vessel of 30 metres which he purchased 
in 2008 (reportedly for SBD 3 million). When he died in June 2014, several 
years had passed during which his sons and circle of advisers had been locked 
in conflict over the future religious orientation, leadership and financial 
management of the church with the Spiritual Authority’s surviving siblings, led 
by his younger brother the Hon. Job Dudley Tausinga. In the process, the close-
knit CFC villages throughout New Georgia split into two factions, as the central 
authorities of the church expelled Tausinga, his sons and the other siblings of 
the disabled Spiritual Authority, justifying this radical move with irreconcilable 
doctrinal differences as Tausinga promoted a message of reformed leadership, 
with less of the elevated status attained by the Spiritual Authority (who was 
referred to increasingly in the Roviana-speaking areas as Tamasa Toana or 
‘Living God’). While the split and its consequences for the cohesion of the CFC, 
and the complicated matter of succession, are being sorted out, the CFC’s many 
projects have proceeded at a somewhat slower pace, although the tree plantation 
bloko allocated at family level are still tended in the anticipation of the future 
value of teak, although who tends what may no longer be a clear-cut case in 
villages where the split has led to internal division, and some plantations are 
likely falling into disrepair.
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The Hon. J.D. Tausinga, one of the key actors on the New Georgia forest scene 
ever since logging started there, was the member of parliament for North 
New Georgia continuously from 1984 to 2014; the country’s longest-serving 
parliamentarian ever. His illustrious political career includes the cabinet 
portfolios of foreign affairs, natural resources, education, and forestry, as well 
as deputy prime minister, several terms as opposition leader, and an almost 
successful bid for prime minister. At the time of his defeat in the 2014 elections 
(to a candidate of the other faction of the CFC), he was the deputy speaker of 
parliament. Meanwhile, he has been operating international business enterprises, 
including the non-profit import and sale of Chinese-made replicas of Yamaha 
outboard motors branded ‘Tausinga’. The university-educated Tausinga is the 
youngest son of the Holy Mama and retained the CFC’s presence in provincial 
and national politics since the days when he himself had an instrumental role in 
the heated political processes and local-level resistance that ultimately led to the 
withdrawal from Solomon Islands of Levers Pacific Timber. Outside observers 
were surprised when in 1989, this influential, for some notorious, person thought 
to be an anti-logging activist brought in a new company. In a 1997 overview of 
the Solomon Islands logging scene, Ian Frazer (1997: 56) commented how the 
anti-logging movement in the country ‘suffered a major setback when Tausinga 
unexpectedly changed his views and threw his support behind a new foreign 
investor in North New Georgia, the Indonesian-based company Golden Springs 
International’. From the local point of view, however, Tausinga’s actions were 
not seen in any way as an unexpected change of views, but as a fulfilment of 
the ambitions of the CFC to choose their own collaborators and then dictate the 
terms of collaboration.
From Tausinga himself comes a telling summary of development strategy in the 
form of a discussion paper entitled ‘Economic Concept’. The paper was presented 
to a gathering of Western Solomons political and administrative leaders in May 
2002, at the height of the ‘Tension’ when the Solomon Islands government was 
bankrupt and defunct without any rural reach, and the Western Solomons was 
verging on secession. Tausinga’s paper can be seen as a succinct expression of 
CFC policy on resource development; it was intended as a substantial intellectual 
input into the development policy of a new state of Western Solomons and it 
echoes the author’s many-sided personal experiences and his wide readings that 
include Greek philosophy, Oriental religions and Marxist economics:
The guiding principal of economic concept and plan is encapsulated on the 
unwritten wisdom of the spirit of the modern world and thus:
Resources are not resources until you develop them. (Tausinga 2002: 2)
The exercise we take in identifying the economic opportunities shall encourage 
both local and foreign investors to participate in commercial activities. (ibid.: 5)
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The incorporation of thoughts, objects, persons and institutions from outside 
is a foundational strategy in New Georgian ways of relating to wider worlds. 
And so Tausinga’s accentuation of the complementary roles of local and foreign 
investment defines an important space between the globalised challenges of 
today and the situation in the old days, when the predatory approach to inter-
island relationships of New Georgia’s polities exploited the foreign of the day. 
The notion that ‘resources are not resources until you develop them’ may seem 
drawn from Marxist thought, but accurately reflects certain New Georgian 
attitudes that come to the forefront when villagers and their leaders engage 
in discussion with conservation organisations (Hviding 1996a: 56–7, 365–6; 
2003a). This prevailing attitude is not always well understood, and certainly 
expresses something quite different from an indigenous ethics of conservation. 
Indeed it has to do so, in an ontological context where there is no nature as 
distinct from culture, but simply a continuum between what is ‘wild’ (piru) and 
‘domesticated’ (manavasa).
The observations I have made in Marovo and around New Georgia and the 
interpretations I have made over the years are those of a rural Melanesian people 
pursuing agendas of autonomy over an environment on which their everyday 
lives are based. That autonomy also includes, as reflected in Tausinga’s paper, 
a local insistence that ‘resources’ may be identified as and when required, such 
as in the case of lowland forest being converted into (first) monetary value 
and (second) what is envisaged as perpetually yielding plantations of valuable 
hardwoods. In any case, those forests were never pristine. The ‘wild’ forest that 
is rapidly being ‘domesticated’ in New Georgia today is actually itself a product 
of regeneration, through which the domesticated forests of former generations 
reverted into a wilder condition. An argument is made for viewing Melanesian 
forest history in the longest term possible, in order to highlight the fact that 
present-day forest transformations may not be best understood through ideas 
of radical change, devastation and destruction, but, like in the New Georgia 
example, as complicated oscillations between more or less stable, locally defined 
states that engage with levels of larger scale.
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4. Forests of Gold: From Mining 
to Logging (and Back Again)
JAMON ALEX HALVAKSZ
From here, if you walk towards the Watut, there is timber.1 If you go towards 
Biaru, there is timber. If you go towards Garaina, there is more timber. If you 
walk down the Markham Valley, towards Madang, you follow the timber. Even 
in the Highlands, if you look, there is some timber there … Wau is the true origin 
of this timber, Wau is its home. (Elauru resident, 2001)
Since the early days of the 1920s gold rush, the upper Bulolo Valley, Morobe 
Province, Papua New Guinea, has been recognised as a potential source of 
timber. Early miners used trees to create their camps, fuel their fires, and support 
the work of panning and mining. As corporate mining took over the principal 
fields, timber became its backbone. And even as they mined, the expatriate 
mining community was well aware that the timber had value, that if they could 
find a route to the coast, the giant klinkii (Araucaria hunsteinii) and hoop pines 
(Araucaria cunninghamii) might win their weight in gold. The mining community 
and government officers were so sure of the prospect that they pushed for a 
road and, barring a road, an aerial tramway to haul timber down to the coast 
(Lane Poole 1935). Throughout this expansion, Biangai speakers living along the 
upper end of the Bulolo Valley surrounding the colonial township of Wau have 
remained on the margins. Many different groups benefited from early gold and 
timber extraction, but few were Biangai.
1  In Tok Pisin, the term plang was used. This has a number of references, the first being a plank of sawn 
timber. Here I use the second, referencing timber trees.
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Today, in spite of their political and economic marginality, the Biangai continue 
to maintain their centrality in the circulation of timber. As noted in the 
epigraph above, some Biangai claim that Wau is the home of these giant pines, 
in much the same way that its soils are the source of yams and gold (Halvaksz 
2008). In making this claim, my Biangai friend is placing Biangai landscapes at a 
central node in the global market for timber and other resources. For him, this is 
a true network — part of a system of gift exchanges between ancestors, Biangai 
and global markets2 — one with ongoing relationships, transactions and, most 
importantly, obligations. If nothing else, it reaffirms that it is their timber to use.
This chapter examines the efforts of Biangai villagers, Morobe Province, to 
participate in a local timber market, the relationships that they require and the 
obligations that they engender. After presenting the broader historical context of 
Biangai associations with gold mining and commercial forestry, I focus on recent 
efforts by Elauru villagers to engage in community-based timber production 
(cf. Salafsky et al. 1997/8).3
Making Forests in the Wau–Bulolo Valley
The only asset that I can see that will replace the wasting product, gold, is timber. 
The region is purely a forest one, and its climate is decidedly a forest climate … 
In short, it is proven forest country. (Lane Poole 1935: 11)
Throughout the boom and bust cycles of gold and the rise and fall of commodity 
prices for coffee, timber has remained a viable resource. While Lane Poole 
foresaw a time in which timber would replace ‘the wasting product, gold’, 
timber and practices of logging in the area have instead offered some stability 
through macro and microeconomic transformations. Thus, the value of forests 
along the upper Bulolo are very much made through the colonial and post-
colonial practices of mining, as well as local work of supporting and resisting 
those efforts. The forests, as such, do not stand apart from the gold.
2  Jacka (2001) describes a similar set of obligations deriving from the land itself. Seen as an inalienable 
possession, the land upon which the mining town of Paiam is situated establishes a set of obligations between 
the company and Ipili community. Likewise, Biangai conceptualise the land as generative of a seemingly 
renewable resource, trees for timber. However, in contrast to land, timber is alienable. Still, the exchange of 
timber retains obligations for reciprocal relationships.
3  Salafsky et al. (1997/8) distinguish community-based timber production from other more inclusive 
community or social forestry efforts to highlight project emphasis on local timber over non-timber forest 
products, fuel wood and food production. Community-based timber production is also distinct from industrial 
timber harvesting as the former emphasises local residence and ownership, and efforts to add value at the 
point of harvest are less capital intensive and involve local reinvestment.
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Analytically, this raises important challenges to existing literature on the 
construction of state power around forest resources (e.g., Sivaramakrishnan 1995; 
Li 2007; Winkel 2010). As Sivaramakrishnan (1995) argued, colonial forestry can 
be as much about knowing the forests as creating systems of knowledge about 
the peoples that inhabit them. In India, he argues that such systems of meaning 
continue to inform contemporary practices, creating government technologies 
for controlling people and resources. Thus,
While forest dwellers were being sorted into types by tribe and caste, the forests 
themselves were arranged in categories by dominant genera and species. Such 
description and the laying down of taxonomic structures to represent biotic 
communities presaged colonial development projects in which human and natural 
resources were harnessed for imperial purposes. (Sivaramakrishnan 1995: 6)
The colonial project, therefore, organised and controlled people and trees, 
but also generated discourses of management and conservation that continue 
into the present. Winkel (2010: 85) notes this point in reviewing the use of 
Foucauldian concepts in forest policy: ‘many colonial forest policy analyses 
carried out in developing countries also emphasize the continuing prevalence 
of colonial practices in the postcolonial areas’.
Likewise, Li (2007) has detailed how forest policy shaped colonial and post-
colonial relations in Indonesia. However, she extends her discussions to consider 
the agentive possibilities of community forestry in the assemblage of diverse 
interests (official forestry departments, conservationists, agroforestry experts, 
legal advocates, activists, donor agencies and forest villagers). This assemblage is 
conceptualised as a generative space where diverse ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987) make different articulations of human agents possible. Forestry 
practices engage complex networks in and of themselves. But placing them 
into a wider mineral extraction and agricultural context adds layers to these 
networks, and reveals discontinuities in state power, as well as possibilities for 
local empowerment.
During the 1920s and 1930s, when gold was driving the development of Wau and 
Bulolo (Halvaksz 2006, 2008; see also Sinclair 1998; Waterhouse 2010), forestry 
mobilised different agencies, even as forest policy was used as a technique 
for control over both expatriate and indigenous communities. Importantly, 
government foresters aspired to regulate the exploitation of forests by miners. 
Aside from revealing discontinuities in the implementation of colonial state 
power, the history recounted below informs ongoing practices of community 
forestry today.
Like other areas under colonial control, local populations were accused of 
deforesting the region through their ‘wandering habits and hunting fires’ 
(Taylour and Morley 1933). In a presentation to the Australasian Institute of 
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Mining and Metallurgy, Taylour and Morley (as mining warden and assistant 
mining warden for the Morobe goldfields respectively) noted that the district 
was ‘well supplied with a variety of good timbers’ (ibid.: 22), with sawmills 
‘scattered throughout the main centres of the goldfields’ (ibid.:  23). They 
described miners as making use of the readily available timber resources for 
housing and mining.
In reading early accounts of the goldfields, the availability of timber is often 
mentioned either directly as a resource for the industry (as above), or indirectly 
through descriptions of life on the goldfields. For example, in her account of life 
in the early days of the goldfields, Doris Booth describes the use of timber by 
prospectors:
The boys cut down a tree, from which they took a length of about six feet. Then, 
with an Adze, they chipped out the middle of it, leaving the bottom and sides, 
and making something like a native canoe. This was about one foot wide and six 
feet long. When this was completed, they made riffles out of lawyer cane — an 
oblong frame of network of sticks, like a sieve. This was placed on the bottom of 
the box, the layers of cane being as close as possible. Then a flume like a wooden 
pipe was made for the water, which was diverted from the creek into the box. 
(Booth 1929: 87)
Early on, part of the capital for the emerging mineral industry was created from 
the forests. Accounts of the goldfields like Booth’s express little concern about 
local timber rights, although government regulations did exist. Thus, timber, 
like land and water, was intimately linked to the production of gold.
The potential for a productive timber industry was recognised early on. 
However, it was forestalled, at least in part, because of local demand by the 
mining industry, but also because of transport concerns. The logistics and costs 
of building a road to what was then the main north coast port of Salamaua 
were especially daunting. A slow colonial bureaucracy, perhaps more familiar 
with mineral claims than timber concessions, also delayed the development. 
As Charles Booth lamented in a 1939 letter to Pacific Islands Monthly, he had 
tried for 13 years to gain a licence for 25,000 acres, noting ‘When I arrived in 
the Wau area, in 1924, the first thing that struck me was the wealth of timber’ 
(Booth 1939: 36). The government, following the advice of the inspector-general 
of forests, sought to license an ‘established firm’ as the forested area was deemed 
too small for individuals like Booth (Pacific Islands Monthly 1939: 27; see also 
Lane Poole 1935). While Booth had proposed water transport, the government 
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at the time looked to the completion of a Wau–Salamaua road as a more realistic 
option. Ultimately, because of these problems, timber production continued to 
serve local needs in the years leading up to World War II.4
In extracting timber for the mining concerns, local practices and rights over 
such resources were quickly sidestepped. This was done through waste and 
vacant declarations, as well as devaluing the abilities and understandings 
of indigenous peoples. Taylour and Morley, in addition to describing the 
Melanesian population as ‘poor specimens, constitutionally weak, backward, 
and without any form of religion’ (1933: 40), also explained that they know 
‘nothing of rotation of crops’, burning and cultivating until they have ‘exhausted 
[the land’s] capacity to further produce foodstuff’ (ibid.: 23). The ‘native’ farmer 
is thus wasteful, but ‘under the civilizing influence of the Administration, 
the Missions, and industrial organisations, the native is improving physically, 
mentally, and morally’ (ibid.: 40–1). Thus, not only were miners justified in their 
sound use of timber and minerals, doing so would serve the local population 
as well. Benefiting from the model behaviour of the growing expatriate mining 
community, they reasoned that indigenous populations would learn to better 
manage their own resources by following European practices. This discourse 
of improvement becomes important when considering contemporary 
conceptualisations of community forestry below. But  it also differs from the 
professional forestry discourses emerging simultaneously with early miners.
In contrast to the emphasis placed on industry use-values by miners and 
government officials in the mining office, government forestry officials 
emphasised the potential for an industry and the wastefulness of the mining 
community. In his 1935 survey of timber in the Morobe goldfields, Lane Poole 
was concerned with the value of trees and highly critical of the fact that the 
timber was not being used appropriately by mining companies. Cedar, for 
example, was used as an ‘all purpose’ resource when ‘durability was necessary’ 
(Lane Poole 1935: 5). After detailing the construction of a water race made 
completely of pine and cedar, Lane Poole complained, ‘I quote this race in 
detail to show how far the prostitution of timber can go’ (ibid., emphasis added). 
In  Lane Poole’s vision, different kinds timber have known purposes and the 
cedar deployed haphazardly in the goldfields would, in his view, be better put 
to use in the production of ‘fine cabinetry’ (ibid.). As the inspector-general of 
forests charged with making recommendations on the use of the resources found 
in the colony, Lane Poole enforced a set of values that sought to match grain and 
strength with products, fulfilling, in this case, the wood’s finely tuned historical 
disposition for cedar cabinetry. Making races for mining from such a fine timber 
4  At the time, Lae was not deemed a viable port, especially as Salamaua had been established as the coastal 
station supporting the development of the goldfields.
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was simply offensive. Therefore, he argued that the mining community needed 
to better use the resources available to them. Miners, in his view, were not 
the ‘civilizing influence’ that they imagined themselves to be. They too were 
wasteful, knowing nothing of timber’s value.
In contrast to claims by mining officials, it was not simply a matter of taking it 
out of local control and imposing colonial management. In another area of the 
goldfields, Lane Poole spoke favourably of Wahgi Valley forestry practices and 
the emphasis placed here is revealing:
The destruction of the forests has resulted in a shortage of timber for hut-
building and fuel; and this has led the natives to adopt a forest policy. Reports 
from the District and Assistant District Officers — Messrs. Melrose and Penglase 
— show that the natives in this region and in the Whagi [sic] Valley are making 
plantations use the Casuarina for the purpose. Timber is counted so valuable that 
the Government officers are obliged to pay for the tent poles and fuel required for 
their camps. These primitive people have, through the spur of want, developed a 
forest policy which shows them to be more fore-sighted then the average of their 
white brothers in Australia. (Lane Poole 1935: 4, emphasis added)
While Papua New Guineans certainly did not differentiate woods suitable 
for fine cabinetry, they did manage scarce resources and develop sustainable 
forestry practices. In contrast, the miners’ wasteful ‘prostitution of timber’ was 
akin to the destruction of forests by swidden agriculture (which Lane Poole also 
derided). In both cases, the true values were not maximised.
As Wood (2005) notes, Lane Poole offers a more complex image of the colonial 
than the caricatures of state discipline described by Sivaramakrishnan. But more 
importantly for this chapter, it shows discrepancies in colonial authority 
and a diversity of ways in which forests were deemed useful by the colonial 
government. It also opens up an intellectual space in which local management 
is not only viable, but perhaps better than the expatriate mining community’s 
use of the same.
In highlighting what must have seemed an irony from the perspective of colonial 
policy, Lane Poole also makes a series of recommendations for the development of 
an industry in the Wau–Bulolo area, which eventually comes to pass as practice. 
Aside from demanding that a route to the coast be identified, the establishment 
of regional offices and the training of technical experts, he strongly emphasised 
the need to develop a market internal to Papua New Guinea such that the colony 
would be self-sufficient in the production and maintenance of its own timber 
resources. Community forestry efforts in the village of Elauru reflect this call.
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Logging Biangai Landscapes
For Biangai, trees are an important part of the social and physical landscape in 
which they work and live. The forests are home to animals, plants and spirits 
that are important for sustenance, shelter and cosmology. Hunting paths cut 
through the forests signify family connections, and stands of economically 
important fruit and nut trees (especially Pandanus julianettii and Pandanus 
conoideus) hold named relationships with specific individuals. In mourning 
songs (or yongo ingi), the soul of the dead is imagined as travelling through 
forested paths, where specific rivers and trees are evoked to tie the deceased to 
a lived landscape (Halvaksz 2003). It was perhaps in the construction of a men’s 
house where the relationships between trees, families and people were most 
clearly displayed. Each family was responsible for providing a single post; one 
for each corner, the centre walls, a central post and ridge beam. Through its 
construction, the placement of trees in the men’s house marked social relations 
rooted in land, connecting named kinship groups (solonarik) to each other and 
to the land from which the building materials were drawn. I argue below that 
trees made into timber have the potential to be both links in social networks as 
well as marketable products. But this also requires that we view the market more 
broadly as an essential network.
Community forestry was largely introduced into Papua New Guinea by missions 
and coastal plantations (Martin 1997). However, as detailed above, the Wau–
Bulolo Valley has a unique relationship to such practices as they emerged in 
conjunction with gold mining. In the 1920s, small-scale timber operations 
initially supplemented the profits of both individual miners and the operations 
of the larger groups that eventually came to dominate the valley (Healy 1967; 
Sinclair 1998). The industry took off as the two larger operations, Bulolo Gold 
Dredging and New Guinea Goldfields, developed profitable timber subsidiaries 
that were key industries in the post–World War II mining economy.5
At first, companies acquired timber rights on government lands around the 
townships of Wau and Bulolo. Once they had expended the timber in those 
areas, New Guinea Goldfields began to negotiate with the neighbouring 
villages, including Biangai. Attempts to access stands closer to Wau were 
made in 1967–68, with New Guinea Goldfields seeking permission from the 
Department of Forests for timber rights on two areas of ‘native owned land’ 
(Lae Archive 1963/68: 26). The communities, it was emphasised in the supporting 
correspondence from District Commissioner H.P. Seale, were ‘very keen to 
5  Bulolo Gold Dredging eventually established a plywood factory in 1952. Surrounded by klinkii and hoop 
pines, Bulolo would become the centre of forestry and forestry research with the establishment of the Bulolo 
Forestry College. To this day, Bulolo continues to be a centre of forestry activities.
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go ahead’ (ibid.: 184). However, after an investigation by a forest officer, the 
department director expressed concern that ‘the timber is very scattered, that 
the locals are more interested in an access road rather than a large cash payment, 
and that considerable work will be required of one of [the government’s] officers 
to determine ownership’ (ibid.: 63). Similar motives can be seen in subsequent 
logging deals discussed below and they reflect generally different goals and 
desires for partaking in timber schemes.
It was under the newly passed Forestry Act 1973 that Elauru, Winima and 
Werewere, the three villages furthest from the town of Wau, became participants 
in the timber industry (Mitio 1981, 1984). The Forestry Act (Amalgamated)1973 
provided two processes for gaining access to timber. The first allowed for the 
declaration of a Native Timber Authority, a licence that allowed direct dealings 
between companies and communities over small areas of land. Under such 
schemes, logging was allowed only in so far as it fulfilled the construction needs 
of the company. In the second, the state acted as a broker in negotiating a Timber 
Rights Purchase agreement on behalf of communities. Elauru first contracted 
with New Guinea Goldfields under the smaller Native Timber Authority. 
But eventually a Timber Rights Purchase agreement was also negotiated on their 
land. Their experiences with the two arrangements contrast greatly.
In their version of this history, Biangai initiated the contact, as they were eager 
for the sorts of benefits accrued by the Biangai communities closer to the town 
of Wau. An elder described the events as follows:
The story goes like this. A road just doesn’t appear out of nothing, but it comes 
from the efforts of this village, Elauru. This land was here and the company sent 
word that it would like the trees in our forests. A good number of us, all papagraun 
[landowners], went to the NGG [New Guinea Goldfields] office and said to them, 
‘Why are you looking for trees? We have trees.’ They asked, ‘Where?’ We told 
them in Elauru, and they wanted to know what kinds. We said, bush trees and 
a kind of pine tree, and the next day they came to look. (interview with Elauru 
elder, 2002)
As Elauru villagers tell the story, they were eager to have their land logged 
as it meant the extension of the road to their village, facilitating access and 
transport between their homes and the town of Wau. It was development as 
they understood it. But a road is more than just a path through the valley. 
Like hunting paths followed by men, or the winding routes that they take to 
their gardens, roads enfold histories, social relations and stories. Roads shared 
by family bind that family together, and one might expect that a logging road 
implies more than a practical relationship to the space. Such relations, and the 
desire to establish and maintain them, are not captured in the director of forests’ 
concern that Biangai are more interested in roads than cash payments. In fact, 
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roads have more meaning. In his narrative, the Elauru elder is staking a claim on 
the relationships that the road makes possible. In this account of the coming of 
the road, these sentiments are apparent:
R: They carried bows and arrows, two women in front, pulling their bows tight. 
Other women came behind singing, behind the two in front. They came all the 
way up to this point.
Jamon: The road crews were there too?
G: They were at the ceremonial gate below, passing through with us.
K: All of the men and women were performing singsings, pulling them up the 
hill, and a bulldozer pulled a tree behind the women.
G: Now they came up, passing all of us up to the edge of the trees.
Jamon: This was the first tree they had removed from the ground?
All: Yes
[they restate some of the details again]
Jamon: Now, the women were pulling their bows?
K: Yeah.
Jamon: Why?
K: Oh man … [starts to laugh] … because …
R: They didn’t want to kill them!
K: They wanted to kill the whites, or maybe the driver. [laughing, others join in]
K: [still laughing] To show them that it is enough that one of them would get this 
arrow here [points to chest], but … it’s ok
G: We said, ‘Now, God’s word has come, the church is here, and it is ok … take 
our trees and go’.
K: So, they took half from one area. Finished with that, they took half from 
places where we hardly ever go. That’s ok, we said, you can take them and go. 
And us, as angry as we should be, enough that one of you took this arrow too, 
but … [laughs]
The trees were not simply disposable, and their removal was a significant 
event. But the road was marked as well through the performance of leading 
the bulldozer along the newly created path; a parade of sorts celebrating the 
connection between company, communities and the town of Wau.6 That they 
might kill the company employees was funny, but the parade was marked by 
sadness (women remember crying on such occasions). The account reflects the 
sort of playful, yet real, tension that is demonstrated in Biangai debates about 
land and resources; one that is highlighted in their relationship with past and 
present development partners. Songs were also composed for the occasion. 
6  The practice of pulling guests into a meeting is common. On numerous occasions, I witnessed, or was 
myself the subject of, such performances.
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These were songs of sorrow, or yongo ingi (literally, women’s songs), for the loss 
which the women sang as they tightened the strings of their arrows. Yongo ingi 
mark the passing of a loved one, noting their emplacement on the landscape, 
where they came from, where they will journey too; revealing relationships 
among the living and the dead, human and non-human (Halvaksz 2003). 
The songs composed for this occasion marked a similar passing. And as with the 
death of a family member who died too soon, where sorcery and mischief were 
suspected, they prepared their bows and arrows for the occasion. Removing the 
trees evoked connections with ancestors, ones that were forgone for the sake of 
a new relationship with the company, and through the company-created road, 
to the town of Wau.
But the final detail, the piecemeal extraction of timber from different locations, 
is important to the valuation of the trees as well and the extension of social 
relationships beyond the ancestral ones. Timber removed from different 
locations distributed compensation and established ties between specific Elauru 
landowners and New Guinea Goldfields. When evaluating the different regimes 
that have sought Biangai resources over the years (mining, logging, conservation, 
cash cropping), Biangai always spoke highly of logging. Many favoured it 
because of the distribution of benefits, as well as the enhanced communal social 
relations established with the representatives of the company. Contemporary 
gold mining concentrates on a single location, focusing the network on a smaller 
group, while logging can activate a much more expansive group of kin as timber 
is dispersed across the landscape. Biangai preferred the latter.
Under the Native Timber Authority, villagers were actively involved in 
‘witnessing’ the selection and cutting. Individual landowners participated in 
identifying areas and measuring logs, and were paid according to an agreed price 
per super foot (see also Mitio 1981). Disputes were limited mostly to families, 
which is not to say that they were not substantial. Compensation money from 
logging was fought over, but more often than not redistributed somewhat fairly 
and with a great deal of investment in projects that spoke more of a commitment 
to relationships than to self-interests. For example, Elauru villagers spent a 
large part of their compensation on the construction of a permanent church 
building, using store-bought materials and employing a carpenter from the 
coast. Additionally, families receiving compensation payments used some of the 
money to cover their ancestors’ graves with multi-tiered cement monuments. 
When I asked why this was done, it was said that these ancestors also hold title 
to the forests, and ‘you have to treat them well’.
In contrast, Timber Rights Purchase agreements resulted in much broader 
disputes, both among families and between villages. Mitio (1981, 1984) analyses 
the disputes that eventuated between Elauru and Werewere as the forest-
covered hills between the two villages were declared a Timber Rights Purchase 
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area by the government. His discussion emphasises the lack of close contact 
between resource owners and the daily practices of the logging companies. 
Mitio concluded that these disputes resulted from colonial assumptions about 
the organisation of all Papua New Guinea communities into unilineal clans, 
when in fact the Biangai are cognatic, granting both men and women rights 
in resources. Individuals can hold multiple titles in different named resource 
groups called solonarik, making the assignment of individuals to clans a futile 
process. Yet, this was done at the beginning of the Timber Rights Purchase 
agreement, and continues to inform (or confuse) debates around mineral 
compensation today. As royalty payments were made to ‘officially’ declared clan 
leaders without clear identification of which specific timber resources were in 
question, those with secondary, or even primary, rights in a specific tree might 
never be compensated and, more importantly, they might not be acknowledged 
as part of the benefiting group.7
The contrast between these two approaches to timber extraction highlights 
three important factors for contemporary community-based timber production. 
First, in addition to the short-term financial gains, through participation and 
employment in the Native Timber Authority, villagers gained experience in 
forestry that remains useful. As discussed below, it was through employment 
that individuals learned skills that have ensured the longevity of community-
based timber production. Second, smaller projects that provided direct returns 
to specific right holders were less likely to lead to disputes and more likely 
to result in some sort of locally meaningful investment. Third, and perhaps 
most significantly, the Native Timber Authority allowed for a greater sense 
of participation and control over the process, if not the actual practices. 
Subsequently, community members evaluated this experience more positively.
The employment of Biangai men during the Native Timber Authority agreement 
increased their sense of control as they ensured a greater degree of transparency 
through participation in the logging and processing of their resources. One of 
those employees, K–, benefited greatly from working with New Guinea Goldfields. 
At first hired for manual labour, he was eventually trained in the operation of 
much of the equipment, tripling his income in the process. At one point, he was 
given his own crew and a company certificate in chainsaw operations. While he 
described working with the chainsaw as ‘good work’, he complained that if he 
went to work for a company, ‘it would be like living in a prison’. Unable to take 
7  The disputes between villages follows a similar logic, and continued during my research in 2002 as a 
group of Werewere villagers tried to establish a cattle project on the area that was cleared by logging.
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breaks when he wanted, or work on different parts of the job, he would feel 
trapped, lacking control over his own life. Perhaps this sentiment is a factor in 
shaping how community forestry is practised today.8
The Kuper Range Wildlife Management Area
The Kuper Range Wildlife Management Area began in 1989 after discussions 
between Wau Ecology Institute (a local non-governmental organisation 
(NGO)) and Elauru village. Identified as part of a priority area for biodiversity 
conservation (Beehler 1993; Sekhran and Miller 1995), and coupled with the 
Wau Ecology Institute’s desire to move its overrun Kaindi research station, the 
Kuper Range was established in 1992. Initially 500 hectares of land was offered 
by a group from Elauru.9 The use of this facility by tourists, researchers, students 
of the Bulolo Forestry College and a National Geographic film crew increased 
village interest in the project and more families contributed land. Throughout, 
the conservation area was couched in terms of it meeting the expectations 
of development (see West 2006 for similar development discourse). The Wau 
Ecology Institute encouraged such thinking, funding numerous ‘sustainable’ 
development projects.10 Along with beekeeping, a pig farm, handicrafts, bottle 
recycling, a small trade store and ecotourism, a small-scale community forestry 
project was included for K– and his family. Wau Ecology Institute used K3,000 
to purchase a chainsaw, tools and a limited supply of fuel and oil. In addition, 
training was promised in ecological methods and equipment maintenance. While 
the training never eventuated, K– and others possessed enough experience and 
ingenuity to continue a community-based forestry project. Of the many projects 
funded, it is the only one that was still in operation at some level in 2005.
Early on, using chainsaw milling, K– was able to bid on and gain a number of 
contracts in and around Wau, in addition to casual labour for Wau Ecology 
Institute. The field station manager, who was charged with maintaining the 
paths around the proposed conservation area, was given a second chainsaw. 
But as discussed below, it too became significant in the local village-based 
8  Seeking a change in his life, K– applied to become an evangelist, and was accepted by the Lutheran 
Church’s school in Finschaffen for training. For some 10 years timber did not play a major role in the lives of 
Elauru villagers. Shortly after K– left for training, New Guinea Goldfields closed its sawmill in 1976, having 
failed to comply with stipulations of the Forestry Act (Sinclair 1998: 442). The company did not have a formal 
development plan for managing the forest areas under its control. Its contract in Elauru was left unfinished. 
When the idea emerged to start an eco-timber project in association with a small-scale Wildlife Management 
Area, K– was ready to participate.
9  Gold prospecting and squatters at Kaindi made the area less useful for biological research into Papua New 
Guinea’s unique flora and fauna.
10  The Wau Ecology Institute received a grant from the New Zealand High Commission to fund a landowner 
incentive project. The institute stated two objectives in this grant: (1) to assist Elauru villagers in officially 
registering the Wildlife Management Area and (2) to establish an incentive program that would ‘compel 
people not to sell their forests for commercial logging’ (Wau Ecology Institute n.d.: 10).
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economy. With the exception of the field station and ecotourism, none of the 
projects proved to be year-round successes. Many are long forgotten, and even 
ecotourism, once subject to the temperamental relationship between the NGO 
and the community, ended in 2003. Their relationship deteriorated as villagers 
increasingly questioned Wau Ecology Institute’s expenditures, and NGO staff 
became annoyed with weekly requests from Elauru villagers for compensation, 
development and/or support.
Throughout, K– remains a visionary, constantly planning ways to improve his 
project. He imagines opportunities, and programs that will empower not only 
himself, but other villagers as well. He spoke to me often about how his project 
would expand with consistent access to transport and better equipment. But 
most notable was his vision of a certification program that would allow him 
to train and certify other Biangai in the use of the chainsaw. He would teach 
others the skills necessary for participation in the community-based timber 
production project and employment opportunities in the local labour market.11 
In the meantime, his success has been limited to bidding on local contracts and 
acquiring occasional work removing trees that threaten to fall on village homes, 
or using crude chainsaw milling methods to cut lumber for local use.
Biangai Forestry and the Community
The lack of economic success and full-time commitment to the community 
forestry project ensures that it never meets the expectations of international aid 
agencies and NGOs. Many would not even deem this a community forestry effort. 
Elauru’s community effort neither grows, nor increases profits from year to year. 
Instead, the project continues to make meagre economic returns, without ever 
really completely falling apart. In part, this results from the retention of skills 
and equipment necessary to maintain the project. Furthermore, while much of 
the area has been logged, the timber resources are not entirely depleted, as with 
some areas in Papua New Guinea. But more importantly, the local demand for 
sawn timber remains, even if only on an intermittent basis. This is demonstrated 
in the village housing market.
Houses in Biangai villages are always under construction. Bundles of bamboo, 
posts symmetrically embedded in the ground, and skeletal walls temporarily 
braced against the wind can always be found in some corner of the community 
of Elauru as families work at replacing old deteriorating structures. They are 
not company built, but built with the help of many kin, and this construction 
11  He also imagines his own ‘integrated conservation and development project’, one that is full of 
contradictions. On one hand, he wants to recreate the facilities of Wau Ecology Institute on his family’s land, 
cutting the timber needed and constructing offices, a hostel, laboratories and a zoo on his own. However, he 
would do so using timber from the very forests that serve as the centrepiece of the conservation area.
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process adds meaning to the structure. When I helped hammer or carry a post 
or supplies, the homeowner would laugh and say that they will always think of 
me when they stand near the nail that I had just pounded in. Such comments 
were also applied to houses that were finished, as they reminded the residents 
of kin who had passed away, or moved to distant towns. My adoptive mother in 
Elauru often recalled how the walls of their house (made of hand-shaped planks 
fitted like siding) were originally used in the 1950s by her father. The flooring 
of sawn timber was from the house of my adoptive father’s father, made from 
New Guinea Goldfields’ staff houses built during the initial logging operations. 
His house was torn down at the end of a period of mourning a year after his 
death, and the usable components now circulate in the homes of his children 
as reminders. The timber, cut by New Guinea Goldfields from plots of land 
connected to the family, becomes part of an extended memory, folding the 
tall pines of the past landscapes, homes and lives into present buildings and 
contemporary social relations.
Houses are often recycled in this way. During research in 2000–02, Winima 
village was in the process of moving as the government had deemed it in danger 
of being destroyed by landslides. Instead of building entirely new structures, 
each building was almost entirely recycled into the new location. Houses and 
house parts travelled along the road, with only the most significantly worn 
pieces replaced by new bush materials. Such recycling serves as a memory of 
past labour and past labourers. The destruction of an old home can be quite 
emotional, especially if it is the home of one who has recently died, or was built 
with the help of such persons. A post bares both the connection to the land and 
the ‘hand mark’ of human labour.
The typical house embodies the work of an entire extended family, and the 
forests that they command. Construction begins with the cutting of hardwood 
posts, often designated for such purposes a year or more in advance. Cut marks 
made across the base of a tree confirm its eventual purpose. After posts are 
designated, the trees are felled and shaped by hand with axe and machete, and 
left to dry. A single post could take a half-day to shape. The frame of the house 
is a similarly intensive production, accumulated over the course of weeks if 
not months. Only the bamboo and kunai are assembled in the final moments, as 
neither can sit too long and remain useful. Their assemblage indicates the final 
stages, with the threading of grasses for the roof, and splitting and weaving 
bamboo floors and walls. Often, such work might entail an entire community. 
Forestry practices facilitated this work, and were valued for making homes 
and wood products that would outlast their predecessors. Y–’s house offers an 
example of such practices.
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Prominently situated at the entrance to the village, Y–’s house was slow to take 
shape. For months, 16 iron posts stood alone in his area. These were purchased 
at a considerable discount through a relative who was the headmaster at the 
vocational school in Wau where students are trained to make such products. 
Many watched with excitement and amusement as Y– and a teacher from the 
elementary school carefully marked the area, and checked that the posts stood 
perfectly upright before they poured in the cement. But then, nothing else 
happened. More than six months passed, and the posts remained unattended.
One morning while most of the community was preparing to spend the day in 
their gardens, there was much movement around Y–’s forever-emerging home. 
Towards the end of the coffee season, he had purchased fuel and oil for one of 
the two village chainsaws and work had long been under way in a small crop 
of trees on his land. Using this fuel, the operator would be able to cut timber 
for both Y– and himself. The delay came from the difficulty that the chainsaw 
operator was having with fashioning the many sizes and transporting the 
finished products from the bush to the village. They managed to cut the thicker 
cross beams for the floor, walls and roofs, but the thinner sizes kept splintering 
and breaking under the crude method of chainsaw milling. With the materials 
finally carried to the village, Y–’s floor started to take shape.
Some months passed, and Y– and his extended family had finally raised enough 
money through the sale of coffee to purchase the remaining timber from a 
neighbouring village sawmill in Wandumi and from an expatriate in Wau 
who purchases stands of timber to operate his portable sawmill. The timber 
and its transport cost money, but Y– viewed the expenditure as worthwhile. 
Other villagers were equally impressed, as only three other homes were made of 
sawn timber, most of which was taken from logging camp scraps. The walls of 
his house finally started to take shape.
Y– told me, ‘everyone has already said, you are building a real house … just 
like those in town … not at all like a village house’. But this was far from the 
complete story. While it looked much like the homes in the town of Wau, he had 
not constructed his house in the same way as a ‘town’ house. Instead, using his 
limited funds, he had mobilised his network of kin and other relations around 
this effort. Much of the money for timber and supplies, as well as the cups of 
tea, plates of rice and canned meat to feed those who worked a few hours raising 
his walls and roof, came from his extended family.
While the expatriate mill did not cut him a deal, his family in Wandumi helped 
by saving ‘flawed’ pieces for him to purchase at a discount. A relative employed 
by the Works Department in Lae, and another who was the headmaster of Wau’s 
vocational school, both supplied him with money and ‘excess’ supplies from 
their stores. Many in the community (myself included) hammered and sawed, 
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donating labour and tools towards the effort. Most of the newly constructed 
houses in town were built using prefabricated forms, purchased in Bulolo and 
assembled by local carpenters, if not by their future residents. Y– could not 
afford such expenses, but he could utilise his network of kin and the availability 
of skilled community foresters in his efforts. Many now plan to build similar 
homes, suggesting an increase in local demand for timber products. With the 
opening of gold mining at nearby Hidden Valley, it was likely that increased 
cash flows would facilitate this effort.
Conclusion: Determining Success in Community 
Forestry
In his review of community forestry in Papua New Guinea, Martin noted the 
collaborative potential for such efforts, as the influx of ‘small-scale forestry, 
indigenously owned and managed, offers a theoretical potential for diverse 
interest groups to realise their objectives in cooperation with each other’ (1997: 
270). These groups seek to address ecological, economic and political concerns 
providing sustainable alternatives to large-scale resource extraction (such as 
described in Filer with Sekhran 1998). Others have concluded that such projects 
contribute positively to community and environmental sustainability (Salafsky et 
al. 1997/8). However, the systematic lack of training and reliable transport, over-
reliance on local markets, internal friction, and project sustainability continues 
to hinder community-based timber production. Furthermore, Martin is critical 
of part-time efforts that fail to meet commercial standards as communities are torn 
between social obligations (such as funerary expenses and feasts, subsistence 
and cash-crop gardens, and village politics) and full participation in community 
forestry activities. From the perspective of sustaining a capitalist system of 
timber production, full-time participation is necessary for project success.
In contrast, Gilmour and Fisher (1997: 28) argued that regardless of economic 
motivations, community forestry ‘is essentially about access to and control 
of forest resources’ (see also Peluso 1992). This suggests a slightly different 
point of analysis; one that focuses on local empowerment, where political and 
social sustainability are privileged over economic profitability. As Bun and 
Baput (2006) point out, community forestry is a process and is different from 
industrial logging where quick profits are the goal. Here, I have argued that 
while Biangai communities struggle to succeed according to a formal economic 
model, they do succeed in terms of providing villages with alternative practices 
and opportunities that they might otherwise not enjoy. Such successes raise 
questions about development models, whether they are labelled sustainable or 
not. Instead of focusing on profit, export markets and the imposition of a strictly 
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capitalist model, I argue that such projects help extend the base of community 
resources, allowing for innovative and creative engagement within a transitional 
economy (Gudeman 2001). Moreover, we must attend to the different valuations 
of trees as timber and trees as embedded in community networks (Leach 2001). 
As objects that ‘circulate’, trees and their parts become differently entangled in 
systems of meaning that simultaneously facilitate both Biangai and corporate 
values. Values are at play when trees transact relationships among Biangai. 
And they are at play when Biangai, trees and their products engage in wider 
networks of exchange. Trees for Biangai are not simply utilitarian items of 
market value. Even when used in the building of homes, the value of trees 
is as much about the relationships they evoke as the qualities of the species 
themselves.
More broadly, Gudeman (2001: 158) has argued that development results not 
from capital accumulation ‘but from innovation in the relationships of society’. 
Such innovations result not merely from capital investment, technical transfer 
and education, but even in an age of globalisation innovation emerges from 
social networks. House construction is not a novel development for community-
based timber projects (Filer with Sekhran 1998: 299). Critiques of such practices 
emphasise the diversion of labour from more profitable endeavours and towards 
providing for local needs. However, I argue that as they provide opportunities 
for local innovation, the development of a specialised rural labour and improved 
living standards with more permanent structures, such projects are successful 
at extending the economic base of communities, and thus future opportunities. 
In many ways, contemporary Biangai practices follow the model of early 
goldminers, where forest resources are affordably accessed so that effort can 
be given to other development efforts. During the time under consideration, 
coffee, conservation and gold offered other ‘development-like’ benefits. Coupled 
with forestry, Biangai can be seen as creatively engaging diverse economic 
opportunities.
New Guinea Goldfields has already extracted the most profitable tracts and a 
nearby company, PNG Forest Products, continues to fill the broader regional 
demand for milled timber, but at prices beyond the local village. The timber 
demands of the Biangai communities around Wau are intermittent, based on 
seasonal cash flows from coffee sales, and a limited, but growing, interest; 
particularly as the Biangai are attracted to all things modern. Thus, it remains 
important that they have local resources to meet their needs (as Lane Poole once 
suggested). The community forestry projects in Elauru, as well as neighbouring 
Wandumi, seem to be doing just that.
While not meeting NGO and capitalist expectations for growth, Elauru’s 
community forestry efforts suggest much more about community sustainability, 
focusing attention on developing an economic base and community independence 
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in contrast to a reliance on fluctuating markets and dependence on the external 
advising of temperamental NGOs. K–’s many plans also show the promise of this 
effort, one that is not captured in the analysis and critique of similar projects. 
As  NGOs and international donor agencies rush to fund community-based 
timber production, it is import to acknowledge that there are different measures 
of success.
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5. The Impact of Mining 
Development on Settlement 
Patterns, Firewood Availability 
and Forest Structure in Porgera
JERRY K. JACKA
‘Wood for Sale’: The Firewood Crisis in Porgera
In the late 1990s in the Porgera Valley, Porgerans frequently described a 
common difference to me between their country and mine — the United States. 
For Porgerans, the common refrain was that Papua New Guinea (PNG) was a free 
country (fri kantri in Tok Pisin). Whereas everything in the United States costs 
money, everything in PNG was free — firewood, water, food, building materials 
and so forth. All one had to do was walk into the surrounding rainforest, cut 
down trees for lumber, harvest lianas for lashing together timbers, build a house, 
make a fence, and then plant a garden in the cleared space for food. Water for 
crops and people would be provided by the abundant rains and numerous 
springs found throughout the landscape.
By 2006, however, things in Porgera were no longer quite so ‘free’. Selim diwai, 
or ‘wood for sale’, signs lined the Enga Highway along the several-kilometre 
stretch from the security checkpoint at the Mt Maip boom gate to the outskirts 
of the world-class Porgera Gold Mine. Most surprisingly, the wood that was 
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for sale was not pre-cut lumber for building, but was just plain firewood. 
Bundles of four 6-foot-long split pieces of firewood were being sold for K4 (about 
US$1.20) apiece. Not only was I shocked to see firewood being sold, but in the 
six years since I had last visited Porgera, I couldn’t but help notice the intensive 
cutting of forest that had occurred along the highway as well. In fact, this is 
why I had returned to Porgera. One of the things I was interested in trying to 
understand was how migration into the valley was impacting forest resources. 
From a population of around 9,000 when the mine was first built in 1990, to an 
estimated population of over 40,000 today, I was interested in exploring how 
access to and control over resources, and the resources themselves, were faring 
in the era of mining development.
At the outset I want to stress that the relationship between forest exploitation 
and population increases cannot be explained in reference to simplistic 
associations related to carrying capacity and other kinds of ‘balance of nature’ 
arguments (Scoones 1999). Instead, I want to examine the issue of resource 
extraction and access to resources through a political ecology of development 
and human–forest dynamics that addresses political economy and ecology 
equally (Vayda and Walters 1999). As a consequence, I see the firewood crisis in 
Porgera as mutually constituted by sociocultural and ecological factors. From a 
sociocultural perspective, I explore Porgeran conceptions of land tenure, but do 
so from the recognition that different ethno-ecological zones related to relative 
altitude structure the claims that different actors can make regarding certain 
resources. From an ecological standpoint, I highlight forest succession dynamics 
in these different altitude zones and link them to economic and cultural uses 
by Porgerans to understand some relationships between forest exploitation, 
ecological succession, and sustainability of harvest in the different altitude 
zones.
Fuelwood Demands and Deforestation in Rural 
Global Settings
About half of all the timber cut globally is used as fuelwood and, of this amount, 
around 90 per cent is used in developing countries by rural populations for 
cooking and heating purposes (Parikka 2004). While the cutting of trees for 
fuelwood is sustainable in some cases, it has been estimated that wood cutting in 
tropical forests for lumber, charcoal production and fuelwood ‘constitute 68% of 
the proximate causes of deforestation in Africa, 89% in Asia, and 51% in Latin 
America’ (Naughton-Treves et al. 2007: 233). Even in areas where deforestation 
is not occurring, harvesting can result in changes in species composition and 
ecosystem function, as fast-growing secondary species replace slow-growing, 
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old-growth species. Moreover, as is well documented by a number of ecologists, 
often species compositions after human disturbance do not return to levels that 
existed prior to human use (Holling 1973). Nevertheless, management plans in 
many countries wrongly assume that successional pathways in cleared tropical 
forests will lead to ecosystems similar to the ones that existed before clearing, 
that this will happen fairly rapidly, and that species richness will be similar to 
the original forest (Struhsaker 1997; Chapman and Chapman 2004). There are of 
course no forest management plans in place in Porgera, as land management is 
in the hands of customary social groups. However, as the data herein indicate, 
more holistic management plans and socio-economic impact studies need to 
take into account long-term ecological changes brought not just by the impact 
of whatever resource is being extracted, but also by the impacts of migrants, 
many who will stay in resource development zones for years, if not decades 
(Dambacher et al. 2007). In PNG, it is estimated that 23 per cent of the rural 
population lives in areas where firewood is sold, and between 1990 and 1995 
firewood sales generated an estimated K5  million income annually for rural 
villagers (Bourke and Harwood 2009:  392). The expansion of development-
related economic activities in the coming years will only increase the tensions 
surrounding fuelwood availability as land is cleared through logging, plantation 
development, and mining and petroleum ventures.
The protection of forests in PNG is critical as the island of New Guinea contains 
the third-largest extant bloc of rainforest in the world (Primack and Corlett 
2005). New species are constantly being discovered and little ecological work 
has been done since the transition to independence in the mid-1970s. In 1972, 
approximately 29 million hectares of rainforest covered PNG, which constituted 
about 62  per cent of the country’s land cover. By the end of the twentieth 
century, between 3 and 5 million hectares of this forest had been cut.
Currently in PNG, the varying impacts of the drivers behind deforestation 
and the rates of deforestation overall are the source of some controversy 
(Shearman et al. 2008, 2009, 2010; Filer et al. 2009; Filer 2010). As a result of 
the PNG government’s central role in the UN-REDD program1 (United Nations 
Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation in Developing Countries), Filer and colleagues (Filer et  al. 2009; 
Filer 2010) argue that the PNG government has inflated the past, present and 
future rates of deforestation in order to obtain the greatest benefits from the 
REDD program. The source of the controversy stems from three different studies 
of deforestation in PNG, all of which appear to demonstrate varying rates of 
deforestation:
1  Technically, the PNG government is involved in REDD+, which goes beyond just deforestation and 
degradation and includes conservation, sustainable management and enhancement of forests. See Gabriel, 
Chapter 10, this volume, for more information about REDD+.
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• the Remote Sensing and Land-Use Project (RSLUP) associated with Shearman 
and colleagues (Shearman et al. 2008, 2009)
• the Forest Inventory Mapping System (FIMS), which Filer and colleagues 
rely upon (Filer et al. 2009; Filer 2010)
• assessments by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
(FAO 2005, 2010), which are derived from the FIMS findings (Shearman et al. 
2008: 117–8; Filer et al. 2009: 813), although the data between the latter two 
do not match one another (see Table 5.1)!
Central to each of these studies are slippery definitions of such terms as: 
‘deforestation’, ‘degradation’, ‘primary forest’ and ‘primary rainforest’. 
Moreover, the data these studies draw on are scattered throughout various 
sources (much of it inaccessible grey literature) and the methods for which 
land-cover classification was determined (in the FIMS and FAO datasets) are not 
comprehensively detailed.
Deforestation comes from many sources: logging operations, natural and 
anthropogenic fires, plantation development, subsistence agriculture and 
mining. In many instances, forest is converted to grasslands, scrub or agricultural 
land, which may persist for decades (Shearman et al. 2009: 379). Shearman and 
colleagues (2008, 2009) list commercial logging and subsistence agriculture 
as the two primary drivers in the loss of primary rainforest, and attempt to 
demonstrate that increasing population results in loss of primary forests. 
This contradicts what shifting cultivators themselves say — who prefer to use 
secondary forests — and recent studies looking at agricultural intensification 
in PNG (Allen et al. 2001; McAlpine and Freyne 2001). I will address this in 
greater detail later in the chapter as the Porgera data support the intensification 
argument to some degree.
At issue in the deforestation controversy is how much primary rainforest 
existed in 1972 (the date at which the Australian government compiled most 
of the aerial photos of the country, which were subsequently used in making 
1:100,000 topographic maps with land-cover features; both FIMS and RSLUP 
used this data for their 1972 baseline). According to FIMS, there were 29,317,500 
hectares (ha) of primary rainforest in PNG in 1972. RSLUP figures state that there 
were actually 33,227,590 ha. As Filer et al. (2009) exclaim, this is a difference 
of almost 40,000 km2! Given this discrepancy between initial numbers, RSLUP 
claims that nearly one-quarter (23.8 per cent) of PNG’s forests were cut between 
1972 and 2002, while FIMS reports a loss of only 10.9 per cent between 1972 
and 1996. The source of this discrepancy perhaps lies in a slippage of how 
terms like ‘intact forest’, ‘primary forest’ and ‘primary rainforest’ are used by 
the RSLUP team and how ‘total gross forest’ and ‘adjusted gross forest’ were 
used by FIMS (see Filer et al. 2009: 813–4). The RSLUP team writes, ‘In 2002 
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there were 28,251,967 ha of rain forest … with an additional 3,409,018 ha of 
swamp forest, 574,876 ha of mangroves, and 750,309 ha of dry evergreen forest. 
Of the rain forest, 25,332,253 ha were primary forest and 2,919,714 ha were 
secondary forest’ (Shearman et al. 2009: 383). In summary, there are multiple 
classes of forest: primary rainforest, secondary rainforest, dry evergreen forest, 
swamp forest and mangroves. For 1972, however, the land-cover classes were 
‘intact forest, mangroves, scrub, grassland, and water. For the change analysis, 
land-cover classes were combined into two categories: forest (rain forest) and 
nonforest (non-rain forest)’ (ibid.: 381). This raises the critical question of what 
happened to the 4,159,327 ha of swamp and dry evergreen forest from 2002 — 
were they included in the 1972 ‘intact forest’ category? For the remainder of this 
chapter I will assume so, and for the purposes of clarifying and comparing the 
data will assume that these two 2002 land-cover categories were similarly sized 
in 1972.2 This also helps to account for the 40,000 km2 discrepancy between 
the RSLUP and FIMS data. Table 5.1 summarises these new amounts, removing 
4,159,327 ha from RSLUP’s 1972 estimate of over 33 million hectares of primary 
rainforest in 1972.
Table 5.1 Summary of FIMS, RSLUP and FAO studiesa of deforestation 
in Papua New Guinea.










































a FIMS = Forest Inventory Mapping System, RSLUP = Remote Sensing and Land-Use Project, FAO = Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.
b This is equivalent to what FIMS called ‘adjusted gross forest area’ (see Filer et al. 2009). FIMS data are 
reported in square kilometres; RSLUP and FAO data are in hectares.
Source: Shearman et al. (2008, 2009), Filer et al. (2009), Filer (2010), FAO (2005, 2010).
2  Of course they were not the same area, but it is probably safe to assume that there were no commercial 
logging operations in these forest types that would have diminished them from their 1972 area.
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As Table 5.1 demonstrates, once the confusion generated by RSLUP’s 1972 
‘intact forest’ and 2002 ‘primary rain forest’ is accounted for, the FIMS and 
RSLUP data are almost identical in terms of primary rainforest in 1972 and 
subsequent deforestation. Moreover, the total annual rate of deforestation and 
degradation are very similar across the three studies (see the last column in 
Table 5.1). Degradation in Table 5.1 refers to the 2.9 million ha of secondary 
rainforest as documented by the RSLUP group. This was forest that had been 
logged and was naturally regenerating. According to FIMS, this amount was 
1.9 million ha; however, since PNG’s logging industry was booming in the 
late 1990s (Filer et  al. 2009, Figure  1; Shearman et  al. 2009, Figure  5) this 
may account for this difference. The FAO figure of 1,886,000 ha of degraded 
forest comes from the sum of their categories of ‘naturally regenerated forests’ 
and ‘planted forests’ between 1990 and 2005. In Table  5.1, annual rates of 
deforestation and degradation have been linearly extrapolated. As argued by 
Shearman et  al. (2009:  388), this ignores the recent increase in deforestation 
and degradation stemming from the uptake in commercial logging. As such, 
they modelled deforestation and degradation to each year based on the volume 
of timber exported, oil palm exports, increases in population and the intensity 
of El Niño events to account for logging, plantations, subsistence agriculture 
and fire as primary drivers (ibid.: 383). As such, they came up with annual 
rates of deforestation varying from 0.4 per cent in 1972–73 to 1.4 per cent in 
2001–02, with a peak of 1.8 per cent in 1997–98. In primary forests accessible 
to commercial loggers, they calculated the rate of deforestation at 2.6 per cent 
per annum. These numbers are decried by Filer (2010: 151) as exaggerations 
stemming from the ‘moral hazards’ that REDD poses to ‘rainforest nations’ that 
seek to claim benefits from reducing greenhouse gas emissions from fictitious 
levels of deforestation and degradation. This is a point well made; however, 
recent data from the FAO show a rate of deforestation in PNG of 1.51 per cent 
per annum from the years 2005 to 2010 (FAO 2010). Importantly, as Filer et al. 
(2009: 813) note, a significant part of what is being classified as forest loss is part 
of the subsistence cycle of shifting cultivation in which more than 80 per cent 
of Papua New Guineans are engaged. However, in the absence of detailed 
ecological studies it is difficult to state with any certainty how an increasing 
population in PNG with larger demands on the forest will influence future 
forest regeneration, although the discussion later in this chapter deals with 
some possible implications based on the data in Porgera.
What I have tried to do in this section is sift through the data on deforestation 
in PNG and attempt to show that a recent controversy over the rate of 
deforestation isn’t perhaps quite so controversial after all once confusion over 
terminology and land-cover categories is accounted for. Nevertheless, whether 
the annual rate of deforestation of primary rainforest is 0.46 per cent, 1.4 per 
cent or 1.51 per cent, these are still alarming numbers given the vast area of 
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rainforest cut each year in PNG. Between 2005 and 2010, the FAO estimates that 
427,000 ha of primary rainforest was cut each year in PNG (FAO 2010). This 
amount of deforestation currently ranks as the second highest in the world. 
Only Brazil cut more rainforest (more than five times as much as PNG, but Brazil 
has a forested area 18 times larger than PNG’s rainforests).
At this juncture, in discussing forests, I don’t want to lose sight of the trees 
for the forest, for as I discuss in the following sections, it is not the overall 
clearance of forest that needs to be considered in addressing the firewood crisis 
in the Porgera Valley, but rather where forest resources are being extracted as a 
function of altitude, successional dynamics, forest type and resource use rights.
Study Area — Ecological Characteristics
The Porgera Valley watershed (553 km2) is located in western Enga Province, PNG 
(5° 16’ – 5º 33’ S, 143° 0’ – 143º 16’ E). Elevations range from 900 metres in the 
northern part of the valley and climb to over 3,900 metres in the south. In 2002, 
based on satellite imagery, approximately 74.5 per cent of the watershed was 
covered in primary rainforest. Mean annual rainfall is 3,667 millimetres, with 
very little seasonality. In 30 years of rainfall data, there have been only three 
months that received less than 100 millimetres of rain. The mean daily minimum 
temperature is 11.8 °C, and the mean daily maximum temperature is 20.2 °C.3 
The remainder of the land cover in the watershed is grasslands (3.1 per cent), 
gardens (10.6  per cent), secondary forest (9.1  per cent) and mining/built up 
areas (2.6 per cent).
Ecologists and local groups alike offer multiple ways of defining the various 
forest zones in PNG. Robbins (1961) characterises forests from 3,000 to 9,000 feet 
(914–2,743 metres) as lower montane rainforest; similarly, Paijmans (1976) sets 
lower montane rainforest as occurring between 1,000 and 3,000 metres, whereas 
Johns (1982) defines lower montane as occurring at 300–1,000 metres in its lower 
limits and 1,500–2,000 metres in its upper limits, and mid-montane rainforest 
occurring at 1,500–2,000 metres in its lower limits and 2,700–3,000 metres as the 
upper limits. While many ecologists have tried to use features of forest structure 
(such as canopy height, presence/absence of buttressed trees and so forth) to 
delineate forest types, often these designations are characterised by linking 
dominant species to the divisions, such that lower montane is often associated 
with oaks (Castanopsis acuminatissima) and mid-montane with southern 
3  Rainfall and temperature data come from the Porgera Joint Venture mine records. All readings were taken 
at Anawe at approximately 2,300 metres altitude. Rainfall data is from 1974 to 2004; temperature data is from 
1988 to 2004.
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beeches (Nothofagus sp.). Using these nodal forest types, ‘Castanopsis’ as lower 
montane and ‘Nothofagus’ as mid-montane ‘has additional value because it fits 
more closely with altitudinal zones shown by the birds of New Guinea as well 
as enabling the major zone of population pressure to be more easily defined for 
planning of conservation measures’ (Johns 1982: 309).
Various highlands groups show as much diversity in describing forest types 
as ecologists. Among the Nimai, there are two divisions, ‘the upper part [is] 
dimina, which they contrast with the lower same on the basis of altitude, 
temperature, crop types and maturation periods, and general vegetation cover. 
While no sharp boundary separates these two zones, for reference to them is 
usually relative, the 2,100 m contour line approximates the division’ (Hide et al. 
1979: 5). Majnep and Bulmer (1977: 35–6) describe five ecological zones that 
the Kalam delineate: above 2,300 metres is kamay-agn ‘at the base of the small-
leaved southern beech trees’, at 2,300–2,100 metres is a ‘sweet potato’ zone, 
at 2,100–1,850 metres a ‘taro’ zone, at 1,850–1,600 metres a ‘sugarcane, taro, 
and banana’ zone, and below 1,600 metres is the nml zone where marita (fruit 
pandanus, Pandanus conoideus) and black palm grow. They note that the zone 
below 1,600 metres is the one where it is easiest to grow crops. Hyndman (1979) 
describes a four-part division of environmental zones among the Wopkaimin. 
As can be seen from this brief survey, groups across the highlands recognise 
important altitudinal differences in respect to resource management and use.
In Porgera there are three environmental zones that Ipili speakers recognise 
(Figure  5.1). Below about 1,700  metres is a zone called wapi. Similar to the 
Kalam, this is a zone recognised for its high productivity, but due to dangerous 
forest spirits it is not used for gardening and living (Jacka 2010). However, 
it is an area that is used for hunting and foraging. Between about 1,700 to 
2,100 metres is the andakama, literally ‘the place of houses and cleared spaces’. 
This is the zone in which most gardening is done. Above about 2,100 metres is 
the aiyandaka, literally ‘the place of beauty’. It is the high, wet, cold rainforest 
in which beautification rituals were conducted by young men and women who 
were preparing themselves for the rigours of life as sexually active, reproductive 
adults (Biersack 1998, 2004). The altitude boundaries are rather rough estimates 
as, similar to the Nimai, Porgerans distinguish the zones not on actual altitude, 
but on a range of factors relating to soil type, temperature, and presence or 
absence of critical species. Two of the most important markers that delineate 
the zones are the fruit pandanus, signalling the beginning of the lower zone 
(as entered from the middle zone), and various cultivars of wild pandanus 
(Pandanus brosimos) that signal the upper zone. GIS analysis that I conducted 
of aerial photos and satellite data from 1972 supports using 1,700 metres and 
2,100 metres as good points at which to distinguish the zones. In 1972 in the 
eastern Porgera Valley, 78.1 per cent of the total area for gardening was found 
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between 1,700 and 2,100 metres, 14.9 per cent occurred below 1,700 metres, 
while only 7 per cent of total garden area was found above 2,100 metres. There 
were no gardens below 1,400 metres or above 2,300 metres in 1972. With the 
development of mining and the completion of the Enga Highway, this would 
radically shift by the 2000s, as most occupation occurred above 2,100 metres in 
the aiyandaka. The implications for this transformation are explored later in the 
chapter.
Figure 5.1 Environmental zones recognised by Ipili speakers, Porgera Valley.
Source: Image created by author using ArcGIS.
Social Context and Land Tenure Rules
Porgera is known most famously for its extensive epithermal gold deposits 
discovered in 1939. Small-scale expatriate mining began in 1948 with local 
miners becoming active from the late 1950s. The 1960s and 1970s saw a few 
medium-scale sluicing operations develop alongside continuing local mining, 
but the planning and development for the large-scale Porgera Gold Mine in 
the mid to late 1980s fundamentally altered the mining scene in the valley. 
Since production began in 1990, the Porgera mine has been one of the top gold 
producers in the world, averaging about 900,000 ounces of gold annually.
Tropical Forests of Oceania
104
Porgera Joint Venture is the operator of the mine. Initially comprising a number 
of mining companies (most notably Placer Dome, who ran daily operations) and 
the state, today the joint venture is 95 per cent owned by Barrick Gold and 
5 per cent by Mineral Resources Enga, an entity equally owned by the Enga 
Provincial Government and the Porgera Landowners Association. The Porgera 
Landowners are members of the seven landowning clans affiliated with the 
mining lease property.
Since the late 1980s, when mining development began in earnest, outsiders 
have poured into the valley in hopes of sharing in the wealth generated by 
the gold extraction (for an overview of issues surrounding the development 
of the Porgera mine, see Filer 1999; Jackson and Banks 2002). The outsiders 
are predominantly from neighbouring cultural groups, especially the Huli and 
Enga, who have long-term kinship and trading links with the indigenous Ipili. 
Today, I use the term Porgeran to characterise the inhabitants of the valley as so 
many Enga and Huli have married in, moved in, and built houses and gardens 
that the social scene today is one of multiple cultures and languages, such that 
terms such as Ipili, Huli and Enga at best only describe the primary language 
that some Porgerans speak. However, what is of interest for my purposes in 
this chapter is to understand how resource rights are determined by a person’s 
link to a landowning group, as rights are not apportioned equally to everyone, 
especially newcomers.
The basis for social organisation in the valley rests on three principles: land (yu), 
group (tata or yame) and bilateral kinship principles. In Porgera every named 
group controls various named blocks of land in the region that are generally 
demarcated by creeks or ridgelines. What is of importance though is that 
Porgerans utilise bilateral kin reckoning to determine membership in a group 
and to regulate property rights. In doing so, Porgeran social organisation ensures 
that any one person is a member of several groups, generally the eight groups 
of one’s great-grandparents as well as those of their spouse, making 16 groups 
in all for a married couple to affiliate themselves with. Practically, this would be 
impossible but it is expected that people will live ‘multi-locally’ (Biersack 1995), 
building gardens and houses on two, three or four of their possible kin groups’ 
lands. Most people actually do this for a number of good reasons. A primary 
reason that people give is that the steep topography, variable soils, and potential 
for frosts and droughts create a number of different micro-environments such 
that when one’s crops fail in one area, there is a strong likelihood that there 
will be crops not harmed in another area (Waddell 1975). Another rationale 
for living multi-locally is the responses that people can make when conflicts 
break out, such as moving to another group’s lands to avoid the fighting and 
revenge killings that are endemic in this region (Meggitt 1977; Gordon and 
Meggitt 1985).
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There are several terms that recognise the differences in how a person is 
affiliated to a group, since they do not have equal membership rights in all of 
their groups, despite the use of bilateral kin reckoning. Male agnates are tene. 
All consanguineous women are called wana. The sons and grandsons of women 
who are consanguineous kin are called wanaini and aiyane lapone, respectively, 
and a woman’s husband who comes to live on his wife’s land is a wanakalini. 
There is a system of incorporation such that multigenerational interaction with 
a group is recognised through calling a woman’s great-grandson tene, just as an 
agnate is called. What this means practically is that if a man goes and lives with 
his mother’s kin and stays there, raising a family, making gardens and helping 
in compensations, his grandsons will have the same status as male agnates. 
The rationale for this according to Porgerans is that in terms of the relationships 
between people and land, in Porgera there were always too few people and too 
much land. Besides incorporating cognatic kin, Porgeran groups were also keen 
to incorporate outsiders, called epo atene, literally translated as ‘those who come 
and stay’. Ideally epo atene would eventually be incorporated as affines through 
marriage into the group and then within a few generations converted into tene 
(cf. Wohlt 1995). The importance of all these different kin designations relates 
to how land rights are assigned in the group.
Land among Ipili speakers is conceptualised as having a ‘skin’ (umbuaini) and 
‘bone’ (kulini). The skin of the land is the topsoil, plants, trees, structures and 
gardens, while the bone is all of that underneath the skin. Land is controlled 
through a communal property system and the bone of the land is said to be 
‘held’ (mina) by the group. Individuals within the group ‘own’ the land’s skin 
(they are called anduane, ‘landowners’) and also inherit land from their fathers 
and mothers and in turn pass their land to their children. Despite the fact that 
the Ipili term anduane is translated into English as landowner, the true owners 
are the collective group; individuals merely have long-term and inheritable use 
rights. Besides inheriting land, one can also gain rights to a piece of land by 
cutting primary rainforest and then planting a garden or building a house on 
the land. Even in very old secondary forest, people are aware of who first cut 
the land (the anduane) and anyone intending to make a garden on old secondary 
forest that is not their own must find the offspring of the actual owner to receive 
permission to rework the land. This is rather common as land is frequently 
loaned out to various people for varying lengths of time, which is one way that 
hosts, the anduane, recruit people to come and join the group, hoping that in time 
they will marry in and their children will become tenes. Short-term loans such 
as these are called yu no atene rights, which translates as something like ‘land 
eat stays’ or someone who receives land to stay on and plant a garden. All of 
these forms of affiliation to a clan are important because they determine the 
kinds of rights that a person has in respect to gaining access to land, converting 
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forest into gardens, and adjudicating conflicts over land. The important thing 
to note is that these rights are not codified, but are flexible, open to dispute and 
interpretation, and contingent and context dependent.
Generally, though, tenes make most of the decisions as to how land is allocated 
and make judgements on disputed lands. In terms of a person wanting to cut 
primary rainforest to build a house or make a garden, they must gain permission 
from a tene. With the exception of epo atene and yu no atene, any person in any 
of these categories can do what they like with inherited lands — they can cut 
trees, plant trees, or even give away portions of land to others. Epo atene can 
give land to outsiders to use; these outsiders (themselves epo atene) can’t plant 
trees, although they can cut down trees that are not economically important. 
All economically important trees in the areas around houses and gardens 
are individually owned and can only be cut with their owner’s permission. 
Concepts of tree tenure and land tenure are linked in that Porgerans recognise 
that a lot of effort goes towards maintaining casuarina (Casuarina oligodon) and 
pandanus (Pandanus julianettii) trees, and hence anyone who has planted them 
and maintained them should gain access to the land as well. Therefore, people 
who loan land must remain vigilant to ensure that trees are not being planted 
on it, or else risk losing that land. Planting trees is a signal that one intends to 
claim the land permanently for one’s self and one’s kin.
Thomas Igila, a Huli man, related a story to me that may well be hearsay, but 
the message indicates how powerful the concept of planting trees is in terms of 
land ownership. He told of how a group of Huli in Port Moresby was given a 
patch of land to garden on by some local landowners. After a while, the Huli 
asked if they could plant trees on the land and the local landowners allowed 
them to do so. At that time, the Huli then logically assumed that they were 
being given the land since they were told they could plant trees on it. When the 
local landowners asked for the land back after a few years, the Huli refused to 
relinquish it. According to Thomas, the case went all the way to the Supreme 
Court of PNG, which found in favour of the Huli. As mentioned, I don’t know if 
a case like this ever made it to the Supreme Court, but as far as local land court 
cases go in Porgera, people surreptitiously planting trees on land to take it over 
was a constant source of litigation. In nearly every case, the land is given to the 
person who has planted trees on it.
In summary, traditionally Porgeran social groups were faced with two facts: 
abundant land and insufficient numbers of people to defend the group against 
aggressors. Coupled with unpredictable environmental conditions that challenge 
their high-altitude subsistence system, and endemic conflict, Porgeran culture 
responded by having a very flexible social organisation that had numerous 
mechanisms for incorporating cognatic kin and even outsiders by offering 
agnatic-like kinship status and land. In the context of mining, though, land 
5. The Impact of Mining Development on Settlement Patterns, Firewood Availability and Forest Structure in Porgera
107
has become less abundant. It is still considered important to have a large group, 
as conflicts are still endemic. One result is that people welcome outsiders, but 
are less likely to allow them to become true landowners in the sense that they 
can plant trees and take over lands for their own. Without the right to plant 
trees, outsiders must then turn to cutting trees in areas of primary forest and 
secondary forest in order to obtain firewood — enter the firewood crisis of the 
mid-2000s.
Trees and Land Types
The land types that I use in this chapter — primary forest, secondary forest, 
gardens and grasslands — are derived from Porgeran terms. Trees are called ita, 
and what I am calling primary forests, Porgerans refer to as itapu or ima. Gardens 
are called e, and several kinds of gardens are differentiated. E wene are ‘new’ 
gardens where cultivation has not occurred yet, but trees have been cut down to 
make the garden; e siaka, or an ‘alive’ garden, is a garden in which sweet potato 
mounds are being made; e talu, or a ‘fertile’ garden has crops growing in it; e 
si is an old garden with grass growing in it; e pale is an old garden with trees 
growing in it; and e imati are forests which show traces of ancient or very old 
gardening. E pale and e imati are what I translate as secondary forests. E pale are 
secondary forests that are about five to 25 years old. People generally cannot tell 
how long ago a garden was in an e imati secondary forest, only that it is not ima, 
primary forest that has never had a garden cut in it. Generally people prefer to 
make new gardens in e pale, as soil fertility is greater, but trees aren’t as large as 
they are in e imati and ima. Grasslands, which I don’t discuss here, are another 
indigenous land type called puka.
Within the field of environmental studies there is some debate over how pristine 
primary rainforests really are (Posey 1985; Parker 1993; Fairhead and Leach 
1996; Willis et al. 2004). Balée (1989), for example, argues that approximately 
12  per  cent of Amazonian terre firme forests are anthropogenic. My concern 
in this chapter is not to argue that primary forests in Porgera have never had 
gardens in them. The critical point is that Porgerans do not recognise any 
gardening activity in them that would create large canopy gaps and significantly 
alter the composition of tree species in ima forests. Ima forests do serve as 
supply sources for single logs, for which I have seen plenty of evidence over the 
years. Therefore, the category ‘primary forest’ for the purposes of this chapter 
indicates forests that have received only minor disturbance from humans over 
several decades.
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Culturally, trees figure critically in Porgeran experience. In one origin story, a 
tawe akali (‘sky man’ spirit) finds a group of women living and gardening in the 
eastern Porgera Valley. They all are living in a giant water gourd that he picks up 
and takes to the sky world while the women are sleeping. While they sleep, he 
lays out food for them and sharpens an opolanga (Schefflera actinophylla) digging 
stick for each woman. He wakes the women by playing a bamboo mouth harp 
(lino) and then feeds them and gives them their digging sticks. After eating, he 
instructs the women to gently dig up a taiya (Araucaria cunninghamii) tree and 
plant it next to his house. When they do so, the branches of the tree sprout 
men whom the tawe akali matches up with the women. These couples then 
become the ancestors of all the clans in the Porgera area, according to the elder 
woman who told the story. After hearing this story, my research assistant added, 
‘They became the ancestors of everyone in the world’. In other origin stories, 
quasi-mythological ancestors plant a number of important tree species as they 
move about the landscape. Today, these locales still contain dominant numbers 
of these species marking the passage of these mythical heroes.
Men have lifelong connections to trees. Porgeran etiquette requires that 
a husband not ask his wife directly the sex of their newborn child, so he 
discreetly enquires, ‘U pe, nu pe?’ which means ‘Axe or net bag?’ This indicates 
the cultural implements that define gendered livelihoods in Porgera — axes for 
men to cut firewood and build houses and fences, net bags (bilums) for women 
to carry produce and babies. Traditionally, after boys were born, the fathers 
would take the placentas which had been placed in bilums and tie them to the 
tops of very high trees so that as the young men grew up they would not be 
afraid of heights or of climbing trees to de-limb them. Many men whom I came 
to know personally or through stories — Mata, Bope, Pawa, Tapaiya, Yakati and 
others — were, I eventually learned, named after tree species. In time, it often 
became hard to disassociate the man from the shape or quality of the tree. Pawa 
(Dacrydium sp.), a tree known for its strong wood and prickly needles, became 
entangled with the Pawa who would beat his wife mercilessly for the slightest 
of infractions. Yakati, the father of one of my elder key informants, Muyu, I 
never met, but I could never purge my mental image of him as short and broad 
like the yakati ‘highland breadfruit’ (Ficus dammaropsis) tree. Many of the 
names of places and waterways also come from trees. Porgera comes from the 
poketa tree (Alphitonia incana), which presumably grew along the banks of the 
Porgera River in sufficient numbers to give that river its name. Likewise for the 
Tupa and Pongema rivers that share names with their associated tree species. 
There are at least two place names in the eastern Porgera Valley that come from 
a tree species — both are called Tatonga, meaning ‘at the base of the tato’ tree 
(Nothofagus sp.), a dominant tree in mid-montane forests, as mentioned earlier.
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Trees also figure in important rituals both as metaphor and substance. 
Magic formulas (kamo) invoke tree species names to mimic qualities found in 
those species, such as strength, stickiness, smoothness, watery sap and so forth. 
To ensure that her husband’s skin remained healthy and supple, wives would 
chew the leaves of lioko trees (Acronychia sp.) while staring into the sun and 
reciting a magical spell. Women also buried used moss menstrual pads at the 
base of Nothofagus trees, the largest trees in the Porgeran landscape, which 
as one male informant indicated were ‘the only trees strong enough not to be 
killed by menstrual blood’. Several rituals designated for healing people and 
renewing the fertility of the earth required the use of specific tree species to 
build ritual houses and other structures for their properties of strength and 
fragrance. Other  species are used merely for their decorative purposes; for 
example, many people employ leaf bundles from species that have green shiny 
leaves with whitish undersides for the contrastive elements that arise when the 
leaves are in motion.
Economically, trees of course provide firewood, building materials and fencing. 
In fact, ita means not only tree, but also ‘wood’ and ‘fire’. Perhaps rather than 
seeing the forest for the trees, trees are seen as ‘buildables’ and ‘burnables’. 
While some trees are not used for either building or burning, they are used 
for medicines, rituals and clothing, and as sites for hunting marsupials or birds 
because of seeds, nuts and fruits preferred by these game animals. Pandanus 
species are also important for food sources and building materials, and the 
leaves of one cultivar of P. julianettii (tapuna) are used as compost in sweet 
potato mounds. In 2006, while gathering data on uses of trees, of 110 species4 
encountered in the field, only one species did not have an economic or cultural 
use. By far, the most economically important tree is the casuarina (C. oligodon), 
called yar in Tok Pisin. Casuarinas are planted around houses and in gardens 
and grow naturally in disturbed areas, such as near landslips and along eroded 
stream banks (Robbins and Pullen 1965). Besides being the most important 
firewood species (Bourke and Harwood 2009: 392) due to its long burn time, 
high heat output and low ash production, casuarina is also a nitrogen fixer, 
which contributes to its importance in garden locations. Additionally, it is often 
used for fencing and house building.
At this juncture, I want to look at data I gathered in 2006 on tree 
successional dynamics in the different environmental zones in Porgera. 
While anthropogenically planted casuarina is perhaps the most important tree 
species, naturally occurring trees in secondary and primary forests are also 
very important and serve as a critical fallback resource when people need more 
wood than can be supplied by casuarinas, which is fairly often. To understand 
4  Overall, Porgerans recognise more than 220 distinct tree species.
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what kinds of trees grow where and in what abundances, comparative analyses 
were done on the composition of tree species found in the three environmental 
zones and in the differences between primary and secondary forests. As will 
be seen, altitude has a significant impact on which trees come up in secondary 
forests, thereby hampering the abilities of Porgerans to obtain adequate wood 
for building and cooking in the higher-altitude zone.
Methods
Forest Transects
The survey of tree species by land use type and elevation zone was conducted 
in the eastern part of the Porgera Valley around the Kairik airstrip (5º 26’ S, 
143º 10’ E). This was land held by the Bipe clan, among whom I was living 
in 2006. This site was chosen due to its proximity to the Enga Highway, and 
because there were several ‘camps’ of Engans living nearby who were using trees 
for house building and firewood, allowing me to explore population pressure on 
local resources and on tree tenure and land tenure dynamics between immigrant 
and host communities and individuals. Twenty-two 50 × 10 metre (1.10 ha in 
total) transects were sampled. Transects were established in both primary and 
secondary forest at each of the three elevation zones, with the exception of 
primary forest in the upper elevation zone, as there is no longer any primary 
forest in this area (around the Kairik airstrip). What species should have been in 
primary forest in the upper elevation zone were reconstructed from oral history 
and data from other sites in the PNG highlands at a similar altitude.
In the lower elevation zone, three areas (1,500 square metres) were sampled 
in primary forest (at elevations 1,635–1,652 metres) and four areas (2,000 
square metres) in secondary forest (at elevations 1,662–1,684 metres). In the 
mid-elevation zone, five areas (each 2,500 square metres) were sampled in both 
primary forest (elevations 2,020–2,091 metres) and secondary forest (elevations 
2,070–2,092 metres). In the upper elevation zone, five areas (2,500 square 
metres) were sampled in the secondary forest only (at elevations 2,357–2,388 
metres). The secondary forest sites ranged in age from eight to 12 years since 
gardens had last been planted in them. Approximate ages of the secondary 
forest sites were cross-checked with different informants. Initial locations of all 
22 plots were chosen by stratified sampling and direction of plot transect was 
randomly generated, with the exception of ensuring that cliffs and waterways 
were avoided. All trees with a diameter at breast height (DBH) ≥ 10 centimetres 
were recorded (Ipili name taken) and measured (DBH).
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Focus Groups
Two focus groups were organised to gather data on the cultural and economic 
uses of all trees recorded from the transect data. One focus group comprising 
older men met on five occasions, while one focus group of younger men met on 
three occasions. There was general consensus between the two focus groups on 
the usefulness of certain species as firewood, building materials and harbouring 
key animals for hunting, but the elder focus group knew substantially more 
about the ritual uses of certain trees. The focus groups also discussed what kinds 
of trees would normally be found in the primary forest of the upper elevation 
zone. A third focus group composed of both younger and older men was used 
to list freely the most important trees for firewood, house building and fence 
construction. Once lists were compiled, individual participants were asked to 
rank the species in each list in order of importance for the three purposes. Again, 
ranking exercises showed general consensus within the group of informants as 
to how valuable each listed species was relative to the others.
Tree Identification and Prior Research
Due to time and budget constraints, voucher specimens were not collected for 
determination of botanical species in 2006. Species names have been determined 
by previous work from other researchers and comparison of cognate terms 
among neighbouring groups. In the 1970s, a dictionary of the Ipili language 
was compiled by Dr Francis Ingemann and vernacular tree names were recorded 
and identified in the field by John Womersley, assistant director of the Division 
of Botany, Department of Forests, PNG (Ingemann n.d.). As well, Ipili and Enga 
share cognates for several tree species with neighbouring ethnolinguistic groups 
(Huli and Wola), among whom much species identification work has already 
been done (Ballard 1995; Sillitoe 1996, respectively). From the entire sample, 
for all species with five or more individuals, there are only seven species whose 
scientific names were not determined.
In total, I have conducted 16 months’ worth of ethnographic research in the 
Porgera Valley. Numerous semi-structured interviews on the use of forest 
resources were held with men and women during a 14-month research period 
from December 1998 to February 2000, which supplement the findings from the 
focus groups held in 2006. Forays in the forest with men and women were also 
a significant focus of research in the earlier research period.
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Results from the Ecological Surveys
There is a wide variety in the composition of forests in the highlands; although, 
as mentioned, ecologists have identified highland forests by ‘nodal’ species 
that predominate in certain forests — oaks (Castanopsis acuminatissima and 
Lithocarpus sp.) in the lower montane forests and beeches (Nothofagus sp.) in 
the mid-montane forests (Johns 1982; also Paijmans 1976). Porgera fits this 
characterisation well; oaks comprise 40 per cent of all species in the lower elevation 
zone, and oaks and beeches account for 40 per cent of all species (11 per cent 
beeches, 29  per cent oaks) in the mid-elevation zone, which corresponds to 
the boundary between lower montane and mid-montane rainforest of the 
ecologists. Across all of the sampled sites, 934 individual trees representing 110 
species were recorded. Sixty species (54 per cent of the total) were represented 
by four or fewer individuals. Twenty-two species (20 per cent of the total) were 
represented by only one individual. In summary, Porgera’s forests have high 
species diversity but are dominated by a few species. For instance, at the family 
level, Fagaceae (oaks) is the most prominent family, comprising 29 per cent of all 
trees. This is followed by Pandanaceae (pandanus) at 11 per cent, Euphorbiaceae 
(spurges) at 7 per cent and Cyatheaceae (tree ferns) at 6 per cent of all trees.
As would be expected, however, the abundance and distribution of trees in 
Porgera varies by elevation and forest type (primary versus secondary). Species 
abundance can be measured in two ways — by the number of individuals 
of a species per unit of land or by the amount of wood available for use by 
a species per unit of land. In terms of the amount of wood available for use, 
foresters use a measure called basal area, which is expressed in square metres 
per hectare. A  final measure that ecologists use to compare the composition 
of different species in different sized forest plots is importance value (Krebs 
1989). Importance value is a relative ranking of species based upon three 
criteria: (1) species frequency (how many plots a species occurs in divided by 
total number of plots), (2) species density (number of individuals per hectare) 
and (3) species dominance (basal area). Values based on these three criteria are 
relativised (absolute values are expressed as a percentage of the sum of the 
absolute values) and are ranked on a scale of 0 to 300.5 As my concern in this 
chapter is to understand which species of trees are economically important, 
I focus on importance values to highlight which species in each zone and forest 
type are frequent, dense and dominant.
5  Importance value = relative frequency + relative density + relative dominance. Relative frequency = 
frequency of one species/total frequency of all species × 100. Relative density = density of one species/total 
density of all species × 100. Relative dominance = basal area of one species/total basal area of all species × 100.
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In the lowest elevation zone, oaks (Castanopsis and Lithocarpus) are indeed 
the most important species in both primary and secondary forest. In the mid-
elevation zone, Castanopsis oaks are the most important species followed by 
Nothofagus beeches. In the upper elevation zone, Nothofagus beeches are the 
dominant species in primary forests based on informants’ information, other 
studies in highlands PNG (Paijmans 1976; Ash 1982; van Valkenburg and Ketner 
1994), and from my own work in upper elevation forests in Porgera outside the 
area sampled in 2006. Of extreme interest is that in upper elevation secondary 
forests, no individuals of Nothofagus ≥ 10 centimetres DBH were found in any of 
the plots. The most important species were tree ferns (Cyathea sp.), followed by 
a softwooded pioneer species (Homalanthus nervosus) and the tapuna variety of 
nut pandanus trees. Table 5.2 summarises the data on importance values in the 
sampled transects by elevation zone and forest type.




Species Ipili name Importance value
Upper secondary Cyathea sp. tambu 30.4
Homalanthus nervosus ambopaiya 27.4
Pandanus julianettii tapuna 25.0
Middle primary Castanopsis acuminatissima pai 100.3
Nothofagus sp. tato 50.1
Syzygium sp. pipi 26.3
Middle secondary Castanopsis acuminatissima pai 52.4
Nothofagus sp. tato 25.7
Lower primary Castanopsis acuminatissima pai 68.4
Araucaria cunninghamii taiya 32.9
Lithocarpus sp. yomboto 22.2
Lower secondary Castanopsis acuminatissima pai 64.1
Lithocarpus sp. yomboto 38.9
While the data in Table 5.2 show the most important species in each type of forest 
and elevation, not all trees are as economically important as others, especially in 
terms of hardwoods used for firewood, fencing and building materials. Another 
consideration besides what species are present in each zone and forest type is 
that the actual amount of wood per forest and elevation is highly variable as 
well. These results are summarised in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.3 Basal area (m2/ha) per forest type and elevation zone.
Elevation zone and forest type Total basal 
area




Upper secondary 17.4 9.6 55.2
Middle primary 78.9 78.6 99.7
Middle secondary 26.3 22.1 84.2
Lower primary 54.8 54.6 99.6
Lower secondary 37.3 36.3 97.3
As seen in Table 5.3, basal area is highest in the primary forests in the mid-
elevation zone. This is a function of the size of Nothofagus trees found in 
this zone, many of which had diameters (DBH) of over 100  centimetres. 
The  difference between basal areas in the secondary forest in this zone 
highlights the absence of exceptionally large trees. In the lowest elevation 
zone, there are no southern beeches. Castanopsis oaks predominate and are 
much smaller in diameter in general than southern beeches, hence secondary 
forest does not exhibit such a dramatic difference in change in stand basal 
area as the mid-elevation zone. The highest elevation zone shows the lowest 
amounts of useful wood per  hectare. No hardwood species were listed as 
being economically important in terms of firewood, house building or fence 
construction in the high-elevation zone. However, this zone does provide a 
greater abundance of resources such as pandanus nuts, pandanus leaves that 
are used for roofing materials, and tree fern fronds, which are cooked in earth 
ovens and eaten. Basal area of hardwood species would be higher in high-
elevation primary forests than secondary forests (if there had been any left in 
the study area). In 1999, I observed the clearance of high-elevation primary 
forest throughout the eastern Porgera Valley. Many of the trees cut were huge, 
buttressed Nothofagus trees. Figure 5.2 shows a wokabout sawmill in operation 
in 1999 in high-elevation primary forest just to the east of the 2006 study site; 
the stumps and planks are from Nothofagus trees.
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Figure 5.2 A wokabout sawmill in operation in 1999 in high-elevation 
primary forest, Porgera Valley.
Source: Photo by Jerry Jacka.
Results from the Ethnographic Research
Based on previous research and participant observation, I was aware of how 
important casuarina was for firewood and fences. For example, in June 1999, 
I travelled with my research assistant Peter Muyu to the western Enga hamlet 
of Punuma. Due to various land disturbances that are common to the local area, 
Punuma sits in a large grove of casuarina trees. Peter and I were to stay with a 
distant relative of his named Saima. Saima had just built a new house for himself 
and his new wife and when Peter and I entered the house, Peter made sounds 
of whistling approval. I assumed it was over the house construction, but Peter 
elbowed me and pointed to the rafters above the bedrooms that were stocked 
full of some 50 or more split, dried casuarina logs. Saima just grinned sheepishly 
at the good fortune he had of living among such extensive casuarina groves.
As mentioned in the Methods section, in 2006 I was interested in trying to get 
at some sort of consensus over which trees besides casuarina were of obvious 
economic importance. The categories that my research assistants suggested we 
should use were firewood, house construction and fence building. Table  5.4 
is a composite ranking of the economically important species, as listed by 
participants.
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Of all the species that were ranked as being important, only two appear in all 
three categories — pai (Castanopsis acuminatissima) and lepa (Lithocarpus sp.), 
both oaks in the Fagaceae family. Moreover, only 11 tree species in total were 
used to rank economic importance in all three categories. Whereas Castanopsis 
is the most abundant tree other than C.  oligodon, the lepa oaks are rather 
uncommon. For the purposes of abundance, I used the encounter rate across 
the 1.1 ha plots where 40 or more individuals per species was ‘high’, 20 to 39 
was ‘medium’, and fewer than 20 was ‘low’. Many of the trees that appear in 
these rankings are low in abundance; it is unknown if this is a factor of being 
selectively harvested due to their economic importance, or if they are uncommon 
ecologically. The 11 species from Table 5.4 are ranked using importance values 
and presented in Table 5.5.
The data in Table 5.5 support the abundance rankings from Table 5.4. The top 
four species, yawale, pai, tato and yomboto, are the only ecologically abundant 
tree species that are also economically important. Yawale (C. oligodon) was not 
used in the calculation of importance values as the numbers of these trees from 
the 1.1 ha plots do not accurately reflect their actual numbers in the region since 
people plant them in gardens and around their houses.
Implications
The combined results of the ecological and ethnographic data point to only 
three species of tree (pai, tato and yomboto), in addition to one species of 
anthropogenically planted tree, casuarina (yawale), as occurring in sufficient 
enough abundance (in terms of both numbers and basal area) for human 
exploitation for use as firewood, fencing, or building materials. Only one of 
these three species, tato (Nothofagus sp.), occurs in high-elevation forests. 
However, this species was not found in any of the plots in upper elevation 
secondary forests, which indicates that overharvesting of parent species or some 
other factor is limiting its ability to colonise secondary forest settings at high 
elevations. Mid-elevation forests contain both pai (Castanopsis acuminatissima) 
and tato (Nothofagus sp.) in large numbers. Based on importance values 
(Table 5.2), primary forests are twice as important as secondary forests for these 
two species at mid-elevations. Yomboto (Lithocarpus sp.) is a very marginal 
tree in mid-elevation forests (importance value of 1.67 on a scale of 0–300). 
Nothofagus is not found in low-elevation forests. Table 5.2 shows that contrary 
to mid-elevation forests, pai and yomboto are of more importance in secondary 
forests at low elevations. For yomboto, the difference of importance for secondary 
versus primary forest is marginal. For pai, however, both importance value and 
basal area are around three times as great for low-elevation secondary forests as 
compared to primary forests. At this elevation, pai seems to flourish with some 
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human disturbance. This is similar to other research on human disturbances of 
Castanopsis acuminatissima around Wau in Morobe Province (van Valkenburg 
and Ketner 1994). Van Valkenburg and Ketner also looked at the response of 
Nothofagus to disturbance (anthropogenic, landslides, fire, storms, etc.) and 
concluded that both Castanopsis and Nothofagus need disturbance to regenerate, 
but also need mature species to produce seeds. ‘At various places … the forest is 
no longer able to recover to maturity and if intensity and frequency of human 
activities increase, species such as Nothofagus pullei and Castanopsis will also 
disappear because of lack of seed’ (van Valkenburg and Ketner 1994: 53).
These results have great significance given the settlement patterns associated 
with mining development at Porgera. In the early 1970s, colonial administrators 
debated the merits of different routes for a road into the Porgera Valley. 
The main footpath used by colonial patrol officers bisected the most populous 
portions of the valley for ease of administration and control. A shorter route was 
eventually chosen that bypassed the main areas of settlement and was located 
entirely within the high-elevation rainforest at the southern end of the valley 
(Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.3 The Enga Highway in the Porgera Valley.
Note: The transition in the legend from green to brown delineates 2,000 metres above sea level.
Source: Image created by author using ArcGIS.
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Initially, only a few individuals built houses along the road, but with the advent 
of mining development in the late 1980s, more and more families started to clear 
forest, build houses and plant gardens adjacent to the road. Around Kairik, big 
men urged their clansmen to occupy as much land as possible as rumours were 
circulating that an airstrip to serve the mine would be built next to the road 
at Kairik. Outsiders were initially welcomed into the area as there was far too 
much land for the relatively small population. Over the past 20 years, however, 
population has exploded in the Porgera Valley. From an overall population of 
5,011 in 1980, the population increased to 9,255 in 1990 and 22,809 in 2000. 
Estimated population for 2010 is over 40,000 people. More critically, the 
population increases have been very uneven, with most of the increases in 
communities along the road in high-elevation forest. Figure 5.4 shows the rate 
of population increase in the valley from 1980 to 2000 in the different census 
units in the Porgera census district.
Figure 5.4 Population increase in Porgera census district, 1980–2000.
Note: The area in yellow is the Porgera mine.
Source: Image created by author using ArcGIS.
As seen in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, populations in high-elevation areas of Porgera 
have grown by approximately seven to ten times their 1980 populations. 
The area around Kairik where this study was done has experienced a greater 
than fourfold increase in population. As a result of these patterns, most of the 
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impacts on Porgera’s forests have been in high-elevation areas. While these 
forests can supply the needs of locals and immigrants in their primary states, 
as demonstrated in the Social Context and Land Tenure Rules section, the 
secondary high-elevation forests are extremely resource poor with no major 
hardwood species growing in these forests that can be used for firewood, fences 
or building materials.
While outsiders were initially welcomed, today land and trees along the Enga 
Highway are valuable and frequently contested commodities. Numerous 
intergroup fights and killings have occurred from the late 1990s over the land 
and resources along the road. Beginning in the mid-2000s, several groups started 
creating ‘forest reserves’ in mid-elevation primary forests that could only be 
used by an exclusive set of clan members who had received permission to cut 
individual trees in these reserves.
But do the creation of forest reserves, the onset of large-scale mining 
development and population explosions due to immigration mean that primary 
rainforest is disappearing in the Porgera Valley? Contrary to the argument by 
Shearman et al. (2008, 2009) that shifting cultivation is one of the two primary 
drivers of deforestation of primary rainforest in PNG, McAlpine and Freyne 
(2001) demonstrate that while PNG’s rural population increased by 50 per cent 
between 1975 and 1996, the total amount of land that went into agricultural 
production to sustain this population increase expanded by only 11 per cent. 
As a consequence, rural agriculturists are deploying a range of intensification 
techniques to increase their yield (Bourke 2001) that are not dependent upon 
cutting primary rainforest. In fact, Allen et al. (2001: 533) determined the type 
of land cover that was cleared for planting gardens by rural agriculturalists — 
55.8 per cent was secondary forest, 12.9 per cent short woody regrowth, and 
30.7 per cent either grass or mixed grass/woody regrowth. Only 0.5 per cent 
of the land area that was primary forest was cleared for gardens. Of course, 
Porgera has had vastly different rates of population growth than the nation as a 
whole. In 1971, a census was conducted which counted 4,020 people in Porgera. 
In terms of land use in 1972, approximately 448 km2 were primary rainforest and 
25 km2 were gardens/cleared space. The 2000 census counted 22,809 people, 
about 5.7 times as many people than in the early 1970s. Land use for gardens 
more than doubled with 59 km2 as gardens/cleared space by 2002. The amount 
of forest between 1972 and 2002 decreased by 36 km2 to 412 km2. Population 
increases in Porgera, therefore, appear to be closely related to loss of primary 
rainforest; however, intensification is also occurring. For example, in the early 
1970s, each square kilometre of garden land supported about 160 people. By the 
early 2000s, each square kilometre of garden was supporting about 386 people. 
Of course, the ability to purchase outside food stuffs, mainly rice, certainly 
influences the latter equation. To summarise for Porgera, both deforestation and 
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intensification are occurring to accommodate the massive population increases 
into the area. However, as argued in the preceding sections, these population 
and land use pressures have very localised ecological outcomes as a result.
Conclusions
Porgera’s firewood crisis is a result of three interlocking forces resulting from local 
tenure and resource management practices, colonial history and forest succession 
dynamics. While Porgerans are active planters of economically important trees, 
such as C. oligodon, and manage forest succession through techniques relying 
upon shifting cultivation, recent demographic and sociocultural transformations 
challenge the ability of Porgerans to maintain sufficient forests in certain areas 
of the valley. Once welcomed outsiders are no longer able to plant trees on 
borrowed land due to land valuation increasing along the Enga Highway, and 
also because planting trees on a certain plot of land is a local cultural expression 
of the intent to claim ownership over that land. Population increases also 
hamper the effective management of forest succession by limiting the area of 
land available for shifting cultivation. The sociocultural dynamics of managing 
trees and forests may not have been hindered if not for the routing of the Enga 
Highway by outside, colonial decision makers away from mid-elevation hamlets 
into high-elevation forests. As Porgerans moved higher in altitude to be near 
the highway, they encountered vastly different conditions for crop production 
(Jacka 2009) and different forest succession dynamics from mid-elevation 
forests. While the two most economically important mid-elevation trees besides 
C.  oligodon, pai (Castanopsis acuminatissima) and tato (Nothofagus sp.), grow 
well with some anthropogenic disturbances (van Valkenburg and Ketner 1994), 
secondary forests at high elevations are incredibly resource poor in terms 
of usable timber for firewood, fences and house building. Trying to balance 
this confluence of local resource management practices, exogenous historical 
decisions and ecological factors creates a social, economic, and ecological crisis 
for most Porgerans. Once-free resources are now commodities and social and 
ethnic tensions have flared into large-scale resource conflicts (Biersack 2006).
Analysis of the factors underlying the firewood crisis points to the need to 
approach human–environmental issues as complex, coupled human and natural 
systems (Gunderson and Holling 2002). The goal of this chapter was not to argue 
that high-elevation forests in Porgera were ‘pristine’ and are now under threat 
from increasing human populations and reduced carrying capacity. Rather, the 
goal was to examine how human societies and the rainforests in which they live 
are mutually constitutive (Bayliss-Smith et al. 2003) and how certain internal and 
external forces challenge the resilience of these human–environmental complexes 
(Holling 1973). The data I have presented show that human exploitation of 
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mid-elevation forests, while disruptive, is resilient in that key resources in 
less-exploited forest sections resemble those of exploited sections. The same 
cannot be said for human exploitation of high-elevation forests in Porgera and 
probably elsewhere in PNG. This highlights an important policy distinction in 
that large-scale resource development plans in PNG need to be attentive to the 
coupled human–natural systems that they intend to impact. Future social and 
ecological impact assessments need to be more comprehensively synergistic 
by realising that the societies and environments of PNG comprise one tightly 
integrated system and not two disparate systems that occasionally interact with 
one another. Finally, debates about deforestation that focus solely on per annum 
rates of change or numbers of hectares cleared annually have the potential to 
overlook the local, culturally contingent and ecologically specific ways that 
forest resources are used across time in subsistence-based communities.
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6. The Structural Violence of Resource 
Extraction in the Purari Delta
JOSHUA A. BELL
The Papuan forests teem with valuable timbers, choice gums, medicinal 
herbs, aromatic spices, and a hundred products which, to win, need only the 
educated efforts of the aboriginals, for the enrichment of the world’s markets  
(Bevan 1890: 284).
Introduction
On the bank of the upper reaches of the Aivei River sat an empty cargo 
container, detritus from a failed logging and oil palm venture initiated in 1993 
(Filer with Sekhran 1998: 188–9; Bell 2009). In 2002, when I first encountered 
this container, the forest was slowly engulfing its blistering orange-red surface 
(Figure 6.1). All the heavy equipment brought to this site had been removed 
or scavenged for parts, and the empty cargo container was all that remained. 
In 2010, when I returned, the container had slipped from the bank and was 
now submerged in the river. While every forest has its share of the remnants 
of failed projects, the forests, mudflats and tidal creeks of the Purari Delta, and 
the wider Gulf of Papua, have more than their fair share. Their presence and 
lingering absence serve as a testament to the failed and ongoing intersection this 
region and its inhabitants have with capitalism, and the extent to which forests 
are central to these engagements.1
1  See Mawyer, Chapter 2, this volume, as well as the evocative explorations by Raffles (2002), Kosek (2006) 
and Gordillo (2011).
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Figure 6.1 Empty container enveloped by the forest on the banks of the 
Aivei distributary of the Purari River.
Source: Photo by Joshua A. Bell, 2002.
This container possesses companions to the west on the bank of the Pie River at 
Baimuru government station. One has sat next to the police station for at least 
20 years, and until 2010 was used as the holding cell (Figure 6.2). This is where, 
following verbal rebukes and typically a beating by the police, the accused 
were kept for a night to several days before being freed. More often than not, 
the occupants of this cell were young men charged with the cultivation and 
possession of kuku dipi (marijuana), the making of ‘steam’ (home-made alcohol) 
and having an illegal home-made gun. Since ‘zoom’ (outboard motor fuel) is too 
scarce or costly to be used for transporting prisoners to the provincial capital 
(Kerema) or the national capital (Port Moresby), these young men would either 
return to their village or remain hanging out in Baimuru, becoming a lingering 
source of anxiety for all. Collectively, these young men, and the lawlessness 
they are perceived to embody, are understood to be emblematic of the new era of 
consumption, jealousy and the ascendancy of individualism over kin relations, 
known locally as moni kaeou (‘money ground’) (Bell 2006a).2
2  Indicative of this new order, the first murder occurred at Baimuru station in December 2005 around 
Christmas. The victim, a man in his late 40s, is said to have been killed while walking home in the early 
morning by young men he angered at an all-night card game (Kaia Rove, personal communication, 6 April 
2006). Gambling has become a new norm in the delta as communities become temporarily awash with money 
through royalty payments (Bell 2009).
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Figure 6.2 Container turned into a jail, now disused.
Source: Photo by Joshua A. Bell, 2010.
Further south on the river’s bank lie another set of containers that have been 
converted into the base for a watchtower from which locally hired security 
guards sit waiting for both real and imagined threats (Figure 6.3). The watchtower 
helps guard the operations of ethnic Chinese merchants affiliated with the 
Malaysian multinational Rimbunan Hijau, which has conducted the bulk of the 
logging operations in the Papuan Gulf. These merchants came to the delta on the 
invitation of the current parliamentary member for the Kikori Open seat, who 
owns the plot of land on which the watchtower has been built. Their operations 
are part of the larger eclipsing of locally owned and operated businesses. 
The success of this operation has made it and the ethnic Chinese operators the 
objects of much jealousy. The intensity of this jealously emerged most starkly in 
2005 when ‘rascals’ (raskols) came by outboard motor from Kerema, robbed the 
store, and almost killed its manager, Jackson. When I met him in 2006, Jackson 
gladly showed me the scar that radiates down from his shoulder along his back 
where a bush knife split him open. Following the elaboration of this encounter 
in Tok Pisin, he quickly changed the conversation to ask whether I had any 
United States currency to exchange with him for Papua New Guinea (PNG) kina.
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Figure 6.3 Containers on the bank of the Pie River used to form a security 
tower outside a Chinese-run trade store in Baimuru.
Source: Photo by Joshua A. Bell, 2010.
Condensed in this detritus of failed and ongoing resource extraction, and the 
ongoing wakes that these encounters help generate, we have vestiges of Tsing’s 
(2005) ‘frictions’, where the assemblage of local, global, human, non-human, 
nature and culture are materialised and reconfigured (Raffles 2002). These and 
other containers in the delta are ‘good to think’ not only because of the different 
scale-making projects they help enact and foreground (Tsing 2005: 57), but 
also due to the metaphorical and relational aspects of ‘cargo’ (kago) by which 
Melanesians remake the terms of their engagement with the economic and moral 
inequities of the global economy of resource extraction (Wagner 1981). If the 
first container evokes failure and the lurking quality of things submerged, then 
the second and third are evocative of the misunderstandings, violence and 
transactions, legal and illegal, that occur as these projects unfold. All conjure up 
the entropic effects of the delta and the ongoing attempt by outsiders to wrest 
resources — whether they be coal, oil, timber, sago, copra, rubber or eaglewood 
— from its enduring flow. These activities have directly and indirectly involved 
inhabitants of the delta in the reworking of place and subjectivity, and are part 
of the cutting and reknitting of the networks by which the delta as both real 
and imagined place is connected and disconnected.
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Building on my earlier work on the informal economies around resource 
extraction and the transformative effects of incorporated land groups 
(Bell 2006b, 2009), I focus here on the conjoined effects and ruptures of resource 
extraction and the various types of violence they engender. Specifically, I draw 
on Farmer’s articulation of ‘structural violence’ (Farmer 2004), through which 
he attempts to understand the conditions and effects of inequality in and 
on communities. A key aspect of this violence is the erasure of history and 
understanding of the relations that engender this oppression.3 Formulated in 
response to the particular conditions of Haiti, structural violence can be seen 
to be part and parcel of what Harvey (2005), reformulating Marx, refers to as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’. This inequality — whether economic, social 
or representational — is an increasingly salient aspect of neoliberalism and 
capitalism more generally, and has profound effects along the supply chain, 
which in turn feed back and impact local communities. Structural violence is 
particularly visible in the frontiers of capitalism where resources are made and 
unmade, and relations and histories erased (Tsing 2005; Kosek 2006). As  we 
shall see, structural violence and its effects are a key force in the shaping of 
people’s understandings of the assemblage of relations that are critical to the 
formation of their environmentality (Agrawal 2005: 166). I am specifically 
interested in how the various forms of violence have shaped I’ai people’s 
responses to outside efforts to tap their forests for the world’s markets, and the 
corresponding transformations of their knowledge about the forest, others and 
the self that these engagements have involved. In this way, I seek to contribute 
to discussions of how the state and companies articulate their relations with 
communities through violence (Dinnen and Ley 2000; Wood 2006; Lattas 2011), 
with the full acknowledgement of how difficult writing about such violence is, 
and the dangers in both overstating and understating its slippery dimensions 
(Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004).
Moving through a brief history of resource extraction in the Purari Delta, 
I proceed to a discussion of the wakes of recent events, memories and current 
processes. In what follows, I do not make an attempt to provide a comprehensive 
history of Purari communities’ engagement with resource extraction; rather, 
I offer some salient events that show how relationships have been transformed 
over time.
3  Farmer’s formulation builds explicitly on the work of the Latin American theologian Johan Galtung 
(1969), and has clear parallels to the articulations of ‘everyday violence’ (Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois 2004) 
and ‘symbolic violence’ (Bourdieu 1991), which are equally concerned with the power dynamics of lived 
reality and the misrecognition of the causes of inequality.
Tropical Forests of Oceania
132
Histories of Resource Extraction in the 
Purari Delta
While my focus is primarily on events since 2000, it is important to situate 
these contemporary processes within longer-term and fractured histories of 
resource extraction in the region. These intersecting histories are products of 
what Theodore Bevan (1890) termed ‘the enrichment of markets’. Credited with 
being the first European to discover and travel up the Purari River, Bevan’s 
remarks in this chapter’s epigraph are prescient of the later ventures that came 
to the region. His optimism resonates with these projects and foregrounds the 
ways in which the Purari Delta and its surroundings have been reconfigured as 
resources through a variety of ventures: the Vailala oil fields (1912), Wame sawmill 
(1922), surveys by the Australasian Petroleum and Anglo-Persian companies 
(1920s–1930s; 1950s–1960s), the proposed Wabo dam (1970s), Rimbunan Hijau’s 
logging ventures (since 1995), InterOil’s prospecting and drilling (since 2002), 
and resurgent interest in the Purari hydropower project (2010). Moreover, 
Bevan’s relentless collecting of flora, fauna and ethnographic specimens is 
emblematic of the bundling of activities carried out by most Europeans in the 
region, whereby various entities became resources to be extracted and sold or 
collected for science (Welsch et al. 2006; Bell 2013).
While far from uniform, these resource extraction projects over the past 100 
years have worked to transform communities’ relationships to their forests 
as the colonial and post-colonial state has sought to gain access to the region 
and extract timber. To extend a metaphor drawn from the reality of the delta’s 
environment, this process continually involves ebbs and flows, and periodic 
submerging and revelation of what has been covered. As a result, this process is 
uneven at best, and is re-articulated anew with each generation and each new 
project regionally.
Following Bevan’s initial incursion into the Purari Delta, the region slowly 
came under European influence. In 1905, Reverend John Henry Holmes of 
the London Missionary Society inhabited Urika station on the delta’s coast 
(LMS 1906: 318). Alongside his evangelising, Holmes also sought to transform 
communities through work. He began employing Purari boys to manufacture 
rattan chairs, which they sold within Papua and in Australia. Until the 1940s, 
kaia ini, as the rattan was known, was also used in the construction of the 
central ritual figure, the kaiaimunu. The construction of these wicker figures 
was central to the empowerment of male initiates (Williams 1923a; Bell 2010). 
While it is unclear if Holmes understood the symbolic associations of kaia ini, 
these industrial activities were central to the belief of Holmes and other London 
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Missionary Society members that spiritual salvation could be achieved through 
hard work. The symbolic analogies at play here most likely did not escape Purari 
people’s attention.
Alongside these uses of forest materials, Holmes also embarked on modification 
of Urika’s immediate landscape. Holmes quickly encountered the nesting 
of relationships that Purari communities have to place. As Holmes remarks, 
upon settling in Urika, ‘[we] unwittingly … had stepped into a totemic hornet 
nest; we were stung on every hand, but were innocent of the provocation’ 
(Holmes 1924: 145). He comments:
We had to fell trees, cut canals and demolish on one hand that we might build 
up on the other. Our proceedings alarmed people in all the villages; they were 
concerned because the island, being an awapa-mako [opa mako, place of spirit-
beings], their totem-kinship demanded of them approval or disapproval, of our 
doings. (Holmes 1924: 145–6)4
Holmes’s comments are suggestive of the conflicts that arose around 
cosmologically important places for the Purari people during this early period, 
as well as their perceptions of subsequent transformations enacted by later 
projects.
Far from being an undifferentiated tidal swamp, the delta was and still is 
understood to be a palimpsest of culturally significant places whose meanings are 
constituted through both past and present practices and contemporary narrative. 
Airu omoro, a class of narratives, speak of these connections understood as kapea 
(paths) by which past actions of imunu (ancestral spirit-beings) are inscribed in 
the landscape connecting people to their wider world (Bell 2006b). Prior to the 
iconoclasm of the Tom Kabu Movement (1946–69), communities materialised 
their relations to imunu through large-scale rituals and displays of objects, 
which acted as the ruru (‘skins’) of these otherwise immaterial beings (Williams 
1924; Maher 1961; Bell 2010). Accompanied by feasting, these rituals helped 
affirm traditional leadership positions and relations within descent groups. 
The ravi (longhouses) that housed this material were quite literally forests of 
relations transposing, through carved images and masks, ancestral presence 
with various sensorial and social effects. With the abandonment of the ravi and 
with few heirloom objects left (Bell 2009), the remaining imunu are understood 
to reside in specific trees, whirlpools and stones and become visible through 
taking on different human, animal or mechanical forms.5 Consumption habits 
4  In 1913 Holmes gives a sense of the scope of these endeavours: ‘Side by side with building our station, 
canal-making, land-clearing for gardens to support a family ranging from 150 to 300 during the 5 yrs a 
coconut plantation of 6000 young palms was planted and in another year the first fruits from this plantation 
will be gathered’ (CWM/LMS 1913).
5  There are three types of imunu: kae (‘earth’) imunu, ere (‘water’) imunu and iri (‘tree’) imunu. I was told 
that iri imunu are the most like humans.
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and subsistence activities, as elsewhere in Melanesia, further root people into 
this system whereby the growth of one’s children’s bodies is understood to be a 
manifestation of ancestral efficacy and parental nurture. Christianity (Seventh-
day Adventist, Pentecostal and United Church denominations) has helped to 
further attenuate communities’ engagement with, and understanding of, these 
beings. For many, the forest has become a place of danger where demonic 
forces now dwell (Brunois 1999). These beings pioneered the kapea that form 
the present landscape that underlie social formations and their histories, all of 
which have become central to the Purari people’s negotiations about resource 
ownership (Bell 2009).
Within a year of the establishment of Urika, the administration created a 
government station at Kerema from which it could launch semi-regular patrols 
into the delta (Murray 1912: 177). When the area was deemed pacified after 
1908, the administration sponsored several expeditions to follow on initial 
discoveries of coal and oil in the Papuan Gulf (Carne 1913; Wade 1914; see also 
Rickwood 1992: 38–42). These surveys resulted in the identification of the 
Vailala oilfields in the neighbouring Gulf Division in 1912. This site, along with 
Papua’s nascent plantation economy, needed new sources of labour, so recruiters 
turned to the delta.6 Labour increasingly involved men in unprecedented travel 
out of the delta to plantations in the neighbouring Gulf and Central districts, 
as well as to work in Port Moresby. During these sojourns, men were exposed 
to Papuans of various cultural backgrounds, the Australian work regime, and 
the evolving colonial language of Police Motu. While the London Missionary 
Society mission condemned labour recruitment because of its effects on their 
own missionisation efforts (LMS 1915: 328), the colonial administration felt that 
labour was beneficial (Murray 1912). This domestication of Purari communities 
through labour, laws and missionisation was part of the broader attempt to 
domesticate communities and harness their resources.
Purari communities were not passive participants within the emerging colonial 
economy, but engaged in a series of tacit and explicit negotiations about the 
nature and extent of their participation. The so-called ‘Vailala Madness’ of 1919 
dramatically brought the simmering regional disenchantment with the colonial 
economy, and the inequality of the moral relationships it engendered, into 
sharper focus. The explosion of economic activity and the new valuations of 
regional resources helped contribute to this event (Williams 1923b; Bell 2006b). 
While temporarily affecting communities on the coast, the effects of the Vailala 
6  The 1907 Native Labour Ordinance allowed individuals to be indentured for up to three years. All 
contracts were signed in the presence of the district’s resident magistrate or assistant resident magistrate. 
The resident magistrate received the labourers’ wages monthly and then witnessed their being paid in full 
upon the end of the contract. In the event of a labourer’s death, he would pay out the wages to relatives in the 
village (Lewis 1996: 49).
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Madness soon passed, as new colonial policies, namely the Native Taxes 
Ordinance (1919) and the Native Plantations Ordinance (1920), prompted 
communities to participate more fully in the commercial transactions.7
During this decade several new regional commercial ventures gave Purari 
communities more direct access to trade goods and became local sources of 
employment (Territory of Papua 1923: 53; Hope 1979). The most successful and 
long-lasting commercial venture established was the Wame sawmill and trade 
store. Established in 1922 by Lewis Lett, a successful trader and planter in Gulf 
Division, Wame quickly became an economic and social hub for the district 
(Woodward 1922: 1). The sawmill processed timber until 1958, after which it 
was moved to the newly established station of Baimuru in 1961.8 By 1925 the 
sawmill employed 65 villagers from all over Delta District and was home to three 
Europeans (Liston-Blyth 1925: 2). By 1943 the sawmill employed 350 labourers 
(Ross 1943: 4) and was sending timber to Daru and Port Moresby (Chance 1937: 2). 
While trees were already sites of valuation that were ‘generative or productive 
relations between persons’ (Leach 2004: 42), the sawmill’s activities helped 
trees become a new locus by which to create and sustain relationships with 
Europeans, and indeed within Purari communities themselves. For example, on 
22 August 1926, the assistant resident magistrate, C.H. Karius, records that 75 
landowners from the Baroi villages of Akiaravi, Oravi and Evara were paid £90 
(or just over £1 each) in return for the right to cut timber along the banks of the 
Baroi River over a period of 10 years (Karius 1937: 2–3). These funds entered into 
the local economy in the form of trade goods. Such commercial opportunities 
augmented those carried out around sago, and allowed for the furthering of 
asymmetric power relations between elders, who held hereditary chieftaincies, 
and the young men who struggled to obtain trade goods through their labour. 
While colonial threats of violence often forced men into these labour situations, 
as much as their wanderlust, on their return they faced sorcery reprisals within 
7  Taxes were imposed on all males between 18 and 36 and placed in a special fund used only for projects 
that were deemed beneficial to the Papuan, such as the funding of schools, hospitals and technical training 
(Lewis 1996: 149). The Native Plantations Ordinance set aside land near villages for plantations, and the 
government provided tools and seeds, while the villages supplied their labour. The resulting profits were 
used to pay their annual tax, and helped instil villagers with a sense of industry. In the early 1920s coconut 
plantations were established near every major village in the delta, and villagers were encouraged to try 
planting a range of produce (Territory of Papua 1923: 50). While it is difficult to trace the impacts of these 
policies, they not only induced men to more readily sell their labour, but most likely also induced them to sell 
their resources of timber, sago and fish.
8  In 1937 Steamships Trading Company purchased a half interest in the operation. During World War II 
the mill was taken over by the Australian military administration for timber production for the war effort, 
although production slowed due to the lack of boats to transport milled timber to Port Moresby (Bennett 
2009: 103). After the war, the operator was Port Romilly Timber Mills (Nicklason 1969: 243–48).
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their community if they proved unwilling to distribute their goods.9 This form 
of social disruption, one of the tacit results of resource projects escalating the 
uneven distribution of wealth, is ongoing in the delta, and remains one of the 
most destabilising effects of these projects (Bell 2006a).
This structural violence was accentuated by the venereal diseases that these 
capitalist incursions helped to spread. Although present in 1912, the increased 
rate of infection in 1922 was such that the administration established a medical 
outpost near the mouth of the Aivei River (Territory of Papua 1923:  116). 
The  increased transmission in the delta was deemed a result of the traffic 
of women from the Urama and Goaribari communities for trade goods and 
shell valuables (Woodward 1921: 1), but no mention is made of European 
involvement. As with the present circumstances of the Papuan Gulf, logging and 
oil exploration camps created new commodity contexts in which prostitution 
flourished as communities without direct access to European goods attempted 
to access them. As recalled by I’ai elders in 2001 and 2002, Goaribari groups 
continued to come to Purari villages until 1947, and to the camps into the 1960s. 
The structural inequalities that helped give rise to the trade of sexual services 
for trade goods has continued into the present. Since 2000, it has not been 
uncommon for communities seeking to access the flow of real and imagined 
wealth around present-day resource extraction projects to seek to marry their 
daughters to men working in the camps and to obtain materials from the logging 
ships (Bell 2006a; Hammar 2010).
Following World War II, the region was transformed by the Tom Kabu 
Movement, which combined iconoclastic fervour with intense interest in 
economic independence through cash cropping (Maher 1961, 1984). Although 
suppressed by the Australian administration, this movement helped to open 
up communities to the possibilities of new things, and shift the cultural 
expectations and horizons of communities. Soon afterwards, the Australasian 
Petroleum Company (APC) began conducting surveys in the delta’s hinterland 
and to the west in Kikori (Hicks 1953: 695–700; Pym 1958). In the 1950s, the 
APC established a base at Middletown, at the juncture of the Sirebi and Kikori 
rivers, and by 1955 had four rigs operating. It spent £3 million a year and 
had a labour force of ‘thousands’ of men through Delta District and beyond, 
with 20  vessels, numerous launches, helicopters and so forth (Hope 1979: 
249). Following these unsuccessful surveys, in 1960, the Consolidated Zinc 
Corporation and the British Aluminium Company began investigating the 
9  During a patrol in 1914, the resident magistrate of Delta Division reported that, in the village of Pai-ara, 
‘young boys that go to work, on their return are obliged to hand over some of their hard earned trade, to 
appease the old scoundrels who profess to be Sorcerers … their dread of the Sorcerer is so great, that some of 
the boys as soon as they arrive, go to the Sorcerer, and give him some of their trade without being asked for 
it by the Sorcerer, this is done to ensure that the Sorcerer will leave them alone’ (Ryan 1914: 5–6).
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upper Purari to initiate a hydroelectric scheme. In 1972 the Japanese company 
Nippon Koei conducted another preliminary study of the feasibility of a dam, 
which in 1973 was reviewed by the Australian company Snowy Mountains 
Engineering Corporation. Then in 1974 an American consortium — led by 
Bechtel Engineering, General Electric and Westinghouse — expressed interest 
in this project as a source of power for uranium enrichment, ushering in a new 
wave of planning studies centred on a proposed 2160 megawatt dam. While 
environmentalists in Australia and PNG protested against this scheme (Pardy et 
al. 1978), it also failed the test of economic feasibility, and was abandoned.
Following a lull in the copra market, in the 1990s, the Papuan Gulf came into 
focus again as multinational conglomerates began reinvestigating the region’s 
potential for logging and oil production with new technologies. A conjunction 
of factors in the 1990s — specifically, the increased demand for hardwoods and 
PNG’s fiscal crisis — encouraged both international interest in harvesting these 
forests and government eagerness to raise revenue by granting concessions 
(Filer  1997; Filer with Sekhran 1998; Filer et al. 2000). The Purari River 
constitutes the boundary between two major logging concessions. To the east 
is the Vailala Block 3 concession (200,100 hectares), which has been controlled 
by Rimbunan Hijau since 1992 and operational since 1999. To the west is the 
Baimuru Block 3 concession (438,300 hectares), which was allocated to Turama 
Forest Industries in 1995, but where logging operations had not yet commenced 
at the time of writing.10
In 2001–02, Rimbunan Hijau subsidiary Frontier Holdings carried out operations 
in Vailala Block 3 from its original base camp at Kaumeia on the Purari River. 
The site of this camp is held by the I’ai to be the ancestral site where the female 
ancestors Keia and Auei paused on their way to find the moon. Over its five 
years of operation (1999–2004), the camp stripped this site bare, turning it into 
an eroding patch of earth. The second camp on the Aivei branch of the Purari 
River near Evara village was opened in 2004. A third camp, simply known as the 
Purari camp, was opened in 2007 and was still operating in 2012.
This scenario shifted dramatically with the activities of the Canadian company 
InterOil that began exploratory drilling in the Purari Delta’s hinterland in 2002. 
Despite InterOil’s drilling activities remaining spatially remote in 2006, its 
presence on the upper Purari River continued to loom large in the imaginations 
of coastal villagers. This was fuelled in part by glimpses of large helicopters 
carrying equipment inland and by movement of the company’s barges up and 
10  Permits to Turama Forest Industries (TFI) were first issued in 1988, and in 1995 extended to cover 
1.7 million hectares for a duration of 35 years. There were rumours linking TFI to Rimbunan Hijau for many 
years, but these were only confirmed in 2011, when the Rimbunan Hijau subsidiary Niugini International 
Corporation Ltd was officially recognised as operator of the Turama concession.
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down the river. As of 2006 InterOil possessed three petroleum prospecting 
licences (PPL 236, 237 and 238), which covered coastal and inland areas in 
Central and Gulf provinces. The upper Purari River falls within PPL 238. Since 
2009, InterOil’s activities have been the source of incredible speculation in 
the delta communities. In March 2010 I was told of how the company’s new 
base camp being built above the former logging camp at Kaumeia would rival 
Port Moresby and lift the delta out of obscurity and on to the centre stage of 
national development. While lobbying for InterOil’s proposed overland pipeline 
to follow the Purari River, community members also talked of an impending 
meeting to reinitiate the Wabo hydroelectric project on the upper Purari River. 
In September 2010, the Australian company Origin Energy Ltd and PNG 
Sustainable Development Program Ltd (PNGSDP) announced a memorandum of 
understanding to commence the Purari Hydro Scheme (Barrett and Elks 2010). 
This project was abandoned when the PNG government took over the PNGSDP 
shares in the Ok Tedi mine in 2012.
The Ebbs and Flows of Violence11
The recent wave of resource extraction and exploration has exacerbated existing 
tensions in communities and created new problems due to perceptions of 
unequal royalty payments (Bell 2009). As these projects have unfolded, the state 
has become increasingly absent. The exception, however, has been the bursts 
of periodic presence of the mobile squad, who without exception have come to 
enforce the movement and activities of the logging company. As elsewhere in 
PNG (Dinnen and Ley 2000; Dinnen 2001; Wood 2006; Lattas 2011), this has 
distorted people’s views of the state and its interests in protecting communities, 
and helped enforce a growing sense of communities’ alienation from their land. 
To this end, a major campaign promise of the winning candidate in the 2002 
Kikori Open election was how, if he was elected, Rimbunan Hijau would fill 
the void of the state and provide communities with health clinic buildings and 
roads. Here I recount some aspects of these encounters as they are configured in, 
and around, a police officer known as Inamu Monovae (‘One-Eye’).
Violence around the current wave of logging appears to have begun in September 
2000 when inhabitants of Aumu village near the mouth of the Aivei River held 
up a small cargo ship headed to the then-active logging camp of Kaumeia. Due to 
complications prior to and following the 1997 elections, the I’ai had been at 
11  Although presented in a coherent chronological narrative, the events I recount only became clear to me 
in 2010 with the benefit of hindsight and interviews with community members of Aumu. In October 2000, 
when I first came to the delta, I had heard about these troubles but until 2010 had not had the chance to 
interview participants.
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this time frozen out of the project’s royalty payments (Bell 2009). Already 
frustrated by the lack of compensation for the use of their waterways, the men 
also stopped the vessel because of increased erosion caused by the ships’ wakes 
and the pollution these boats are thought to cause by dumping their bilge. Men 
took eight pallets of food as payment and then let the ship proceed. A mobile 
squad from Moresby was dispatched once the incident had been reported and 
Aumu was raided. I was told how the chief, councillor and teacher were asked 
to line up and then told to jump into the river and swim to the far bank and 
back while the police shot the water nearby. Villagers’ canoes were riddled 
with bullets, and all the dogs, ducks and chickens were killed. The terrified 
villagers ran away and lived in their fishing camps in the forest for a month. 
They were brought back by the son of a policeman, whom they credit for saving 
the village from further reprisals. However, for some time, subsequent cargo 
ships would go by the village at full speed and fire a warning shot or two as they 
passed. At night these ships would also rake their high-powered spotlights over 
the village to wake and scare people. Recalling these events in 2010, one man 
remarked, ‘Aumu is the only one fighting for this river!’
This incident was one reason why villagers throughout the Purari Delta were 
terrified when the mobile squad returned on two separate occasions in 2001 and 
2002 (Bell 2006a: 220–1). My return to Baimuru in October 2001 coincided with 
the arrival of a mobile squad detachment that had not only been dispatched 
to deal with disturbances at the Kaumeia logging site, but was also raiding 
villages in a search for illegal home-made firearms and marijuana. The rumours 
circulating that the police were assaulting women on the coast were such that 
men in Mapaio talked of how they would meet the police with force if necessary. 
At the centre of these rumours was One-Eye, a man of Oro and Milne Bay 
parentage who served during the war in Bougainville. His nickname derives 
from the patch he wears over an eye damaged in this conflict. Within the delta 
it is widely believed that One-Eye possesses X-ray vision in this covered eye, 
which makes him all the more fearsome. More than this, however, narratives 
also circulated in 2001 and 2002 that, during his persecution of youth in 
Baimuru, One-Eye berated them in Tok Pisin by saying that his actions were 
payback because ‘your grandfathers ate my grandmothers, now you will eat 
dirt!’12 When asked about the incident, one elder related how his uncles told 
him of an event that occurred in Oro Province near Buna during World War 
II, when they were serving in the Papuan Infantry Battalion and had helped 
Australian commanders gather and kill Oro men who had collaborated with 
the Japanese. They were then said to have raped the men’s wives and sisters.13 
12  A, tumbuna bilong yu kaikai tumbuna bilong me, nau yu kaikai graun!
13  I have never been able to ascertain if there is any truth in this remembrance. It may be that the story 
recalls the Higaturu trials of 1943 during which Papuan collaborators were hanged.
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This man thought that One-Eye was using the police action as a way to enact his 
own revenge for this historical event and, as his story quickly spread, this only 
added to local people’s fear of the police commander.
In September 2002, One-Eye returned to the delta with a detachment of six 
men to investigate and retrieve seven chainsaws that had been stolen from 
the Kaumeia camp. Upon hearing of their imminent arrival in Mapaio, where 
the I’ai were preparing to host their Independence Day celebrations, the local 
councillors held an impromptu meeting. Some 30 men gathered in the dark on 
the village’s rugby field to talk about what might happen. The talk that followed 
revealed their fear of One-Eye and the police more generally, as well as the 
structural inequalities that logging had brought about in people’s access to cash 
and store-bought goods. The meeting began with one man speaking in the local 
language:14
One-Eye is going to do damage. One-Eye told the workers at Kaumeia base who 
are holding the chain that he wants to go inside and check if the chain is there or 
disappeared. While One-Eye went inside to see how far the chain came out from 
the bush, he wanted to come out and ask the workers questions again. But the 
workers were frightened and they ran away. They had never seen police. But he 
did not come to beat them, he just came to check their rooms. The policeman was 
just asking them, if some say yes they will get pain, but they ran away. When 
they come to the village it will be a big problem. So these policemen coming will 
spoil the village. Policemen are saying the village has no trouble in it, but these 
boys are coming so there will be trouble. The names of the people are in their 
hands, but if you two councillors are not here they are going to really spoil us …
One-Eye came down and beat one man at base. That man got all his things and 
brought out everything in [a] clear place. That is what happened at base. What 
people did he brought it out. That man was from somewhere else [another area 
of PNG]. Our small ones were just staying there, and that fellow they belted said 
everything. Our small ones got frightened and came down. They should have 
stayed there but they got frightened and came down [to the village].
The speaker and others present urged the councillors to settle the matter before 
the police came in force and caused the young men to flee into the forest, 
raising suspicions and most likely leading to their being beaten. One young 
man was suspected of having fled the camp with a chainsaw and, on hearing of 
the arrival of the mobile squad, had already fled Mapaio. Another man at the 
meeting interjected:
You people have not seen the action of One-Eye. I have seen his actions when I 
went with … to Epea [Vailala base camp]. He is not going to care about anybody, 
he will do whatever he wants. One-Eye is not going to care about anyone. He will 
14  The following texts have been translated into English with the help of another local man.
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chase the councillors too because the police sent a message for … who stole [the] 
company chainsaw for it to be put in the councillor’s hands and return it, but 
you people didn’t do it. They have sent [a] message already to do that. But this 
policeman doesn’t care. When he wants to beat people, he will beat them. He will 
beat the councillors too. This is what I saw in Epea [Vailala].
To this a third speaker added:
The police are coming, we don’t know what their thinking is. Some of us don’t 
know how they beat people, some of us go around Moresby and know … but 
they are still coming and they are going to be here in the village. So we must 
think and do the things for the health of the people. Police is coming down, 
and our children, boys, women and children are going to get pain by running 
into the bush. They will come and not look to the councillor but hit him and 
the chief.
As the meeting went on talk whirled about how the villagers had brought this 
problem on themselves by unduly pressuring their sons and nephews working 
at Kaumeia to provide them with store-bought food or asking to stay with them 
while marketing produce at the camp. People also spoke of the evils of kuku dipi 
and how marijuana was to blame for the stealing of the chainsaws. Invoking 
more fears of the possibilities of what might happen, a fourth speaker said:
Please if you are father of the house, don’t run away because these people are 
dogs and will do whatever they want. These people are dogs. You don’t leave the 
house if they come in the night, because if you leave the house your wife and 
daughter will be smashed by them. So just stay in the house, don’t leave.
Adding fuel to these fearful speculations, a fifth speaker, a former policeman, 
remarked on how he had once raided a village in the highlands:
A chopper came up and left us in the middle of the village. When we went to the 
house there was no one. We burned the house, and just shot the dogs, cats and 
pigs. They will come down and do this … they did not sleep good and so they 
are angry and they are going to come down and do these things. So you young 
ones must think and do the right things for old ones.
As the night wore on, tensions between men who did and did not have kin 
working at the logging camp worked themselves out. The councillors urged calm 
and promised to resolve the matter by finding the stolen chainsaw reportedly 
located in the village, and that any confrontations would not result in violence. 
At 2:00 am the group dispersed, still fearful that the night or dawn might bring 
a raid.
The next day the mobile squad arrived at 9:30  am with One-Eye leading 
the group. Their arrival caused all sports being played in celebration of 
Independence Day to stop. Only one young man had fled on the news of their 
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arrival. The councillors met with the squad and were given a list of suspects — 
24 young men who all worked at Kaumeia. While the councillors sat with the 
Independence Day committee to discuss the names, One-Eye asked me over to 
talk. Speaking in English, he remarked how he had heard I was here but wasn’t 
sure what I was doing. After I explained my work, One-Eye commented that he 
was on a routine patrol of the area during which he and his men had confiscated 
some marijuana up in the border Pawaiian area. He also explained that this 
operation was about recovering chainsaws, which cost K2,000 each. Two had 
been recovered but five were still missing. One-Eye then remarked: ‘It’s  for 
logging — um — because those machines are the ones that are used to make 
money for landowners. Without those machines the company can’t cut logs … 
We are coming through the leaders in an easy way.’ Then, referring to himself, 
he noted that ‘Papuans are peace loving. Oro Province are like highlanders, they 
need force.’15
Following our brief conversation, One-Eye addressed the villagers assembled on 
the rugby field in a mixture of Tok Pisin and English:
There are independence celebrations in Gulf, Western Province, Milne Bay, 
Southern Region too. Oro is where they are strong headed, so when I go [there] 
I use force like in the highlands. Now we don’t come like that this morning. I don’t 
want the community to be scared, so I came to your leaders in a good way. I want 
you to have a normal Independence Day celebration because plenty of villages 
have come to celebrate. I want all these people to enjoy PNG independence. 
So that is why I come in a good way. Now all these people they don’t know why 
the police are come. They have just come to celebrate independence. You have all 
come to cooperate, which I appreciate. Now you need to work with your leaders. 
Whatever we do please cooperate with what we need so we can leave you to your 
celebrations. Because we could have come and raided your village at night but 
I don’t want to do this because you need to celebrate your Independence Day. 
That is why we came true through to your leaders. Through the leaders we can 
talk and work with them to find what we need. Force is a last resort, huh? Some 
places this isn’t the case but you people are peaceful. I just want to tell you all 
this so you can cooperate.
Appealing to purported regional variations in temperament, and playing up 
what could have happened, One-Eye tried to position himself as a peaceful 
enforcer of the law. My unconfirmed suspicion was that he had not raided the 
village in part due to my presence. The chainsaw believed to be in Mapaio was 
eventually recovered and the young man responsible taken to Baimuru where, in 
addition to being beaten, he was held in the cargo-holding cell for several days 
before being released. In the end, the visit was a peaceful one but, as evident 
15  My notes are from memory following our conversation. Oro Province is technically part of the Papuan 
region, but One-Eye seems to have thought of it rather differently.
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in the above commentary, it provoked an outpouring of anxieties about the 
violence that could come — violence that the men had seen and heard about 
being inflicted elsewhere. As discussed elsewhere in PNG, these rumours not 
only create new structures of fear, but they also distort a community’s sense 
of the state, and can significantly reshape what people believe is possible and 
permissible (Jacka 2001; Kirsch 2002; Butt 2005; Wood 2006). These distortions 
are constant features of the shifting configurations that are the politics of place 
and value that resource extraction helps enact (Tsing 2005).
I next encountered One-Eye at the third Rimbunan Hijau logging camp on the 
Purari River in March 2010. In 11 years since the first camp was established at 
Kaumeia, logging roads (passable only during the dry season) had connected 
this site to a logging depot at the mouth of the Vailala River. Moreover, with the 
economic opportunities present in the logging camp, I had heard how women 
often visited camps bringing items for sale to workers and their families. Indeed, 
when visiting the camp, I encountered three Southern Highlands women in the 
market who were on their third trip down to sell store-bought goods. It was 
only on my second trip to the camp that I met One-Eye. He saw me and emerged 
from underneath a house where he was sitting, smoking and speaking with 
others. After learning what I was up to, and recalling that we had met before, he 
asked to speak to me out of earshot, and we proceeded to talk for the better part 
of an hour. He explained how he and some companions had come three weeks 
ago to establish a police base and how they were conducting periodic patrols. 
Telling me of his recent patrols to stop marijuana trafficking from Kerema, he 
also alluded to his membership of a special task force to help ensure law and 
order in the region, particularly in light of the InterOil project, which he assured 
me was of special interest to the United States. Earlier in my trip, I had been 
to the new base that InterOil was building and had met two very bored mobile 
squad policemen. Armed with automatic weapons like One-Eye himself, it was 
their job to stop and investigate all river traffic. However, as my I’ai friends 
explained, their lack of a searchlight meant that it was very easy to slip by the 
checkpoint under the cover of darkness.
While One-Eye’s stature seemed rather diminished by the time we met in 2010, 
he was still feared by the I’ai and other Purari communities. His reputation 
for brutality continued, despite the more limited range of his actions in 
patrolling the logging roads. But if he and his companions at the InterOil base 
represented the PNG state, and by extension the companies they ultimately 
served, their presence was not without friction. As suggested in the next two 
examples I  discuss, narratives abound about how the environment itself is a 
lively actor pushing back against the actions of these individuals and companies 
(Tsing 2005: 29).
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Figures of Resistance
In the late afternoon in March 2010, I sat on the veranda of John’s house 
drinking tea.16 My companions and I had come to the settlement of Kae Varia 
after surveying the upper arm of the Ivo branch of the Purari River from 
Mapaio. During this trip we had visited the former logging camp at Kaumeia, 
now green with secondary growth, and had also stopped at the Pawaiian 
settlement of Poroi before coming down the eastern arm of the Purari. At Poroi 
we encountered a once-vibrant village reduced to a single household. All the 
inhabitants had moved up to Wabo to be closer to the activities and possibilities 
around InterOil’s operations there. This trip up the river was an attempt to fulfil 
a promise I made to the Mapaio community in 2006 to follow up on the survey 
of the Purari River I had first completed in 2002. Their and my hope was that 
I would produce a map for the community with ancestral sites and landmarks 
marked out through a global positioning system. Then and now, communities 
were deeply concerned about the destruction of ancestral sites by Rimbunan 
Hijau and now InterOil, and collectively there was a belief that a map could help 
make their claims legible (Peluso 1995). Indeed, already we had seen evidence 
of this destruction obliquely through being shown stone tools that workmen 
had either unearthed themselves or found on the roads as they were being cut.
In 2003, concerned about the direction in which things were headed, John and 
some 50 men and women had moved to this site on the west bank of the east 
branch of the Purari River from the Aikavalavi section of Mapaio. I had worked 
with John’s father during my initial fieldwork, and this visit provided us with 
an important opportunity to catch up after eight years. At the time of my visit 
his father was convalescing in the regional hospital of Kapuna and died shortly 
thereafter in 2011. Moving to this spot on the strength of his father’s ancestral 
connections, John and his companions were part of a contingent of I’ai who 
have moved up the Purari River to have more immediate access to the informal 
economies of the project areas, as well as to assert their ownership of land that 
was otherwise not normally inhabited.17
16  My return to the Purari Delta in March 2010, after a four-year absence, was shaped by the unexpected 
death of my adopted father and principle research assistant Kaia Rove. His death was understood to have been 
connected to ongoing leadership disputes within his clan. ‘John’ is a pseudonym.
17  At Ne’ea swamp, a traditional fishing and hunting locality, we came upon another group of I’ai from 
Mapaio who had established a semi-permanent camp on the riverbank in 2006. They had done so to be closer 
to the Kaumeia logging camp, and to have access to the InterOil project. Prior to their arrival, however, they 
had been visited by InterOil officials and police telling them that they had a month to vacate the project area 
or they would be forced to leave. Further down the river is the I’ai village of Vikoiki, an offshoot settlement 
from Aumu, another I’ai village located further south on the Purari River. Established in 2001, Vikoiki is on 
the west bank of the Purari River, opposite a now abandoned logging loading point used by Rimbunan Hijau. 
Indicative of the desires and misunderstandings that the logging and for that matter InterOil’s activities are 
generating, a group of people from Muro (a village site north of Orokolo Bay) has occupied the abandoned 
logging point since 2008. Their presence and claims to the site have generated a lot of resentment from the 
residents of Vikoiki who claim the area as theirs.
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The conversation on John’s veranda turned to the conditions at the Purari logging 
camp ten minutes downriver. I had visited the Purari logging camp earlier in 
the day, spending six hours meeting with workers to ask them about their work 
conditions.18 They were understandably guarded in their conversations with me, 
and flatly denied that they had any issues with gambling, prostitution, alcohol 
or marijuana, as documented elsewhere in PNG (Hammar 2010). When I raised 
this with John and company, the group started laughing and began enumerating 
the activities that took place in the surrounding area.19 John commented how 
kuku dipi ‘is the popular one! [Laughing] … if you were there at night you 
would find them on the road’. The group said that gambling flourished and 
that prostitution also occurred. Our talk turned to how the camp had been 
damaged by fire in March 2009, and the structures I saw had only recently been 
rebuilt. The only undamaged buildings were the Seventh-day Adventist church 
and the Asian workers’ quarters, which are at some distance from those of the 
local workers.
By one account of this event, a number of men and some women were gambling, 
drinking and listening to music in the single men’s barracks on the night of the 
fire. As the revellers carried on, out of the forest and into the building walked 
a naked white woman. Stunned, the group is said to have watched her walk 
through and then out of the building. Shortly thereafter the fire broke out and 
spread wildly. The other story was that someone’s small stove had got out of 
control while boiling water during a late-night gambling session. Men routinely 
have small kerosene stoves for cooking in their sleeping quarters, where they 
also hide zoom. Some workers sell stolen fuel on the black market to supplement 
their marginal incomes, which are all too quickly spent buying overpriced 
foodstuffs and other consumables in the camp’s store. It is thought that the fire 
accidently ignited a store of this fuel.
While the second story speaks to the grinding conditions of the logging camp, 
the first story is an example of a particular genre of narrative that I had been 
hearing since my arrival in the Purari Delta in 2000. These stories focus on how 
imunu periodically surface and disrupt the activities of the living. The cumulative 
effects of resource extraction regionally have only further exacerbated the 
breakdown of people’s relations with imunu. Indeed, local people tell of how 
imunu have either been taken by foreigners, as in the case of one spirit-being 
that took the form of a stone, or have been driven out by activities like seismic 
18  This trip was a follow up on some work I had conducted in the Kaumeia logging camp in 2001 and 2002. 
On this visit, I interviewed three workers — a grader of roads and two chainsaw operators from Morobe 
Province.
19  Informal economies flourish both within and alongside these camps due to the captive market of the 
workers and their isolation. While visiting the next day, we ran into a relative of one of my companions from 
Iuku village in Orokolo on the coast. The relative had come to the camp to sell betel nut to workers at a huge 
margin. He remarked how he also sold rum when it was available.
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testing. Large trees are the main home of iri imunu, which makes logging the 
most disruptive of these activities. In the past, and for those men still conscious 
of tradition today, protocol dictates that the principal male present addresses 
the imunu that resides within a large tree before it is cut down to make a house 
post or canoe. The imunu will be told of the group’s intention to cut down their 
home, and then asked if they will leave. Food is offered to the imunu, and is 
subsequently consumed by the men. Once the meal is over, the cutting of the 
tree can commence.
Awareness of these relations within the Baimuru community of Kararua was 
such that a large feast was held before logging began in their western territories 
in 1999. During the feast the imunu were asked to find new homes and not 
to harm the community. The I’ai, with whom I principally worked, never did 
anything similar, which has made them persistently wary about working at the 
logging operations and sensitive to the problems that non-placated imunu can 
cause. As a result, my I’ai friends saw the white woman as the forest manifesting 
itself and wreaking vengeance on the morally dubious workers. In 2001 and 
2002, rumours circulated of how the tutelary ancestral figure Ivia and the still-
living but hidden figure of Tom Kabu were variously behind the endless deluge 
of rain. The narratives that abounded about these actions directly linked them 
to local people’s exclusion from royalties or compensation payments (Bell 2009).
It was during this trip that I also heard of a kae imunu named Aupea who, in 
the shape of a stone, blocked InterOil’s barges carrying equipment to Wabo. 
According to my acquaintances, the imunu had, like the white woman, decided 
that enough was enough, and was actively blocking the barges. His actions were 
so successful that the barges had to navigate a different river passage to avoid 
his movements. In these narratives, these imunu become spectral weapons of the 
weak, disrupting frontier capitalism and opening up spaces through which the 
I’ai can hope for recognition.
A Scarf Wrapped around the Head
While the structural violence of resource extraction finds unique expression 
in the examples I have discussed thus far, it is also found in more quotidian 
examples. In closing I want to turn to two examples drawn from experiences 
in Kararua and Mapaio. Separated by eight years, these two examples point to 
the enduring inequalities engendered by the ongoing resource extraction in 
the region.
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Just south-west of Baimuru government station, Kararua village is occupied by a 
confederation of clans that compose the Vaimuru tribe. Regionally, the Vaimuru 
were the strongest adherents of tradition, but had been receiving timber royalty 
payments since 2000. This periodic influx of money had increased gambling in 
the village and was a growing source of domestic strife. This strife took a variety 
of forms, from kin yelling at one another during the distribution of payments, 
such as I observed one afternoon, to the inability of the community to come 
together with contributions of sheet iron to cover one communal building for 
the sake of an increased water supply. Instead, indicative of their fragmentation, 
each household had their solitary sheet and catchment. The most profound 
embodiment of these increased disruptions was in a scarf that an older woman, 
Kiki, wore tied tightly around her head. I had come to know her husband, Avae, 
and when visiting Kararua I always made an effort to spend time with them 
both. On one of my visits, Avae and I began speaking about intergenerational 
problems caused by logging. Our talk quickly turned to gambling, and then 
to Kiki’s scarf. Avae and Kiki disclosed how her scarf kept a skull fracture in 
place, and how Kiki was racked with headaches without it. One day, as they 
gambled with newly dispersed royalty payments, one of their sons ran out 
of funds. On being refused a loan by his mother, he hit her with a wooden 
plank. The  family had since mended the social strain that this violence had 
caused, but Kiki continued to suffer the legacy of this encounter. Avae’s anger 
had not abated, and he had all but concluded that he would die keeping all his 
knowledge of his descent group’s lands to himself.
In 2010, when I returned to Mapaio, I found that gambling also dominated life 
in the village, yet people were even more outspoken about the pollution of the 
Purari River. This is the main source of drinking water for the community, and 
a major source of food (fish, crayfish, etc.) and water used in the processing 
of food (sago). For years community members had noticed that sedimentation 
in the water had increased, the taste had deteriorated, and there were more 
ailments associated with unpalatable water, such as intestinal complaints and 
more frequent and lasting sores. Indeed, eye infections and body sores, which 
were previously confined to the wet season, were now a constant occurrence. 
One small girl’s sore was so bad that her toe had to be removed. Alongside these 
health issues, fish were increasingly found covered in sores.
One possibility is that these sores may be due to the effects of increased 
population in the central highland provinces. In his discussion of aquatic 
pollution discerned from testing in 1978, Petr (1983: 329) notes that the Purari 
catchment receives wastewater from the major towns of Goroka, Kundiawa, 
Minj, Mt Hagen and Mendi. Increased faecal material from the greater animal 
and human populations in the catchment could be increasing these various 
health and environmental problems. However, Petr notes that the Purari River 
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at Wabo appears to be self-purifying and, in any case, pollution of the main 
river should not be such a great concern because ‘people along the Purari 
prefer drinking rainwater and water from side streams’ (ibid.: 331). While this 
preference still exists, the reality is that many communities do not have an 
alternative to drinking the water from the main river.
It is also likely that the higher sedimentation load is caused by deforestation both 
in the delta and in the highlands. While it remains to be seen whether InterOil’s 
activities are having the sort of effects on the Purari River that are experienced 
by the community of Mapaio, the company’s community affairs officers have 
warned communities against drinking the river water or eating dead fish found 
in the river. They did not link these restrictions to the company’s own activities, 
but one cannot help but speculate on the relationship.
Conclusion
If place-making is a way of constructing the past, a venerable means of doing 
human history, it is also a way of constructing social traditions and, in the 
process, personal and social identities. We are, in a sense, the place-worlds we 
imagine. (Basso 1996: 7)
In this chapter, I have attempted to think through the place-worlds that resource 
extraction in the Purari Delta helps to imagine, and with it think through the 
structural violence these activities give rise to and help enact. Working in this 
region, one is very aware of the legacy of earlier representations, how writers 
seeking to bracket and frame the Purari people portrayed them as primordial 
cannibalistic semi-aquatic mud dwellers (Bevan 1890: 186–8; Murray 1912: 
197; Holmes 1924: 28–9). While the violence of these representations is only 
obliquely felt locally (Peluso 2003), spectres of this past do periodically appear. 
I have tried to expose aspects of the micro-politics of structural violence in the 
Purari Delta, show how resource extraction structures life at the cost of local 
communities, how companies use police forces to make communities comply 
with their wishes, and how communities themselves become more violent in 
the wake of the new instabilities of wealth and power that resource extraction 
brings (Lattas 2011). In doing so, I hope not to paint too bleak a picture of the 
Purari Delta where, despite the problems I outline, people find the resilience 
to joke, laugh, sing and enjoy aspects of their lives. However, the situation in 
the delta, as in other regions affected by such projects, is stark and not to be 
understated (Kirsch 2006; see other contributors to this volume). My hope is that 
in bringing together these histories, and contemporary accounts, more attention 
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will be brought to bear on the impacts of resource extraction regionally, and 
that the affected communities may begin to obtain the justice they deserve and 
the compensation they need.
When I asked a long-term friend and Mapaio resident, Henry, about the way 
he saw the future for his children in light of these events in 2012, he remarked:
Like I have said, myself I am not going to stop [it] because the people they want 
the development to go in. The government wants the development to go in. If I 
a village person goes to stop the development then the government is going to 
come against me and beat me again. So that is why the village they want to stop 
the particular project for the future but the government is forcing that thing 
to happen. So we have no power to stop it. We have concern for our children 
there to stop it but we have no power because the government has power to do 
everything there. So our government is not concerned about histories they are 
just going in and doing these things inside.
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7. The Fate of Crater Mountain: 
Forest Conservation in the Eastern 
Highlands of Papua New Guinea
PAIGE WEST AND ENOCK KALE
Introduction
Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) Crater Mountain Wildlife Management Area 
(CMWMA), a conservation-as-development project that began informally in the 
late 1970s – early 1980s and that was solidified by national and international 
conservation policies and practices in the 1990s, effectively ceased to exist in 
its original form in March 2005. The CMWMA, the oldest Wildlife Management 
Area (WMA) in the country, was a 2,700 square kilometre area located at the 
borders of Eastern Highlands, Simbu (Chimbu) and Gulf provinces. The area 
that the CMWMA encompassed is home to the Gimi and Pawaia peoples who 
believe that their day-to-day lives and social relations with the living and dead 
bring their forests and the plants and animals in them into being. The lands 
that the CMWMA encompassed matter to Gimi and Pawaia because they sustain 
them and are sustained by them, because they hold and tell their history, and 
because they are the source and the sink for their cosmological relations with 
the past and the future (see Ellis 2002; West 2005b, 2006a). Although neither of 
these sociolinguistic groups think of the world in terms of western notions of 
‘value’, conservation scientists, activists and practitioners saw Crater Mountain 
and the landscape around it as biologically valuable — ‘a natural resource of 
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national and global importance’ (Johnson 1997: 394). They saw it as valuable 
for three main reasons. First, much of it is covered with forest that is highly 
biologically diverse with high rates of endemism. Second, the area encompassed 
by the WMA was large enough to cover the landscape between lowland 
rainforest on the Purari River and montane cloud forest on Crater Mountain, 
thus creating a protected area that included multiple forest systems under one 
project. And third, because human population densities are low around Crater 
Mountain, it was assumed that human-generated changes to the landscape 
are slight.
This chapter describes the complicated history of the CMWMA and the reasons 
for its decline. It is based on Paige West’s research with the architects of the 
conservation-as-development project, the people who implemented it and 
carried out its day-to-day management, the scientists who conducted research 
within its boundaries, and its Gimi-speaking residents, as well as Enock Kale’s 
experience as a facilitator working with Gimi communities and conservation 
organisations in an attempt in the early 2010s to try to revitalise the CMWMA.1 
The chapter also describes the decline of a program for training young Papua 
New Guinean scientists that grew out of the CMWMA and argues that even with 
the failure of the CMWMA this training program was an enormous conservation 
success for PNG.
Background to the Crater Mountain Wildlife 
Management Area
The CMWMA began informally with the work of David Gillison, a photographer 
and conservation enthusiast. David was married to anthropologist Gillian Gillison 
and in the 1970s and 1980s they lived with Gimi-speaking people in Ubaigubi 
village in Eastern Highlands Province. Gillian conducted anthropological field 
research concerned with gender and mythology and focused her work on Gimi 
women. David spent time with Gimi men, talking about initiation and trekking 
through the forests on hunting expeditions. During these talks and trips David 
‘fell in love’ with New Guinea birds of paradise and began photographing them. 
He ultimately approached Wildlife Conservation International (what is now 
the Wildlife Conservation Society — WCS) with a plan to protect the habitat 
1  Paige West is a cultural anthropologist who has worked in the Crater Mountain area since 1997 (see Ellis 
and West 2004; Mack and West 2005; West 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2008a, 2008b; West 
and Brockington 2006; West and Carrier 2004; West et al. 2006). Enock Kale is a conservation biologist and a 
native Gimi speaker. He grew up in the CMWMA.
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of these birds around four villages (Ubaigubi, Herowana, Maimafu and Haia) 
on a landscape that crossed the boundaries of Eastern Highlands Province, 
Gulf Province and Chimbu Province.
The CMWMA was officially established in 1994 (Johnson 1997: 397). In October 
of that year the PNG Department of Environment and Conservation declared it 
a national WMA under the Fauna (Protection and Control) Act 1966. The Act 
establishes the mechanisms by which ‘Wildlife Management Areas, Sanctuaries, 
and Protected Areas’ are set up and maintained. The Act provides for a set of 
formal institutionalised mechanisms to regulate wildlife harvesting, possession 
and trade in these areas.
For an area to be gazetted a national WMA, the ‘customary landowners’ 
must provide the Department of Environment and Conservation with a ‘legal 
description of the boundaries of their area to be gazetted’, a list of ‘clan 
leaders who will sit on the local Wildlife Management Committees’, and a list 
of conservation rules or laws that will be used to govern the WMA (Fauna 
(Protection and Control) Act 1966). Since the majority of people living around 
Crater Mountain had, at the time of the CMWMA’s inception, little knowledge 
of the mechanisms by which the national laws work, WCS employee Jamie 
James went to the area to help people establish the boundaries and determine 
who would sit on the legally mandated Wildlife Management Committees 
(Johnson 1997: 399). James targeted ‘leaders’ who were hand picked by David 
Gillison, and assumed that because David identified them as ‘leaders’ that they 
were identified by the local communities as leaders. Most of the men identified 
as ‘leaders’ by Gillison had worked with him as field assistants during his years 
living in Gimi-speaking villages.
The Biodiversity Conservation Network (BCN) was the major donor for the 
Crater Mountain project during the period of its official inception. The largest 
single grant was the BCN implementation grant of US$498,107, which was 
spread over a three-year period from 1995 to 1998. As a BCN partner, the WCS 
committed US$76,950 in funding to the project.
BCN was designed to fund and study international conservation projects that 
linked biological conservation with economic development. The ideology 
behind BCN was that biodiversity as ‘biological capital’ is already linked to the 
economic ‘health’ of the planet.
The BCN program overview states:
Conservation efforts that ignore the economic needs of local communities 
are unlikely to succeed. The Biodiversity Conservation Network (BCN), 
a component of the Biodiversity Support Program (BSP), is an innovative 
USAID-funded program working in the Asia/Pacific Region to provide grants 
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for community-based enterprises that directly depend on biodiversity. BCN is 
testing the hypothesis that if local communities receive sufficient benefits from 
a biodiversity-linked enterprise, then they will act to conserve it. (BSP 1996: iii)
BCN took as its premise that commodity production and economic incentives 
which tie people to commodity-based systems are the strategies that will promote 
the conservation of biological diversity. BCN devised what its literature refers to 
as the ‘core hypothesis’. The BCN core hypothesis states:
If enterprise-oriented approaches to community-based conservation are going to 
be effective, they must: 1) have a direct link to biodiversity, 2) generate benefits, 
and 3) involve a community of stakeholders (BSP 1996: 1).
In effect, the hypothesis is that ‘if local communities receive sufficient benefits 
from an enterprise that depends on biodiversity, then they will act to counter 
internal and external threats to that biodiversity’ (BSP 1996:  1). The BCN 
project of hypothesis testing began in earnest with a US$20 million commitment 
from USAID in 1992 and was planned to last for six and a half years, ending in 
March 1999. Part of that money was used to found and fund the Research and 
Conservation Foundation of Papua New Guinea (RCF).
The RCF, a non-governmental environmental conservation organisation officially 
incorporated in 1986 with the help of the WCS and the PNG Department of 
Environment and Conservation, administered the Crater Mountain project. 
David Gillison founded the RCF because of his concern over what he thought 
to be ‘declining populations’ of birds of paradise in the forests near Crater 
Mountain. The stated goals of RCF with regard to the CMWMA fell directly 
in line with the stated goals of BCN. RCF attempted to meet these goals by 
implementing a series of programs within the four villages located in the WMA. 
These programs included creating local businesses revolving around biological 
research, tourism and handicraft production; teaching local men and children 
about biological diversity and conservation; and implementing a monitoring 
system to measure the results of biodiversity conservation.
In addition to all of this conservation-as-development around Crater Mountain, 
beginning in 1987 there were scientists working on the southern side of Crater 
Mountain. Americans Debra Wright and Andrew Mack began the research 
for their PhD degrees in ecology by building a research station that has 
become known as the Sera Research Station. The Sera Research Station was a 
biological research station located on land held by the Toyaido people of Haia 
(Pawaia people). It was built between 1987 and 1994 and served as the base 
for most of the biological research conducted in the CMWMA. Wright and 
Mack worked with Pawaia and Gimi people from almost the beginning of their 
research. Initially, they employed local people as carriers and guides but as the 
station came into being and their research projects got under way, they began 
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to teach local men how to help them collect data. Because of this, in addition 
to the other ‘income-generation’ projects implemented by RCF, the architects of 
the CMWMA also incorporated some training of male landholders so that they 
could serve as research assistants, carriers and guides for scientists.
WCS PNG and the Development of Biological 
Science ‘Training Courses’
Debra Wright and Andrew Mack served as the program directors for WCS 
PNG from 1999 to 2007.2 Their original mandate was to conduct ‘site based 
conservation’ at Crater Mountain, manage and maintain the Sera Research 
Station, develop new sites for conservation and research in PNG, and conduct 
scientific research that could ultimately result in conservation in the country. 
In  addition to these duties, Wright and Mack conceptualised, designed, 
developed and taught a series of biological science ‘training courses’ for PNG 
nationals. This was not part of their mandated duty for WCS; it was done in 
addition to their extensive job requirements.
The idea for the ‘training courses’ began to develop before Wright and Mack 
began working for WCS. In 1996, Mack (who was employed by Conservation 
International at the time) and Wright (who was still completing her PhD) applied 
for funds to conduct a three-month-long biological survey in three areas near 
Crater Mountain (Soobo, O-Pio and Aedo). They organised the survey around 
four taxa (birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians, and plants) and took 
one University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) student, one National Museum 
employee, one Forestry Research Institute professional, and one ‘landowner’ 
for each of the four taxa. During the survey they worked to ‘train’ their 
assistants in research methods including capture, identification and specimen 
preparation. During that same survey season, while at the camp they built at 
Soobo, they invited 20  students from UPNG to join them and take part in a 
course on methods. Both Mack and Wright enjoyed this course and the teaching 
that it entailed, but they were both struck by how little the senior students 
from UPNG knew about research design, methodology and data analysis.
2  Since 1999 WCS has maintained an office in Goroka, the city closest to the Sera Research Station at 
Crater Mountain. Over the years between the founding of the Goroka office and the end of the CMWMA, 
the WCS PNG office became the hub of New Guinea biological research. It hosted researchers from PNG, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Germany, Venezuela, Mexico, France and 
Holland. All of these researchers went through Goroka on their way to the Sera Research Station, and while in 
Goroka they all stayed at one of the houses rented by WCS PNG, at ‘Pacific Estates’, a gated neighbourhood 
about one mile from the city centre.
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Later that year Conservation International, with funding from USAID, asked 
Mack and Wright to conduct a rapid assessment program (RAP) survey at 
Lakekamu. They agreed under the condition that Conservation International 
fund a four-week visit from UPNG students during the course of the RAP. 
Conservation International agreed. Andrew Mack says:
Debra and I took it in a slightly different direction in 1996 than the traditional 
RAP training as was done in Latin America. Our students came from a university 
with weaker fundamental skill building. Therefore, we incorporated more basic 
skills, like making data sheets, proper note taking … We also made the project a 
bit more quantitative as this had been my objection to RAP prior to joining CI. 
I knew about [the Conservation International RAP method] from its inception 
because I had been a good friend of Ted Parker. But we [Debra and Andrew] 
both generally felt that RAP-style surveys could be enhanced without undue 
effort with a little bit of sampling rigor … getting something more than just a 
species list.
In their attempt to refine and revise the RAP methods, Wright and Mack realised 
that with the program they were developing, they could pair the research 
they wanted to do to create a scientific basis for conservation in PNG with the 
biological science training of PNG nationals.
In 1997 they did another RAP-connected four-week course near Maimafu 
village, and in 1998 they did two more survey trips (again using the formula 
of one UPNG student, one National Museum employee, one Forestry Research 
Institute professional and one ‘landowner’ for each of the four taxa surveyed). 
Wright says:
We began this massive training effort because students told us they didn’t get 
any exposure to actual field research in their university training — certainly 
not to netting of birds and bats, trapping of mammals, etc. It was a need that 
we could fill. Without research skills biologists can’t find out what they need 
to know in order to manage and sustain wildlife and ecosystems. We evolved 
the course each year based on post-course evaluations that asked the students 
what they liked and didn’t like about the course, and what else they would like 
to see included. That’s how we ended up doing alternate courses — one focused 
on field techniques, and one focused on project design and proposal writing. 
Both taught data analysis, report writing, and oral presentations. Each year we 
tried to hold the course in a different remote field site and we would take on 
between twenty-five and thirty UPNG students and conservation professionals 
for the four weeks. We thought it was important for us all to be living together 
out in the bush, as a team, working and learning together.
With these early surveys and RAP trips, Mack and Wright had been exposed 
to students from UPNG and felt they showed promise as researchers but needed 
to have some additional field-based training in methods and some additional 
laboratory-based training in analysis and statistics before they could work 
7. The Fate of Crater Mountain
161
productively with visiting researchers or, more importantly, compete for 
international scholarships to study out of PNG for their graduate degrees. Because 
of this, they proposed to run a yearly course in research design, practices and 
analysis that would supplement the biological training students were receiving 
at UPNG. The course was aimed at the most capable and successful students 
majoring in the biological sciences and Wright, Mack with UPNG Professor 
Lance Hill choosing the students.
The training course ran for three years as a course only, but at the beginning of 
the fourth year Mack and Wright decided to add a second stage to the course. 
They, and Professor Hill, felt that some of the students who had taken part in 
the course had accomplished so much and learned so much in the course that 
they might be ready to conduct honours thesis work based on what they had 
learned. Wright wrote a grant proposal to fund a limited number of research 
projects to be designed and carried out by UPNG honours program students 
under the supervision of herself, Mack and Professor Hill. She was successful, 
and in 2000 they implemented a project that identified highly qualified graduates 
of their training courses, and offered them a position with WCS PNG as student 
researchers. In this position they would design a research project, carry it out, 
analyse the data collected and write an honours thesis. During this process they 
would be based in Goroka living in a house next door to the WCS PNG office 
and across the street from Wright and Mack.
Over the next six years a small campus developed around the WCS PNG office. 
We refer to it as a ‘campus’ because it became a kind of hub for researchers 
and students. Initially only people who were working at Crater Mountain came 
through the WCS PNG office, but by 2005 researchers who had once worked 
at Crater Mountain but who now had other sites in the country would stop by 
the WCS PNG offices and stay for a while, even if they were not going out to 
Crater Mountain. In addition, the Mack/Wright house, the home of the assistant 
director of WCS PNG and the senior national scientist, and the student dormitory 
house became lodging sites for visiting researchers from all disciplines. All of the 
researchers who moved through the WCS PNG campus were expected to spend 
time with the PNG students both in professional and social ways. The  social 
world that emerged in Goroka was one that helped students develop both their 
research projects and their identities as scholars. It also served as the key node 
in the emerging network of scholars working in the CMWMA.
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WCS PNG as a Conservation Success Story
WCS PNG, as it was organised under Wright and Mack and as it was connected 
to the CMWMA, was a ‘success story’ for conservation for four main reasons. 
First, Wright and Mack worked against the dominant model of expatriate 
scientist/national scientist interaction to build a program in which national 
scientists began to take the lead in scientific research design. Second, they 
fostered collaboration between international and national researchers from 
different disciplines. Third, they facilitated and conducted the most current 
and interesting scientific research in the highlands regions of the country. 
And  fourth, they raised significant amounts of money for research and 
conservation in the country. That money did not go to consultant or expatriate 
salaries but rather to funding students from PNG to do research.
Historically there have been two forms of interaction between expatriate 
scientists and national scientists in PNG. The first, and most common, is what 
we term ‘science as labour’.
Science as Labour
From 1995 to 2000 a UPNG-trained biologist lived and worked in Maimafu 
village, one of the villages in the CMWMA. During this five-year period he 
collected data on the biological diversity in the forests around Maimafu. 
From 2000 to 2002 a second biologist trained at UNITECH lived in Maimafu 
and collected data, from 2003 to 2004 another from UPNG and from 2004 to 
2006 a fourth man lived there and collected biological data. None of these men 
understood fully why they were collecting this data. They knew how to do it 
(e.g., bird flyover counts, rain meter checks, wildlife trade counts) but they did 
not know what the data would be used for or what kinds of questions might be 
asked of the data. While these men were dedicated people, their lack of scientific 
knowledge of the very basics of rainforest ecology mean that as far as we are 
concerned the volumes of data collected are patchy and incomplete at best. 
But, in fact, American scientists have used some of those data in order to earn 
their PhD degrees. To date, none of the men who worked in Maimafu have used 
any of the data they collected for their own degrees. This mode of operation 
— ‘science as labour’ — is the mode of operation used in PNG by many of the 
major international conservation organisations working there. It does nothing 
to build capacity in country or conserve any biological diversity. It is one of the 
many reasons that ‘BINGOs’ (big international non-governmental organisations) 
have such a terrible reputation in PNG. It is, simply, another form of resource 
extraction. Like mining, logging and fishing, outsiders come in, extract what 
they want and leave little behind.
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Papua New Guineans as Active Participants in Science
The second form of interaction, pioneered by anthropologist Ralph Bulmer and 
Ian Saem Majnep, treats Papua New Guinean nationals as active participants in 
the process of science, attributes scientific findings to them, and seeks to create 
avenues for them to become lead researchers and design research projects (Majnep 
and Bulmer 1977; Majnep and Bulmer 2007). WCS PNG fit this model during 
the Wright and Mack years. Instead of treating all people from PNG as labour, 
the organisation trained PNG nationals as scientists and local landholders as 
research assistants. Since 2001, Paige West has interviewed 26 nationals working 
in conservation in PNG for her ongoing research. These people work at various 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and government offices and 41 per cent 
of them attended one of the WCS training courses. With this, WCS PNG began 
to assure that the people moving up into the government and NGO offices of 
conservation in PNG have a solid background in their undergraduate training 
in the biological sciences. Because of financial constraints, the UPNG Biology 
Department cannot assure this.
Under the management of the Wright/Mack team, WCS PNG developed 
the aforementioned much-needed training programs for PNG nationals. 
These  programs, both the biological field methods training course — in 
partnership with UPNG — and an additional teacher-training course that 
Wright developed in partnership with RCF and the University of Goroka, have 
contributed to the growth of national science and national science education in 
PNG. By developing these programs in partnership with PNG-based institutions 
the Wright/Mack team contributed not only to the growth of biological sciences 
in PNG but also to the growth of national institutional capacity.
The annual biological field methods training course, which began open only 
to UPNG students, now includes national participants from other conservation 
NGOs, national and provincial conservation-related departments, and both 
national museums. It has become the vanguard of science-based conservation 
training in PNG. Under Mack and Wright, WCS PNG also worked with many 
of the UPNG honours students to help them earn and win scholarships to study 
abroad for masters and PhD programs. In spring 2007 there were 12 honours 
students living in Goroka. To date, six of these students have gone on to masters 
programs in the United States, Australia and New Zealand. Previously, there had 
been ten successful honours degrees. All ten of these people went on to earn 
masters degrees. By 2011, the number had increased to 15, of which three were 
PhD candidates.
With all of this, WCS PNG built a network of national and international 
researchers that were connected through Andrew Mack and Debra Wright. 
The  customary landholders around Crater Mountain came to recognise this 
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network through their systems of meaning, making a patriclan (an extended 
family group based on patrilineal descent) with Andrew as the ‘big man’ and 
head of the family and Debra as his wife. Over the years, the Papua New Guinean 
students and the expatriate researchers who worked with WCS PNG became 
incorporated into social life around the Sera Station as Debra and Andrew’s 
children, cousins and the like. Andrew was blamed when someone did something 
socially inappropriate and was lauded when someone did something that was 
seen as appropriate or good. These relations were instantiated through the long-
term presence of some of the WCS PNG honours degree students in areas around 
the Sera Station and in the villages within the CMWMA. Mack was perceived as 
and acted as the patriclan leader and Wright was perceived as and acted as his 
wife. Mack came to embody the role of a highland big man in important ways 
and Wright came to embody the role of a mother.
None of this is to say that either Wright or Mack became, during their 20 years 
in PNG, fluent in or experts on local social articulations. Neither of them learned 
to speak the Pawaia language or the Gimi language. Neither of them actively 
engaged in learning the social vernaculars of the people they were working with 
in and around the Sera Station. In other words, they were one type of ecologist 
that we see globally — focused, when ‘in the field’, on their research, assuming 
that it had little or nothing to do with the local societies, so therefore less than 
interested in the local societies.
Resource Frontiers
While WCS PNG was working to establish its training program and to make 
the Sera Research Station the pre-eminent site for field-based scientific study 
in the country, various other international actors were also focusing on the 
Crater Mountain area. During the entire history of the CMWMA there has also 
been resource-related exploration in the area. The first mining exploration trip 
around Crater Mountain was in 1970, with subsequent trips in 1971, 1972, 1977, 
1983, 1984, 1988, 1995, 1996 and 1997. These trips were undertaken by several 
different companies. All of the exploration trips after 1994 took place under the 
current exploration licence (EL 1115 Crater Mountain). This licence covers ‘a 
rectangular area of 700 km between 6° 39’ S 144° 56’ E and 6° 28’ S 145° 15’ E 
and lies 50 km south-west of Goroka’ with Crater Mountain sitting in the centre 
of the area (Macmin Silver Ltd 1997). With the issuing of this licence there was 
a revival in interest in the area around Crater Mountain and Macmin Silver 
Limited spent about US$1 million on a test drill site in 1998. After locating ‘a 
major gold bearing hydrothermal system’, Macmin considered it ‘prudent to 
defer further valuable exploration funds’ from Crater Mountain (Macmin Silver 
Ltd 2000). The reason given for this deferral was the low value of gold on the 
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world market at that time, but the ‘Crater deposit’ was still, at that point, termed 
a ‘company maker’ for Macmin (Macmin Silver Ltd 2000). In 2002, New Guinea 
Gold Corporation, a partner company to Macmin, announced its acquisition of 
seven new gold and copper projects in PNG that included the Crater Mountain 
licence (NGG 2002).
Elsewhere, West has explained in detail what happened next:
On 6 January 2004, a story in the Papua New Guinea Post-Courier reported that 
Macmin Silver Limited, a subsidiary of New Guinea Gold, had signed a joint 
venture agreement with Celtic Minerals Limited, which gave Celtic a 75 percent 
interest in the Crater Mountain project (Post-Courier 2004a). On 5 February 
2004, New Guinea Gold issued a press release regarding the returns at Crater 
Mountain from a trenching program carried out in December 2003 (NGG 2004). 
The story was picked up by the Post-Courier and ran as a feature on the finance 
page on 9 February 2004 (Post-Courier 2004b). In the press release New Guinea 
Gold announced their application for an expanded exploration license they had 
filed with the PNG Department of Mining. According to the release they filed 
for this expanded license because Crater has such a favorable geological setting 
in terms of its potential for a ‘major gold bearing mineralised system.’ The Post-
Courier story announced the trenching data (9.97 grams per tonne gold in one 
trench) and quoted Peter McNeil, the director of New Guinea Gold, as saying 
that they have ‘never had results of this magnitude right at the surface.’ The 
results indicated that this was a potentially lucrative new prospect, with an 
extremely rich vein, which the company continually likens to the Porgera area 
(Macmin Silver Ltd 2000). (West 2006b: 300)
After this frenzy of press releases, later in 2004 Triple Plate Junction, a gold 
and mineral exploration company from the United Kingdom, partnered with 
Macmin and Celtic and began to carry out further exploration in the Nevera 
Prospect Area and in early 2005 they began working in the Nimi Prospect Area. 
The land encompassed by the Nimi Prospect Area (the south end of EL 1115) is 
held in traditional tenure by people from Maimafu, according to people from 
Maimafu, and on land owned by people from Herowana, according to people 
from Herowana, and on land owned by people from Haia, according to people 
from Haia. These are three of the main villages that took part in the conservation-
as-development project that was the CMWMA.
According to people from all of these villages, the prospectors who have visited 
their lands over the past 30 years have said, with each visit, that if a mine is 
established, people will be given roads, schools, hospitals, jobs and access to the 
other things that they see as development. Villagers also report that prospectors, 
geologists, gold buyers and the many people from other places who have flocked 
to the Crater Mountain area to attempt to access some of this mineral wealth say 
that if mining takes hold, development and cash will come quickly to the area.
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In December 2003 InterOil, an oil exploration and refining company, landed at 
the Sera Research Station and told researchers and customary landholders that 
it would begin exploration activities in three days. InterOil said this would 
entail cutting at least five hectares of forest and bringing 200 workers to the 
site. WCS PNG attempted to negotiate with InterOil in order to have it move the 
exploration site out of the long-term study area (the area around the Sera Station 
had had few human impacts in terms of hunting or harvesting since about 1987). 
The company initially refused to negotiate with WCS PNG, citing underlying 
geological concerns as the reason for its decision to drill within the WCS PNG 
study area. Eventually, WCS PNG negotiated with InterOil a concession for 
minimised impact at the drill site and one for quick drilling (the company 
agreed to be out of the area by April 2004). After these negotiations, InterOil set 
up a ‘camp’ at the proposed drill site and staffed it with a small staff. Between 
December 2003 and March 2006, InterOil proceeded to cut seismic transects 
through the long-term study area surrounding the Sera Station but did not drill 
at all. According to WCS PNG staff, each time they contacted InterOil and asked 
about the drilling schedule, they were told that drilling would begin shortly.
The presence of InterOil near the Sera Station was not simple or benign. 
Local landholders began, soon after the camp was established, to visit and to sell 
food and other items to the small InterOil staff. Local Pawaia and Gimi peoples 
went to the camp to attempt to make money through these small commodity 
transactions and through gaining waged labour. They were told, repeatedly, 
that the staff would eventually hire them when the drilling began. The resident 
landholders were also told, according to people from Maimafu and Herowana 
villages, that one of the reasons for the delay in drilling, and thus the delay in 
waged labour being provided, was the presence of WCS PNG.
Conservation and mining offered the same things to landholders — they made 
resource extraction and conservation commensurable in people’s eyes by tying 
them both to the promise of ‘development’ and the social relations that would 
bring development. But conservation-as-development as a possibility began 
to fade in local fantasies of the future by the mid-2000s. As WCS worked to 
establish its office and ongoing presence in PNG and as the resource extraction 
companies conducted exploration within the CMWMA, the RCF continued with 
its project of conservation-as-development even in the face of growing dissent 
among customary landholders who felt they were not getting what they had 
bargained for when they agreed to work with RCF initially.
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The End of the Crater Mountain Wildlife 
Management Area
On 23 March 2006, four Gimi men from Herowana broke into the Sera Research 
Station with bush knives and guns. The station staff and various WCS PNG 
researchers and employees working at the station at the time were all in 
transition between Goroka, Haia (the village one flies into in order to then walk 
12 hours to the station) and the station. There was a female researcher at the 
research station along with her field assistants who were all from Haia village. 
The four men from Herowana held a gun to her head, beat her and raped her. 
This vicious attack was the pivotal point in the history of the CMWMA. It was, 
more importantly, a horrific event for the victim. We write about it here so 
briefly because we are sensitive to this event not being ours to write about in 
any detail. However, this kind of ‘punitive’ rape is one increasingly common 
form of action in resource extraction situations in PNG. On 25 March 2006 WCS 
PNG pulled all of their staff out of the CMWMA.
Over the course of the months after the attack, Enock Kale met with people 
from Herowana to discuss the events that resulted in the violence of 23 March. 
Members of the Herowana community believed they were not benefiting from 
the conservation-as-development project. Their main complaint was that they 
felt that the profits from the project were not being distributed fairly. Initially, 
instead of blaming WCS, RCF or any of the researchers, they cast blame on 
Mr  Avit Wako, a well-known community leader with historic ties to David 
Gillison. They argued that he was misusing the income generated from the 
project, unequally distributing the opportunity for villagers to participate as 
research assistants and guides, and selectively selling artefacts belonging only to 
his relatives to visitors. For instance, the villagers complained constantly about 
Mr Wako not disclosing the money paid as rent by WCS PNG in 2003, which 
was for bringing in and housing 30  students in the community guest house 
for one month during their annual biological training courses. The villagers 
estimated the total amount of money they lost during that training to be more 
than 10,000  kina. Additionally, many members of the community accused 
Mr Wako of nepotism with regard to deciding whose coffee bags would be the 
back load on the MAF (Mission Aviation Fellowship) planes that carried WCS’s 
students and research supplies at a subsidised airfreight cost. The Herowana 
community viewed Mr Wako as a person who used his power to benefit himself 
or his relatives at the expense of the community.
Although much frustration was building up, many people could not speak 
against Mr Wako, because they saw him as intimidating; he would silence 
whomever he thought was speaking against him, with threats. WCS PNG, RCF 
and other visitors to Herowana did not find any fault in Mr Wako, because to 
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them he was the best man to make logistics possible in the community. He could 
quickly organise carriers and field assistants for the WCS or RCF if needed. 
Therefore, according to the local community, he hid his bad deeds from WCS 
and RCF by promptly attending to their field logistics requirements. This was 
most likely why WCS was never aware of the complaints and frictions building 
up against Mr Wako by the Herowana community. These frustrations had even 
led some villagers to mobilise to construct another airstrip so that they can get 
away from Mr Wako’s influence. The airstrip is almost completed to date.
While the complaints against Mr Wako were building up in Herowana, another 
land issue was developing between a Herowana family and the clan of Toyaido of 
the Haia area over the sharing of rent money that WCS was paying for the research 
site at Sera Research Station. The land on which Sera Research Station was built 
is rightfully owned by a clan in Toyaido village in the Haia area. It happened 
that one of the relatives of the clan that owned the land on which the research 
station was built had migrated to Herowana a long time ago. The descendants 
of this particular man in Herowana claimed that they were rightful landholders 
of the Sera Research Station and should therefore be receiving the rent money 
WCS was paying to the clan in Toyaido. The clan in Toyaido that was receiving 
the rent acknowledged the claim but provided one condition to the Herowana 
family before they would share the money: the Herowana man claiming to be 
the landowner must send one of his sons to be permanently settled in Toyaido 
with his related clan, and be completely a part of that clan, and then he would 
be the one with whom they would share the money. Otherwise, if he wanted to 
claim the money while in Herowana, then the money would not be paid to this 
man in Herowana or his sons.
The young men of Herowana began to observe the struggles between the 
community and Mr Wako’s influence and decided to rob the Sera Research 
Station in the hope of disrupting the research activities from which Mr Wako 
seemed to be benefiting most. The four young men of Herowana who robbed the 
Sera Research Station and raped the female research scientist on 23 March 2006 
were believed to be led by a man who is a direct descendant of the man who 
migrated to Herowana from the clan in Toyaido, who was also claiming to be the 
landowner of Sera Research Station but not receiving any rent.
In March 2007, Paige West, along with Robert Bino and John Ericho, the two 
former directors of the RCF (and both graduates of the WCS PNG training 
program and honours degree program), went to Maimafu village to hold a 
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meeting with its residents to try to help RCF understand its failures.3 When they 
arrived in Maimafu, they found no running water (the RCF-funded water 
supply system was no longer working), no school, no hospital, no guest house, 
no radio, limited ability to get coffee to markets, and a very angry mob. This was 
the first time that Robert and John had been to Maimafu in years. Paige West 
had been every year and was well aware of the decline there, but they were not. 
Although neither of them worked with RCF at the time (and indeed John had 
not worked for them since 2003 and Robert since 2005), people directly blamed 
John and Robert for the failures of RCF and the decline of the services that they 
saw as connected to RCF.
At the community meeting, several major concerns were expressed. First, the 
concern that RCF had ‘gotten rich’ off ‘the Crater name’ and that John and Robert 
had also ‘gotten rich’ and ‘become big men’ because of their work with RCF and 
‘with the Crater name’ and that Maimafu’s residents had ‘gotten nothing’ from 
their social relations with RCF in general and with Robert and John specifically. 
The second major concern was the failure of RCF to supply development or 
avenues for development and then totally pull out from the area with no 
explanation. This is basically the failure of RCF and its staff to participate in the 
correct way in the Gimi world of exchange relations. Third, people expressed 
their anger over the perceived opportunities they had missed because of their 
long-term association with the RCF. They referred to the mining opportunities 
they perceived missing and the oil-related exploration opportunities they 
perceived missing. One long-time RCF Management Committee member said:
You told us that RCF would be a ‘road to development’ but what you have been 
for all these years now is a roadblock to development. You have stopped us and 
you have shamed yourself.
While landholders blamed individual actors for the failures of the project, it is 
our contention that the CMWMA was based on an untested and ultimately 
flawed hypothesis. Conservation-as-development, the driving ideological force 
behind the CMWMA, is a neoliberal approach to conservation ecology and 
economic development, in which it is assumed that environmental conservation 
can be economic development for rural peoples; that development needs, wants 
and desires can be met by the protection of ‘biodiversity’ on their lands, and 
that if they take part in small-scale income-generation projects that are directly 
3  In 1994, while still a graduate student, Debra Wright asked WCS to fund a national student, John 
Ericho, during the research, analysis and writing of his honours thesis. Wright had met Ericho through then-
UPNG professor Mike Hopkins. Ericho had been a high school biology teacher and principal at a Seventh-
day Adventist school in Goroka for years and after meeting Mike Hopkins decided to go back to school to 
complete an honours degree. He was the first WCS-trained student who went on to be a director of the RCF. 
He is currently the national coordinator for the PNG Conservation Forum. Robert Bino worked in Maimafu 
village for the RCF as a village coordinator. He is currently completing his PhD in resource management at The 
Australian National University. He is not writing about the CMWMA.
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connected to this ‘biodiversity’ they can seamlessly enter ‘global markets’ 
as producers and consumers, while at the same time working to conserve 
‘biodiversity’ for the supposed good of the entire planet. These policies and 
practices, designed and implemented by NGOs, are meant to both conserve 
the natural world and provide cash income so that people living where state 
services have retreated can pay for basic needs like education, health care and 
subsistence. The projects also move the management and legislation of the 
relations between people, their surroundings and the market into the purview 
of NGOs. These eco-neoliberal practices and policies attempt to meet the 
social and economic needs of rural peoples through fostering, facilitating and 
supporting the retreat of the state and putting private industry and NGOs in its 
place. In the CMWMA the material and social consequences of these policies in 
and around rural villages have been that both people and the environment are 
left worse off as a result of their implementation.
Since the entire conservation area was based on the premise, from BCN, that 
conservation would bring people economic benefits, the project also, from its 
inception, was directly in competition with resource extraction. By connecting 
biodiversity to the global economic system, the architects of the CMWMA made 
conservation and mining commensurable. Residents of the CMWMA saw the 
two as equally valid options for economic and social betterment. They weighed 
their options, and chose the one that appeared to make the promise of more 
future benefits.
The CMWMA was also based on an erroneous set of assumptions about 
subjectivity that outsiders brought with them to their interactions with Gimi 
and the assumptions that Gimi had about outsiders. During the life of the 
CMWMA the incommensurable understandings of social relations and what 
those relationships meant held by conservation actors and Gimi peoples posed a 
barrier to true collaboration and understanding. For conservation planners and 
practitioners the conservation-as-development project established a contract 
between themselves and Gimi. In this contract, outsiders understood that they 
would get conservation, in the form of the curtailment of hunting practices 
and land clearing practices, and the allowing of access to Gimi territory 
in exchange for development, which took the form of cash income for Gimi 
based on ecotourism, handicraft sales and waged labour positions working for 
visiting scientists. Gimi, whose indigenous epistemology turns on the idea that 
all things come into being through exchange and that exchange relationships 
are in constant need of maintaining, understood the social relations they were 
entering into as enduring ones in which they would contribute land, labour, food 
and friendship to the conservation practitioners and that these contributions 
would be reciprocated in socially appropriate ways. They understood these 
social relationships as allowing them access to medicine, education, technology, 
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knowledge and wealth — the things that they think of as ‘development’. 
Through ethnographic evidence we demonstrate that this was not simply a 
set of misunderstandings but that these differences in the perception of reality 
illustrate different ways of being in and making the world. The conservation 
project’s ultimate failure was not the result of people not holding up their end of 
the bargain; rather, people had been, for the duration of their social interactions, 
taking part in radically different social worlds.
These different social worlds also extend to the natural world or the Gimi forests. 
For Gimi, everything in the forest is a gift as it is the physical incarnation of their 
ancestors’ life force. People and forests will always be — and have always been 
— in a constant transactive relationship, making and remaking each other over 
time. The Gimi world and Gimi as subjects and agents are produced through 
social relationships between people, ancestors, spirits and animals. These social 
relations are not neutral and economic; they are familial and poetic. People’s 
capacities are seen as they relate to other people, to plants, to animals, to spirits 
and to ancestors, and their social selves are understood as comprising the sources 
that went into making them. So what is translated as ‘the Gimi environment’ 
by conservation practitioners is not simply a place filled with floral and faunal 
resources waiting to be used or made into commodities, it is the generative place 
of the social world. By treating Gimi forests as ‘the environment’, conservation 
practitioners not only misunderstood Gimi but also predestined their project 
for failure from the very beginning. The entire conservation-as-development 
project was based on ideas about nature and culture that define Gimi as rational 
economic actors who value forests because of their potential as commodities 
and status as resources. This assumption formed the basis for interventions — 
specifically ecotourism, handicraft production and attempts to regulate hunting 
practices — that have transformed society and space.
It was of no surprise to people familiar with the CMWMA that by 2006 RCF was 
seen as a total and complete failure in the eyes of the majority of landholders 
around Crater Mountain. In January 2006, RCF ‘pulled out’ of the Crater 
Mountain area completely. They flew their staff out of the villages without 
providing any explanations to the villagers and left without a trace. This quick 
exit was due, according to official emails and press releases, to the organisation’s 
failure to raise funds for site-based conservation and development projects 
and its shift to primary and high school conservation-related education as a 
main focus.
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The Fate of WCS in PNG and PNG in WCS
On Friday 9 March 2007, Paige West called Debra Wright to discuss an upcoming 
trip to PNG. When she answered the phone, Wright told West that WCS had 
terminated her and Mack’s employment and that the fate of the WCS PNG 
program was completely up in the air. Over the course of the next six months 
various stories emerged about why Mack and Wright had been terminated.
The initial story given publicly about the Mack and Wright dismissal was that 
WCS had decided to ‘pull out’ of PNG totally. Various conservation-related 
actors were told that the country program was ‘too expensive’ and that WCS 
needed its limited resources elsewhere. When word began to spread that Mack 
and Wright had been fired, WCS began to receive outraged emails, faxes and 
phone calls from people all over the world. It received angry communications 
from well-known people: Sir Michael Somare (PNG’s prime minister), Mal Smith 
(the governor of Eastern Highlands Province) and the Biology Department at 
UPNG. WCS also received hundreds of communications from scientists, social 
scientists and others who have worked in PNG over the years. The majority 
of these communications stressed the success of the Mack/Wright training 
program and voiced outrage over WCS’s closing of its PNG office.
By mid-March 2007, the public story about the future of WCS PNG began to 
change. WCS International sent the assistant director of its Asia Program, a man 
who had never been to PNG before, and a WCS accountant to Goroka to meet 
with the WCS national staff to discuss ‘the way forward’. These discussions 
resulted in Miriam Supuma and Banak Gamui, two WCS PNG employees from 
PNG who had been through the training program, the honours program, and 
successfully completed masters degrees (Supuma at James Cook University and 
Gamui at the University of Missouri), being named the ‘co country directors’ of 
WCS PNG. Supuma and Gamui were, over the next six months, slowly told that 
the education program at WCS PNG was to be phased out. The current students 
would be allowed to finish, but ‘WCS is not a University’ and Supuma and 
Gamui would be in charge of shifting the focus of the organisation to site-based 
conservation.
In an interview about the end of the WCS PNG training program, one very 
senior conservation biologist who has worked extensively in PNG told West:
I would say any organization like WCS that has been in a country for twenty years 
has been there too long. They should be able to build the sort of national capacity 
needed in under twenty years if they really try, even in a place as backward 
(in terms of scientific capacity) as PNG. These big organizations, I think, see that 
attitude as some sort of threat to themselves. They don’t really want to build a 
national capacity that will make them obsolete. I’m not sure I would call that 
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‘neocolonialism’ but maybe I would say they are subconsciously driven by 
unenlightened self-interest. After all these years of international conservation, 
WCS should have programs winking out around the world as national NGOs and 
government agencies take over. WCS could then concentrate on other countries 
and eventually, in an ideal world, be mostly focused on North America.
When they boast that they are committed to conservation in these places 
indefinitely, I see that as a flaw, not a worthy attribute. They should be boasting 
that they will not be needed indefinitely … that they will measure success not 
by how long they stay, but by how quickly they can leave.
Rebirth: The Papua New Guinea Institute for 
Biological Research
On 13 February 2008 the following notice appeared in both the Post-Courier 
and The National, the two major newspapers in PNG:
NOTICE OF INTENTION TO APPLY FOR THE INCORPORATION OF AN 
ASSOCIATION
I, Ms Miriam Supuma of Goroka, P.O. Box 277, EHP, a person authorized for 
the purpose by the committee of the association known as Papua New Guinea 
Institute of Biological Research, give notice that I intend to apply for the 
incorporation of the association under the Associations Incorporation Act 1966.
The following are the details of the prescribed qualifications for incorporation as 
specified in Section 2 of the Act:
(a) To be a premier research institution for conducting biological research and 
monitoring on the flora and fauna of Papua New Guinea; and
(b) To provide an avenue for national and overseas scientists to conduct biological 
research and monitoring to advance scientific knowledge in Papua New Guinea. 
We will do this conducting our own research and by aiding other scientists to 
conduct their research whenever possible, and by presenting our findings in 
an accessible manner to the scientific community, to the public, and to policy 
makers; and
(c) To provide a conducive learning environment for capacity building by training 
aspiring national biologists, including those currently attending universities as 
undergraduates or graduates and those already working as professional biologists 
and conservationists in the non-profit, government, or private sectors. We will 
do this by bringing in internationally recognized scientists to teach training 
courses and to give trainees first hand experience with biological surveys, 
research techniques, data analyses and scientific writing; and
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(d) To source funding from national and international donor agencies to conduct 
biological research and monitoring, to train university students and conservation 
professionals to conduct biological research and monitoring, and to conduct 
seminars, education and awareness on biological knowledge and conservation 
in PNG; and
(e) To facilitate opportunities for university students and conservation 
professionals to attend short training courses, workshops and scientific meetings 
both in PNG and abroad and to further their careers through Honours, Masters 
and PhD degrees in PNG or at overseas institutions; and
(f) To collaborate with national and overseas universities, museums and other 
research institutions to conduct biological research in PNG and overseas and 
arrange for exchange programs to train PNG university students and conservation 
professionals; and
(g) To assist PNG university students and conservation professionals in terrestrial 
and marine biology, environmental science, forestry and agriculture to design 
and conduct appropriate biological research of high quality and of international 
standards; and
(h) To use our research data to develop recommendations for the sustainable 
management of PNG’s fauna and flora and to present these recommendations to 
landowners, resources users, conservation managers, the government and other 
stakeholders to aid them in making wise decisions; and
(i) To build and maintain biological research station(s) where research will be 
done and collaborate with partner organizations on the use and management of 
the research station(s); and
(j) To produce and distribute papers, report and publications, media releases etc. 
on the research and work we do; and
(k) To plan and facilitate work both on advisory and consultancy basis; and
(l) To apply profits (if any) or any income in promoting the Association’s 
objectives; and
(m) To prohibit the payment of dividends or payment in nature of dividend to 
its members; and
(n) To do generally all such other things that may appear to be incidental to or 
conducive to the attainment of the Association’s objectives or any of the above.
After WCS International sent the assistant director of the Asia Program to PNG 
to sort out what to do with WCS PNG after the termination of Debra Wright and 
Andrew Mack, the senior Papua New Guinean staff of WCS PNG felt unsettled. 
In the initial discussions, even after two national ecologists (Miriam Supuma and 
Banak Gamui) were made co-directors of WCS PNG, WCS International argued 
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that there had to be an expatriate advisor to the program. WCS International 
also argued that WCS PNG should be focused on site-based conservation and 
the creation of new protected areas. The senior staff of WCS PNG, all Papua 
New Guinean, felt strongly that the creation of new protected areas is not the 
appropriate strategy for fostering conservation in the country. They all saw 
the continuation of the training courses and the honours degree program as 
crucial for building a national conservation strategy. One of the staff, when 
asked why they all felt so strongly that the site-based conservation focus of the 
international program was a problem, said:
I don’t mean to disparage America, but protected areas is American and this is 
Papua New Guinea. With land ownership here, we can’t alienate land. We need 
to figure out how to conserve our land ourselves and the way to do that is to 
produce more scientists from here. Scientists who know the place and the people 
and who know their science.
Because of this shared sentiment among the WCS PNG senior staff, they decided 
to form a new Papua New Guinean NGO and continue the training courses and 
honours degree program.
Conclusions
In this chapter we have described the history of the CMWMA and some of 
the reasons for its decline. We have also described one of the ‘conservation 
success stories’ to come out of the CMWMA and its decline. We showed that 
the project had very informal beginnings in the 1970s but that over the course 
of the 1980s and 1990s its architects worked to solidify it spatially and legally 
under Papua New Guinean law. We then showed that in the late 1990s the 
project was incorporated into a large international ‘experiment’ meant to test 
the hypothesis that market or enterprise-oriented approaches to conservation 
are effective if indigenous peoples are given labour connected to conservation 
and if they are encouraged to commoditise biological diversity in particular 
kinds of ways. Next we described in detail a program for science training and 
education for national scientists that grew out of the CMWMA. Finally, we 
discussed the demise of the CMWMA and of the training program, highlighting 
the material and ideological reasons for these declines. It is our contention that 
the CMWMA was based on a fatally flawed set of ideas and that it was carried 
out as if larger political–economic drivers were not conterminously affecting 
landholder life and politics as the CMWMA was being developed. The living 
legacy today of the CMWMA is the PNG Institute for Biological Research. 
This NGO has facilitated the growth of national science in the country and 
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created a generation of national scientists and conservationists. It is also our 
contention that conservation projects developed by these actors will outperform 
interventions like the CMWMA.
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The Papua New Guinea Forest Authority (PNGFA) maintains a database 
containing all of the forest areas that have ever been designated as potential 
logging concessions by means of agreements between their customary owners 
and the national government or the former colonial administration. In a version 
of this database that dates to the end of 2011, there are 314 such areas, covering 
a total of 10,953,897 hectares, which is almost one quarter of PNG’s total land 
area. Most of the agreements had ‘expired’, which means that the areas in 
question had almost certainly been logged at some time in the previous 50 years; 
many were ‘current’, which means that logging operations were probably 
ongoing; and a few were under dispute. But one area stands out from all the 
rest. The 521,500 hectares that comprise the April Salumei forest area in East 
Sepik Province are the site of the only ‘REDD+ Pilot Project’ (GPNG 2012a, 
Appendix 4). This chapter will seek to explain how this particular forest area 
came to acquire this special status.
Google will tell you many things about April Salumei, but one of the more 
curious things can be found on a website called ‘The Carbon Capture Report’, 
which has a ‘profile page’ that ‘demarks this person as appearing in content 
suggesting contextual association with Carbon Credits’. The content in question 
consists of a single post made in August 2011 by a PNG blogger who goes by 
the name of Masalai — the Tok Pisin term for a bush spirit. The Bush Spirit 
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wondered if the carbon tax which had just been introduced by the Australian 
government would act as a ‘catalyst for carbon cowboys’ to repeat a form of 
engagement with PNG’s ‘carbon credits’ which had been the subject of so much 
controversy back in 2009. Specific reference is made to an Australian company 
called Carbon Planet as ‘the company that would buy and trade the carbon 
credits that Kirk Roberts was busy quantifying in the forests of April Salumei’ 
(Anon. 2011). It sounds as if poor April may have been an April fool to let that 
particular ‘carbon cowboy’ count her carbon credits. And yet she seems to have 
survived and prospered in the safer hands of government officials.
The Bush Spirit was wrong to suggest that Carbon Planet and Kirk Roberts 
ever had much to do with April Salumei, but he was right to say that all three 
of them had figured in a sort of moral panic that enveloped the forest carbon 
policy process in 2009 (Pearse 2012; see also Wood, Chapter 9, this volume). 
The origins of this moral panic can be traced back to a political contest that 
started in 2005, when the prime minister and self-styled grand chief, Sir 
Michael Somare, made PNG one of the founding members of the Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations. The aim of this body was to amend the United Nations (UN) 
Framework Convention on Climate Change in order to enable countries like PNG 
to receive compensation from the international community for action taken to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD). A proposal along these lines was accepted in principle at the UN 11th 
Conference of the Parties in December 2005 and has been subject to further 
negotiation ever since. However, the prospect of REDD compensation payments 
was not greeted with universal enthusiasm in PNG. That was largely because 
the Coalition for Rainforest Nations was known to be the brainchild of Kevin 
Conrad, an American friend of the Somare family who had recently acquired a 
degree in business administration from Columbia University, and whose previous 
business ventures in PNG had been somewhat controversial (Lang 2010a).
For a brief period in the middle of 2005, there was an intense but inconclusive 
public debate about the relationship between Conrad’s terms of engagement as 
PNG’s ‘climate change ambassador’ and the apparent transformation of national 
forest policy (Filer and Wood 2012: 668). A sense of popular confusion and 
suspicion in the wake of this debate was expressed in a letter written to one of 
the national newspapers:
Supposedly carbon swaps means money for the landowners to protect their forest. 
In reality, our government will give the same ridiculous small percentage to the 
landowners that they do with any other resource development. The Government 
will walk away with nearly all the revenue and probably the land rights of the 
forests … Next time you see someone promoting carbon swaps, look behind the 
scenes. Smell the money and find out where most of it goes. (Bamu 2005)
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Although this public debate did not last long, it did foreshadow the more intense 
debate that came to a head in 2009, in which foreign ‘carbon cowboys’ were 
accused of fomenting a ‘carbon cargo cult’. Some of the people making these 
accusations thought Conrad was wholly or partly to blame for this moment of 
irrational exuberance, yet Conrad deplored it as loudly as they did. As a result, 
the national government took strong measures to suppress the voluntary carbon 
schemes which the so-called cowboys were promoting (Filer and Wood 2012: 
669–70).
Nearly all of the voluntary schemes have since been thrown into the dustbin 
of economic history. April Salumei seems to have escaped this fate because 
she got a stamp of government approval. However, the moment of irrational 
exuberance was partly fostered by the distribution of these very same stamps 
to many other projects that have not survived the subsequent rationalisation 
of forest carbon policy. So there is still a mystery. My attempt to solve this 
mystery will proceed as follows: in the next section, I show how the idea of a 
national ‘carbon cargo cult’ came to be associated with representations of the 
April Salumei forest area. In the following section, I leave that discourse to one 
side and recover what is known of negotiations over the development of this 
area before it came to the attention of the cult’s opponents. In the remainder 
of the chapter, I analyse the social and political process by which the April 
Salumei REDD project1 has achieved a distinctive form of validation at both 
national and international scales. I conclude with a brief discussion of the 
reasons for this apparent success.
The Carbon ‘Cargo Cult’
In September 2009, the Weekend Australian newspaper published a feature 
article by Asia-Pacific editor Rowan Callick under the title: ‘The Rush is on for 
Sky Money: The Struggle Begins to Control the Immense Wealth Certain to Flow 
from Carbon Trading’. According to Callick (2009), the carbon trade in PNG 
‘has been converted into a cargo cult luring cash from Australian taxpayers, 
international investors and local villagers alike’. The Tok Pisin phrase mani 
bilong skai (‘sky money’) was said to have been coined as a reference to the 
profits to be made from the sale of carbon emissions, and reference to a ‘cargo 
cult’ was partly justified by evidence that some local villagers had already given 
real money to ‘local confidence tricksters [who] have been trawling through rural 
1  Although it has been described as a ‘REDD+’ project, the plus sign is superfluous. The ‘plus’ was added 
to REDD at the Copenhagen climate change conference in 2009 to indicate the possibility of securing carbon 
credits by making forest management more ‘sustainable’ or planting new forests (see Gabriel, Chapter 10, this 
volume). The April Salumei project conforms to the older definition of a REDD project as one that simply aims 
to prevent deforestation and/or forest degradation.
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areas, urging people to register with their fake firms to make millions of kina 
from trading to developed countries the carbon values embedded in their trees’ 
(ibid.). The main source for the whole story was Ilya Gridneff, the Australian 
Associated Press correspondent in Port Moresby, who was listed as the second 
author when the story was reproduced in the Post-Courier newspaper (Callick 
and Gridneff 2009). Gridneff had already published an article in The National 
newspaper in June 2009 in which he cited David Melick of the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) as his own source of information for the popular belief 
that ‘sky money’ could be obtained by capturing carbon emissions and bringing 
them for sale in the national capital (Gridneff 2009a). The implication was that 
villagers had got the wrong end of the stick when hearing someone talk about 
technologies for carbon capture and storage.
In June 2008, David Melick was already writing about ‘carbon cowboys’ as 
‘[u]nscrupulous carbon traders (linked to highly placed political figures)’ who 
were ‘strong-arming and threatening landowners’ in a manner already familiar 
in a national forestry sector ‘where corruption is rife’ (Melick 2008). However, 
a full year passed before the internet was suddenly abuzz with evidence of 
strange dealings between some of these carbon traders and Theo Yasause, then 
executive director of PNG’s Office of Climate Change (OCC).2 In November 2008, 
an editorial in the Post-Courier warned of a possible invasion of ‘speculators’ 
and ‘carpetbaggers’ looking to make a fast buck out of the carbon business 
(Anon. 2008), but most of the local news in 2008 was about the role of the 
national government and other stakeholders in the design of an institutional 
framework that would enable respectable foreign investors (including the 
governments of countries like Australia and Norway) to pay for the conservation 
of forest carbon. That sort of news did not make for sexy headlines around the 
world. The media feeding frenzy only started in June 2009, with a stream of 
articles and blogposts from a number of journalists — most notably Natasha 
Loder, an American journalist who was writing articles for The Economist 
magazine, and the aforementioned Ilya Gridneff, who developed a close 
working relationship with Loder from his base in Port Moresby. In November 
2009, Loder and Gridneff were jointly awarded a prize for their efforts by the 
UN Correspondents Association, but they had run out of scandalous revelations 
by the end of September, so the story of PNG’s ‘carbon cowboys’ was almost 
entirely assembled and disseminated over a period of four months.
What the journalists discovered in June 2009 was a set of documents which 
appeared to show that Theo Yasause had been granting or selling rights to trade 
in the carbon contained in various forested areas, facilitating deals between 
2  This body was initially known as the Office of Climate Change and Carbon Trade, then as the Office of 
Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability, and more recently as the Office of Climate Change and 
Development. In this chapter I refer to all its incarnations by the abbreviated title.
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carbon trading companies of different size and provenance, or endorsing the 
allocation of carbon trading rights that had been made by a government minister 
back in 2005 — more than three years before the OCC was formally established 
in September 2008. In July 2009, leader of the opposition Mekere Morauta made 
a speech to parliament in which he quoted from a letter supposedly written by 
then minister for trade and industry, Paul Tiensten, to a company called Climate 
Assist (PNG) Ltd in October 2005, appointing that company as ‘brokers on 
behalf of the Independent State of PNG to buy and sell carbon credits’ (Morauta 
2009). Morauta would later say that he had come across another letter, sent 
from the acting secretary for trade and industry to the chief executive director 
of the same company in June 2005, which confirmed the national government’s 
acceptance of a payment of US$200 million in return for ‘33,333,333 metric tones’ 
[sic] of carbon credits to be traded in accordance with various provisions of the 
Kyoto Protocol (Talu 2009). In his parliamentary statement, Morauta said that 
a search of Australian company records had revealed that Climate Assist (PNG) 
Ltd was ‘a one dollar company’ based in Queensland, which had since entered 
into an arrangement with another company called Earth Sky Ltd, registered in 
the British Virgin Islands, to advance A$10 million to the OCC ‘in return for 
the rights to sell $500 million carbon offsets, retaining 20% for themselves’. 
He also wondered how the OCC had ‘authorised a Swiss based broker, South 
Pole Carbon Asset Management to market 1 million tonnes of avoided carbon 
dioxide emission[s] per annum from a PNG logging project based in the Sepik, 
April Salome’.
Some journalists had already made a link between April Salumei, South Pole 
and Earth Sky (Wynn and Creagh 2009), and another opposition member 
of parliament (MP) had called for an investigation of the deal between OCC, 
Earth Sky and Climate Assist at the very start of the media feeding frenzy 
(Anon. 2009a). The link between all five entities was present in the first draft 
of a design document, produced in December 2008, for the April Salome 
Sustainable Forest Management Project (ASSFMP). This contained a copy of 
a memorandum from Theo Yasause to the prime minister, apparently written 
in June 2008, on the subject of ‘Collaboration with Earth Sky and Climate 
Assist PNG’. According to this document, the two companies had ‘already 
made representation to the National Forest Authority, the Department of Trade 
& Industry, National Planning and various land groups in Central, Madang, 
Morobe, Milne Bay, New Ireland, Eastern Highlands, Western Highlands and 
Southern Highlands’. It went on to say that they would now be ‘remitting close 
to US$50 million per month to the Office of Climate Change to cover for projects 
in the country for the preservation of loggable forest’ in return for ‘a certificate 
to go out and sell the credits’ (Earthsky 2008: 31). As part of this deal, the two 
companies would retain 5 per cent of the revenues from such sales, the OCC 
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would retain 20 per cent, 20 per cent would be paid directly to landowners, 
15 per cent would be spent on ‘community projects’, 20 per cent would be 
placed in a ‘future generation fund’, and 20 per cent would be turned into a 
bond ‘to cover for forest degradation’. Yasause estimated that REDD projects in 
eight provinces would ‘account for 33 million metric tones of carbon credit’, 
which ‘could bring to the country close to $500 million US dollars over the next 
three years’. In order to set this ball rolling, the ‘above group’ was apparently 
prepared to invest A$10 million in the establishment of the OCC itself (Lang 
2009a; Leggett and Lovell 2012: 122).
The mention of ‘33 million metric tones’ — which one imagines to mean tonnes 
— can hardly be a coincidental echo of the earlier letter mentioned in Morauta’s 
speech to parliament. But the link to April Salumei (or Salome) is rather more 
tenuous, because East Sepik Province is not one of the eight provinces from 
which this weight of carbon credits was meant to be derived. The link was 
only made by inclusion of a copy of the memorandum in the project design 
document which named Earthsky Ltd as the ‘owner’ of the project and South 
Pole as the ‘carbon asset manager’ (Earthsky 2008: 15). In his own response to 
the glare of negative publicity which enveloped his office in June 2009, Yasause 
declared that he had stopped dealing with Climate Assist in September 2008, 
but the prime minister, the forests minister and the local MP ‘have been kept 
fully informed and involved and are fully supportive of the April Salome Project’ 
(Anon. 2009b). The other potential supporter he failed to mention was Kevin 
Conrad, who had taken a high-powered Norwegian government delegation on a 
visit to April Salumei in May 2008.
The glare of negative publicity was not the coincidental result of some brilliant 
homework by a small group of investigative journalists. The diet of dodgy 
documents that fed the media feeding frenzy was served up by a group of 
national political actors who thought that a well-aimed attack on Theo Yasause 
would bring down the whole house of cards constructed by Kevin Conrad (Lang 
2009b). But they were disappointed. Yasause was suspended and later dismissed, 
but Conrad’s grip on forest carbon policy was not relaxed as a result. He soon 
announced his own determination to rein in the ‘carbon cowboys … [who were] 
confusing forest communities with tall tales of gold trains just around the corner’ 
(Gridneff 2009b). Whatever he had in mind when he showed April Salumei 
to the Norwegian government, his new campaign against the carbon cowboys 
was justified by his previous insistence on the need for a ‘national’ approach 
to REDD, not for the state-sponsored ‘project-based’ approach authorised by 
Yasause or the purely voluntary version of that approach favoured by some of 
the non-governmental conservation organisations (Howes 2009; Filer and Wood 
2012). This was made evident in a media release that Conrad most likely wrote for 
his patron, the prime minister, in which it was announced that ‘my Government 
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does not currently see a role for Voluntary Carbon Agreements in its policy 
development and regulatory framework for forest carbon and climate change 
in general’ (Somare 2009). The secretary for environment and conservation, 
Wari Iamo, who had been put in charge of the OCC while Yasause’s actions were 
being officially investigated, later published another public notice pointing out 
that ‘[c]arbon trading agreements cannot legally be signed’ over land subject 
to a Forest Management Agreement (FMA) ‘until the Government has put in 
place an appropriate policy and legal framework’ (OCCES 2009). The moment of 
irrational exuberance was officially dead.
April in Waiting
According to one estimate, more than 90 carbon trading schemes were promoted 
during that brief period of history, with a combined coverage of more than 
5 million hectares of forested land (Melick 2010: 360). Most of the schemes have 
never been identified in the mass media or in the substrate of grey literature 
from which the journalists drew most of their inspiration. April Salumei was a 
very large area of land containing a large amount of unlogged forest, but what 
really set her apart from the crowd was not so much her physical attributes as 
her peculiar political history. The PNGFA thought it had acquired the timber 
harvesting rights from the customary owners by means of an FMA, but the 
status of this transaction was shrouded in uncertainty. She looked like a REDD 
project in waiting because forestry officials could not think of a way to turn her 
into a normal logging concession (Filer 2012: 612).
In March 1992, the former Department of Forests signed a Timber Rights Purchase 
agreement over the April Salumei forest area with 116 ‘clan agents’ appointed 
to represent the customary landowners, but 41 of the signatories represented 
Sepik River communities outside the prospective logging concession ‘who were 
supposed to share benefits because of “disturbance” of the river by logging 
activities’ (GPNG 2001: 6). Whether for this or other reasons, the validity of 
the agreement was challenged in court, so the National Forest Board decided 
to negotiate a new FMA with the customary owners under the provisions of 
the new Forestry Act, which had come into effect in June 1992 and turned 
the Department of Forests into the PNGFA. Following the provisions of the 
new legislation, officers of the National Forest Service then arranged for the 
incorporation of 164 (or possibly 181) land groups to represent the customary 
landowners, and in December 1996 the chairmen of 129 (or possibly 133) of 
these land groups signed an FMA with the PNGFA (GPNG 2001: 6, 2009: 4028; 
Leggett 2009: 45).
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In the meantime, a consortium of environmental non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) known as Friends of the Sepik had been working with the East Sepik 
Council of Women and a number of local villagers to oppose the prospect of 
a large-scale logging operation and opt for an integrated conservation and 
development project instead (Duguman 2004: 3). In 1995, the World Wide Fund 
for Nature (WWF) took the lead in helping the dissident landowners to get their 
land excluded from the FMA area and persuade the Department of Environment 
and Conservation to recognise it as a Wildlife Management Area (WMA) under 
the provisions of the Fauna (Protection and Control) Act. An area of roughly 
230,000 hectares was duly gazetted as the Hunstein Range WMA in November 
1997 (Leggett 2009: 46). Some parts of the new WMA lay outside the boundaries 
of the April Salumei forest area, but an area of roughly 180,000 hectares was 
covered by both agreements (Figure 8.1).
Figure 8.1 The spaces at stake in the April Salumei area.
Source: Map courtesy of WWF, Western Melanesia Program.
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This now became a test case in the relationship between logging concessions and 
protected areas, and also a test of the relationship between the two government 
agencies responsible for such things. In an unprecedented gesture of goodwill, 
the PNGFA ‘gave’ K40,000 to the Department of Environment and Conservation 
to conduct an environmental assessment of the FMA area (GPNG 2009: 4025), 
and this was duly presented to the National Forest Board in February 1999, 
with the observation that 44 per cent of the forest was ‘fragile’, and a polite 
recommendation that logging should be avoided if possible (GPNG 2001: 3). 
The board was not legally obliged to accept this recommendation, since the 
declaration of a WMA does not transfer any property rights from customary 
landowners to the state, but since the PNGFA already knew that a number of 
landowner representatives had not given their consent to the state’s acquisition 
of the timber harvesting rights, nothing more was done to advance the process 
of ‘resource allocation’ prescribed by the Forestry Act. In 1998, WWF secured 
funding from the Netherlands government for the Sepik Community Land 
Care Project, with a range of activities directed towards the conservation and 
development of the Hunstein Range WMA. This project should have lasted for 
six years, but the funding was unexpectedly withdrawn after five years and the 
project’s capital assets were donated to the East Sepik provincial administration 
(Duguman 2004).
All of the external agencies and organisations that have sought to establish some 
sort of claim over the resources of the April Salumei area have been baffled by 
its cultural diversity and political complexity. None of the interested parties has 
so far been able to produce a definitive list of the villages or census units that 
contain the local ‘landowners’, but they all seem to belong to one or other of 
the local-level government (LLG) council wards whose populations are shown in 
Table 8.1. Each ward contains between one and three census units.3 The residents 
of these 27 wards speak 13 or 14 languages, most of which were not traditionally 
spoken outside the area. Most of the village settlements in the area contain less 
than 200 people, and these local communities were traditionally at war with 
at least half of the neighbouring communities, even with those that spoke the 
same language (Leggett 2009: 63). Nor have the institutions of the modern state 
done much to enlarge the scale of cooperation between them. Different parts 
of the FMA area overlap the areas represented by three elected members of the 
national parliament, as well as the four local councils, but ‘April Salumei’ people 
constitute a small minority of the people represented in each electorate, and 
most candidates would not even bother to canvass their votes.
3  Leggett and Lovell (2012: 123) have published a map showing the local government boundaries and 
distribution of census units in the area covered by Figure 8.1, but the level of detail makes it hard to decipher.
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Table 8.1 Populations of council wards containing customary owners of the 
April Salumei forest area in 2000.
Tunap-Hunstein LLG area Ambunti LLG area
Walio 132 Kupkain 318
Nein 117 Prukunawi 243
Wusok 29 Malu 661
Wasuware 25 Yerakai 432
Sio 200 Garamambu 621
Hanasi 166 Subtotal 2275
Moropote 298  
Maposi 201 Gawi LLG area
Lariaso 66 Changriman 208
Yabatawe 144 Mari 163
Sowano 252 Yembiyembi 233
Bitara 192 Subtotal 604
Kagiru 161  
Begapuki 179 Karawari LLG area
Gahom 134 Meska 443
Wagu 474 Bisorio 316
Niksek 489 Subtotal 759
Subtotal 3259  
Total population of wards in all four LLG areas 6897
Source: PNG national census data.
The political fragmentation of the area has been reflected in the multiplication 
of bodies claiming to represent the rights and interests of the customary 
landowners. A survey of six villages in the area indicated the presence of 
53 ‘principal clans’, of which only 24 had been given legal recognition as 
incorporated land groups (ILGs) (Leggett 2009: 62), but anthropologists who 
have worked in this part of the country doubt whether ‘clans’ actually function 
as the holders of collective property rights in any meaningful sense (Guddemi 
1997). At the time when the FMA was being negotiated with the leaders of those 
‘clans’ that had been incorporated, there were apparently three landowner 
companies claiming to represent the interests of those landowners who preferred 
logging to conservation, but shortly after the agreement had been signed, five 
such companies apparently agreed to form an ‘umbrella company’ called April 
Salumei Resource Development Corporation Ltd (GPNG 2001). It is not clear 
what purpose any of these companies was meant to serve, since the Forestry Act 
does not recognise landowner companies as legitimate parties to an FMA. On the 
other hand, some of the land group chairmen who signed over ‘their’ timber 
harvesting rights to the state in 1996 were among the landowner representatives 
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who teamed up with members of the April-Salumei Landowners Association to 
support the declaration of a protected area one year later (Leggett 2009: 46). 
A subsequent review of the FMA summed up the state of confusion as follows:
It is not clear as to which ILGs ‘belong’ to which LANCO [landowner company]; 
which ILGs have signed up for forestry and which are working with WWF on 
non-logging use of the forests; did the April people stay out of the FMA for 
ethnic or conservation reasons; which ILGs that have signed the FMA are now 
wanting to withdraw; are the forest owning ILGs happy to have the river ILGs in 
the FMA since the latter own no forest? (GPNG 2001: 8)
This also helps to explain the National Forest Board’s decision not to tender 
the concession.
This decision was subsequently contested by Hunstein Range Holdings Ltd 
(HRH), which was one of the landowner companies involved in the previous 
rounds of negotiation. Jackson Yagi, the chairman of this company, hails from 
Yerakai village in the north-eastern corner of the FMA, beyond the border of 
the WMA which sat on top of it (Figure 8.1). Yagi has claimed that HRH was first 
incorporated in 1995, and that its shareholders were the 129 land groups whose 
chairmen (including himself) agreed to sign the FMA in 1996 (GPNG 2009: 4033). 
This claim seems to be at odds with PNGFA records, but those records do suggest 
that HRH was promoting the interests of one particular logging company as the 
‘preferred developer’ of the area (GPNG 2001). When the National Forest Board 
expressed its own preference for the area not to be logged at all, HRH sued the 
state for the costs it had incurred in its own private dealings.
The outcome of this action would still be shrouded in mystery if it were 
not for the fact that Yagi and two of his legal advisers later testified before a 
commission of inquiry investigating allegations of malfeasance in PNG’s 
Department of Finance. According to this testimony, the state agreed to pay 
K930,100 in compensation to HRH, and K430,000 was in fact paid out in 2005, 
while another cheque for K380,000, originally issued in April 2008, had ‘gone 
stale’ by July 2009 because the solicitor general refused to approve the payment 
until the commission dealt with the case (GPNG 2009: 4041). In response to 
questions about the basis of his claim, Yagi said that his board had incurred a lot 
of travel and accommodation expenses for which it had been obliged to take out 
something ‘like a loan’ for ‘just over a million kina’ from a Taiwanese company 
called Raw Timber Ltd (ibid.: 4038). He then went on to say that the money 
received to date had not been used to repay this debt because HRH had incurred 
more expenses on its own account (ibid.: 4048), and ‘today I have taken out 
another order which the National Court actually granted which was in favour 
of my landowner company for the entire contract agreement so it has gone up to 
some 60 million’ (ibid.: 4050). However, in a newspaper article published on the 
day of the hearing, Yagi was reported as saying that he wanted the commission 
Tropical Forests of Oceania
190
to ‘fast track’ the payment of money under the previous settlement ‘to save the 
State paying K50.8 million as benefits estimated under the Forest Management 
Agreement’ (Anon. 2009c).
Jackson Yagi’s interest in the opportunity costs of forest conservation had 
already been matched by a parallel interest in its potential benefits. In January 
2004, he was congratulated by his local MP, Tony Aimo, for establishing a body 
known as the Hunstein Range Resource Foundation which aimed to acquire one 
or both of the buildings in Ambunti station which WWF had bequeathed to the 
provincial government. Aimo was quoted as saying that:
I used to think that the forest conservation programme was purely conservation, 
but that is not true … it is about sustainable development of the forest resource 
and protection of fragile biological resources, and the empowerment of local 
resource owners with World Bank funding support … I now call on the National 
Government and Treasury Minister to immediately conclude all agreements with 
the World Bank on the forest conservation program so my people can move on 
with the development of the April-Salumei FMA. (Anon. 2004)
The ‘World Bank funding support’ to which Aimo made reference would have 
been money earmarked by the Global Environment Facility for the Mama Graun 
Conservation Trust Fund as part of a ‘forestry and conservation project’ which 
was still being negotiated with the PNG government and which never actually 
eventuated. The trust’s chairman responded to this piece of news by saying that 
he and his board had yet to seek or receive project proposals from anywhere in 
PNG, and had certainly not committed any funds to an April Salumei project 
(Power 2004).
The Springs of Awareness
The earliest document I have sighted in which the April Salumei area is clearly 
designated as the site of a possible REDD project is a letter from Theo Yasause 
to Jackson Yagi that was written in September 2008. In this letter Yasause said:
I am in receipt of your landowner resolutions empowering both you and me to 
act on behalf of the Landowners to produce and sell carbon credits in the Forest 
Management Area … I hereby accept the responsibility as Designated National 
Authority (DNA) and will assist you with identifying an investor, in particular 
Earth Sky Ltd, a Company who is partnering the DNA Office to assist with this 
funding package.
In November 2008, Yasause issued a statement in which he said that ‘Papua 
New Guinea recognizes and supports the April Salome Project as a Voluntary 
Emissions Reduction project (VER) and confirms that it meets the Sustainable 
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Development Objectives of Papua New Guinea’. Later that month, it seems that 
Yasause received a letter from Prime Minister Michael Somare, in which the 
latter said:
I make reference to series of meetings with Hustein [sic] Range Landowners and 
Chairman and Director of April Salome Forest Management Area (FMA) project 
who have been waiting for payments for eco-system services since the initial 
discussion in 1996 … The landowners have since pursued two parallel processes 
to either sell their carbon credits or to undertake logging themselves which they 
are legally entitled to do which would deforest the area for sale of logs. They have 
this legal entitlement since 1996 but have voluntarily not acted despite entering 
into a legal case in 1998 and subsequently winning the case in 2007.
Copies of all three documents were included in the same project design document 
that featured the earlier memorandum to the prime minister on the subject of 
‘Collaboration with Earth Sky and Climate Assist PNG’ (Earthsky 2008). The aim 
of the whole exercise was to show how the ASSFMP could be recognised as a 
genuine REDD project by the custodians of two international standards known 
as the Voluntary Carbon Standard and the Community, Climate and Biodiversity 
Standard.
It is hard to tell when Jackson Yagi first started to discuss the ASSFMP with 
Theo Yasause and representatives of Earthsky Ltd and South Pole Carbon 
Asset Management Ltd. In December 2008, the ASSFMP proposal claimed 
that scientists at the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) were already 
developing an estimate of carbon stocks in the April Salumei area (Earthsky 
2008: 7). In April 2009, a stakeholder consultation process was initiated at a 
meeting between Yasause, Yagi, and one of UPNG’s senior professors, Chalapan 
Kaluwin (Chem-Clean et al.: 2009: 43). The consultation process hinged on a 
series of four meetings held in May that year — the first at the aptly named 
Sepik Center of Hope in Wewak, the capital of East Sepik Province, and the 
rest in three of the villages in the April Salumei area. Each meeting seems to 
have lasted around three hours and involved an exchange of views between 
local stakeholders and representatives of a national company called Chem-Clean 
Ltd. UPNG staff and representatives of South Pole were party to the process of 
organising and recording these exchanges. Chem-Clean submitted draft minutes 
of the four meetings to the OCC within a fortnight of conducting them (Chem-
Clean 2009), but the South Pole people were clearly dissatisfied with the way 
in which responses to local people’s questions had been represented in this 
document. As a result, they compiled a second report which included a running 
commentary on the validity of responses offered by the Chem-Clean consultants 
and a record of subsequent written exchanges with other stakeholders, 
including WWF personnel (Chem-Clean et al. 2009). This second report seems 
to have been completed around the end of July 2009.
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The likelihood of distorted communication at the four consultation meetings 
may be inferred from the text of the public notice which advertised their subject 
matter. For example, the English-language text of the notice which appeared in 
a national newspaper said that ‘[l]eakage effects will be addressed by supporting 
sustainable plantations and an[y] remaining leakage will be addressed by an 
econometric analysis of supply elasticity, leading to a conservative adjustment of 
emission reductions’ — a statement which understandably failed the translation 
test in the Tok Pisin version on the bottom half of the page (OCCCT 2009). Chem-
Clean’s own minutes record some of the distortions that actually took place. 
For example, at the meeting in Wewak:
One audience member was asking ‘What are other risks or bad things from 
Carbon trade after talking about good things?’ This shows that people are still ill 
informed about issues on climate change and carbon trade. Anyway, we manage 
to explain to the crowd the negatives or risks of carbon trade such as leakages, 
additionality, permanence, contractual obligations, slicing of credits because of 
deforestation, socio-economic impacts, fluctuations of carbon prices in the stock 
markets etc. (Chem-Clean 2009: 6)
A question posed in one of the village meetings elicited an equally puzzling 
response:
‘What are the penalties for non-compliance to legal agreement?’ We responded 
that the buyer can slice our revenue if there is deforestation. They have to be 
responsible for their act and do the right things to protect their environment 
and forests. They can educate their children and make proper land-use plans 
or even ask the developer to included [sic] buffers that can offset any leakages, 
additionalties [sic] and permanence. (ibid.: 16)
Given that most of the village conversations were conducted in Tok Pisin, it is 
hard to imagine what was actually said here, let alone what was understood. 
It is doubtful whether any of the local villagers would have ended up with 
a better understanding of the relationship between land-use plans and the 
technicalities of carbon sequestration in light of the Tok Pisin version of the 
following conversation in another village meeting:
A landowner was concerned that they have a WMA within the FMA area of 
520,000ha. The 126,000 currently and its carbon credits of 2.2 million GtCO2e 
is too small. He was concern [sic] that if the 126,000ha does include both the 
WMA and FMA. We elaborated that under REDD, the 200,000ha of WMA is not 
qualified because it was already ‘protected’. This means only the FMA area of 
520,000ha is eligible. However, we mentioned that since the WMA is inside the 
FMA area and there are still legal issues between PNG Forest Authority and the 
Department of Environment and [C]onservation, REDD may be the only solutions 
to both problems and could be easily resolved. Hence, the landowner urged 
the government to consider the 520,000 ha a REDD project to avoid confusion. 
(ibid.: 8–9)
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Even the second report on the consultation process failed to clarify the physical 
extent of the area from which carbon credits would be extracted.
The additions made by the South Pole people to the second report were less 
concerned with the quantification of leakage, additionality and permanence 
than with the question of how REDD project revenues would be distributed. 
When someone ‘in the crowd’ at the Wewak meeting asked about ‘benefit 
sharing mechanisms’, the Chem-Clean consultants apparently said that they 
had ‘no idea’, and referred the question to the HRH representative, who ‘stated 
that they will get over 60% whilst the rest will go to the government and the 
developer’ (Chem-Clean 2009: 7). It is not clear from the draft minutes whether 
‘they’ would be the landowners or the HRH directors, so members of ‘the 
crowd’ might have been forgiven for concluding that the landowners would get 
nothing at all. As for the ‘developer’, the consultants told the people present 
at one of the village meetings that ‘2.2GtCO2e was already sold to Earthsky’ 
(ibid.: 9). This prompted a ‘landowner company representative’ to allege that 
‘some money valued at USD25 million was already misused by the government 
when Earthsky [was] already paid upfront’, and then go on to say that bank 
statements were now being collected ‘to justify and validate their claim’ 
(ibid.: 10).
At this juncture, the South Pole people added a note to the second report to 
say that they did not think Earthsky had so far made any payments to the PNG 
government. This note immediately went on to say that all of the revenues 
from the sale of carbon credits would accrue to a body called the April Salome 
Foundation (ASF), which would spend 80 per cent of the money on projects in 
the FMA area, 18 per cent on other projects, and would contribute the remaining 
2 per cent to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (Chem-Clean et al. 2009: 
20). The second report alluded to an ‘organisational chart’ which represents this 
form of benefit distribution (ibid.: 16), and although this chart is not attached 
to the report itself, it was reproduced in a thesis written by Matthew Leggett, 
who conducted fieldwork in the April Salumei area between May and July 2009 
under the auspices of WWF (Leggett 2009: 52). The chart is at variance with 
the note, for it shows that gross revenues from the sale of carbon credits would 
accrue to Earthsky, which would then subtract an unspecified amount to cover 
its own costs and the costs associated with provision of ‘technical support’ to 
HRH. The ASF would then receive 80 per cent (not 100 per cent) of the net 
revenues, and would spend this money on projects proposed by the ILGs holding 
shares in HRH, while 18 per cent would be paid to the PNG government (not the 
ASF) as a sort of tax to cover the cost of ‘projects’ outside the April Salumei 
area. Leggett’s investigation of the ASF website (which no longer exists) raised 
a suspicion that HRH directors might be involved in the management of that 
body, ‘which if correct would represent a clear conflict of interest’ (ibid.: 53). 
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In light of all these conjectures, it is hard not to sympathise with a woman who 
was said to have become ‘emotional’ at one of the Chem-Clean village meetings, 
wanting the government to ‘realise that many men in Port Moresby cheat us’, 
while insisting that the villagers themselves ‘have all the resources and we are 
not stupid’. The consultants took this to mean that ‘the villagers are happy in 
their [villages] though they lack basic government services and infrastructures’ 
(Chem-Clean 2009: 13).
Happy or otherwise, there was evidence in Chem-Clean’s draft minutes that 
local villagers had some rather odd ideas about the carbon trade. One villager 
was reported to have said that ‘things such as sicknesses, deaths of trees caused 
by bad gases, remove [sic] of good air from their forests have created panic 
and false alarm among people’ (Chem-Clean 2009: 9), while another reportedly 
said that ‘we thought a tower will be build [sic] to capture all bad gases and 
these gases will be packed and sold for cash’ (ibid.: 14). Leggett’s subsequent 
research in the area found that Chem-Clean’s consultants had failed to dispel 
such ideas, and might well have encouraged their diffusion. Local knowledge 
was now encapsulated in the idea that transactions in forest carbon involved the 
‘work of selling air’ (wok bilong selim win) or else the collection of ‘sky money’ 
(mani bilong skai) (Leggett 2009: 56). Two of his informants asked questions in 
Tok Pisin which Leggett translated as follows:4
What kind of pipes or other things do we need to collect the carbon? Will this 
company South Pole come here and build a factory to collect the carbon? Or 
do we need to collect it in plastic bags and go to Wewak or what? We don’t 
understand. It sounds like hard work …
Where does this wind (carbon) come from? It comes from the ground and the 
forest belonging to us. If South Pole come here and destroy our forest and our 
resources and steal our air I’m really worried. If they eat up our air, our children 
are going to die — what will they breathe? (Leggett 2009: 57).
The second report on the consultation process took due note of Leggett’s findings, 
and concluded that ‘key challenges such as the legitimacy of representation by 
the landowner company, details on benefits and equity sharing, transparency, 
accountability, general information on carbon markets and current and future 
land use issues will have to be addressed to ensure a proper sustainable 
implementation of the project’ (Chem-Clean et al. 2009: 37).
4  These two quotations are reproduced in Leggett and Lovell (2012: 125).
8. How April Salumei Became the REDD Queen
195
Survival of the Fittest
In the wake of all the scandal about carbon cowboys and the carbon cargo cult, 
there was a notable decline in the number of foreign companies willing to invest 
any more time or money in the development and promotion of REDD projects 
in PNG. Earthsky, South Pole and Carbon Planet were three of the companies 
that vanished from the national scene at this juncture. Nevertheless, a company 
called Rainforest Project Management Ltd (RPM) took on the role of developing 
the April Salumei Sustainable Forest Management Project — with April’s name 
correctly spelt.5 The ASSFMP proposal was submitted to the Climate, Community 
and Biodiversity Alliance (CCBA) in June 2010, and its validation was approved 
one year later.
The 2010 version of the ASSFMP proposal had no individual authors, but 
listed a number of ‘project development partners’, including HRH, the Prime 
Minister’s Department, the OCC, the PNG Forest Research Institute (a branch 
of the PNGFA), and the UPNG Centre for Climate Change and Sustainable 
Development (RPM 2010: 7). The document was not only posted to the CCBA 
website, but also to the website of a body called the Rainforest Management 
Alliance, a body that seems to have been created by the ASSFMP’s ‘project 
manager’, Stephen Hooper, who also represents the ‘project implementer’, RPM. 
The Rainforest Management Alliance website featured four other proposals for 
carbon trading projects in PNG (and none for projects in any other country), but 
there is no evidence that any of the other four proposals were ever submitted 
to the CCBA. The space occupied by the ASSFMP proposal also came to feature 
some additional documentation: a letter of support apparently written by the 
prime minister’s legal adviser to the local MP, Tony Aimo, in July 2010; another 
one seemingly written by the government’s acting chief secretary to Stephen 
Hooper himself in August 2010; two undated press releases in favour of the 
project from Tony Aimo and the forests minister, Belden Namah; and a copy of 
the Ambunti-Dreikikir District Development Plan (in which the project was not 
mentioned).6
The 2010 version of the project proposal claimed that a new round of meetings 
had been held with local community members and the chairmen of local land 
groups and landowner companies between October 2009 and January 2010, as a 
result of which 163 land group chairmen had supposedly signed consent forms 
(RPM 2010: 96). The local landowners were now said to be divided between 
5  Earthsky’s disappearance from April Salumei was more apparent than real, because RPM turned out to 
have the same registered address in the British Virgin Islands.
6  The Ambunti-Dreikikir district or electorate is the one that has been represented in parliament by Tony 
Aimo between 2002 and 2013. It includes the Ambunti and Tunap-Hunstein LLG areas, and thus includes 
about 80 per cent of the people with customary rights in the April Salumei forest area.
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‘four main cultural groups’, each with a specified number of ILGs holding 
shares in a different landowner company, and these four companies were said to 
be shareholders in HRH (ibid.: 24). The land groups whose chairmen refused to 
sign the original FMA were now said to be among the 44 land groups that had 
agreed to let one of the four landowner companies (Niksek Samsai Resources 
Ltd) act on their behalf. Information about the social, economic and political 
organisation of the area seems to have been derived from a report written by a 
company called Tack Realty Ltd in 2004, but no proper reference is given to this 
report, nor have I sighted a copy of it. The proposal made provision for another 
three or four years’ work to ‘update’ land groups and map their boundaries, and 
‘once it is done it will provide what will be possibly the most robust database 
and understanding of traditional landownership in PNG’ (ibid.: 89).
Tack Realty’s earlier investigation of this subject seems to have been 
commissioned by HRH as evidence in support of its compensation claims. 
The ASSFMP proposal cited this report as evidence that the opportunity cost to 
local landowners of keeping loggers out of the FMA area was more than US$188 
million, and then said that if the landowners were to succeed in their ongoing 
efforts to secure K58 million in compensation from the national government, 
this would not entail any relinquishment of their ‘logging rights’ or their ‘right 
over the biodiversity’ of the area (RPM 2010: 39). The proposal used PNGFA 
figures to determine that the ‘gross forest area’ covered by the FMA was around 
177,000 hectares, and if a 15 per cent ‘buffer zone’ were to be subtracted from 
this figure in accordance with the National Forestry Development Guidelines, 
that would leave a ‘net production area’ of around 150,000 hectares that 
would have been logged under a timber permit (ibid.: 63). Nevertheless, it 
is the larger of these two areas that was described as the ‘carbon accounting 
area’ (ibid.: 65), from which all agricultural activity, including the practice of 
shifting cultivation, would be banned under the terms of the project proposal, 
so people owning land within this area would henceforth have to make their 
gardens somewhere else (ibid.: 93). There was a glimmer of recognition that 
this could cause a problem for the distribution of landowner benefits from 
the project, because ‘the population distribution map shows the population is 
not evenly distributed and the carbon accounting area to be least populated’, 
but this problem was thought to be solved because ‘we have assumed an even 
distribution to be conservative’ (ibid.: 65) — whatever that meant.
By the end of July 2010, the CCBA website contained six comments on this 
version of the project proposal. These included comments from Theo Yasause 
(in his private capacity), Wari Iamo (in his official capacity), Matthew Leggett 
(on behalf of WWF), and Martin Golman, who was the deputy director of the 
Forest Research Institute. All comments except the one made by Yasause were 
critical of the proposal. Leggett’s comment included a copy of a published press 
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release in which Iamo denied that the OCC was a ‘project partner’ or was ever 
even approached for its ‘endorsement, support or partnership’ (OCCD 2010). 
Iamo’s own comment consisted of a letter reiterating a recent decision of the 
National Executive Council ‘that voluntary trading of forest carbon is inadvisable 
and premature under present arrangements’, and attached legal advice to the 
effect that PNG’s laws did not yet allow for the creation of negotiable property 
rights in forest carbon (CCBA 2010: 31–8). Golman’s comment was the longest 
and most critical of all, possibly because he was, as he said, partly ‘representing 
himself as a prominent landowner of Malu village in the project vicinity and 
an expert in sustainable forest management practices and carbon assessment 
in April Salumei’,7 but also because he had some responsibility for negotiating 
the FMA with local landowners in 1996 in his capacity as an official of the 
National Forest Service (ibid.: 9–10). Golman maintained that many of the 
landowners in the April Salumei area had never consented to being represented 
by Jackson Yagi and HRH in the negotiation of any project at all, nor had they 
ever received any share of whatever money HRH had managed to secure by way 
of ‘compensation’ from the state for the opportunity costs of forest conservation 
(ibid.: 13). He went on to propose that any further research relating to forest 
management in the area of overlap between the FMA and the WMA should be 
conducted by the Samsai Niksek Forest and Carbon Foundation, founded by 
himself, in partnership with the Forest Research Institute (ibid.: 18).
The Crowning Moment
Despite this negative commentary, April Salumei was still crowned as the only 
pilot REDD project in an area covered by an FMA. The ‘validation’ of the project 
was undertaken by a Californian body called Scientific Certification Systems, 
which contracted a New Zealand company called Environmental Accounting 
Services Ltd to check the project’s compliance with the CCBA’s 14 project design 
standards. The validators did most of their work between June and August 
2010. This included an evaluation of the negative comments posted to the CCBA 
website and the conduct of ‘community meetings’ at three locations in the FMA 
area (SCS 2011: 6). Their report contains 41 instances of ‘non-conformance’ that 
required some modification of the project design document, but many of these 
were minor and easily dealt with by the project proponents. Once the project 
document had been revised to the satisfaction of the auditors, a ‘validated copy’ 
was released for public consumption. This time the authors were shown to be 
Stephen Hooper and a group of seven Papua New Guineans, all of whom had at 
one time or another been employed by UPNG, although one, Simon Saulei, had 
7  He had recently completed a PhD thesis on this topic at The Australian National University.
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returned to his former post as director of the Forest Research Institute at the 
beginning of 2009. Both documents, along with a ‘monitoring plan’ requested 
by the validators, were posted to the CCBA website.8 They also appear on the 
website of another body called the Pacific Forest Alliance, which is also one of 
Stephen Hooper’s creations.9
The most significant modifications of the project design to emerge from the 
validation process were concerned with problems of authorisation and 
ownership. The first of these problems was to determine which local people 
had some entitlement to be consulted about the project, or be made aware of 
it, or give their consent to it, or share in whatever costs and benefits it might 
generate. The ‘carbon accounting area’ was now confined to the ‘net production 
area’ (around 150,000 hectares) that would be logged if a timber permit were 
granted over the FMA area (around 520,000 hectares), but the REDD ‘project 
zone’ was now expanded beyond the boundary of the FMA area, not only to 
include a 10-kilometre buffer around its northern, eastern and southern flanks, 
but to the banks of the Sepik River in the north and to the East Sepik provincial 
boundary in the south (Hooper et al. 2011: 33).10 This meant that it included 
the whole of the WMA that lay outside the FMA area (Figure 8.1) and probably 
covered about 900,000 hectares altogether. In the previous design document, 
the 10-kilometre buffer zone was thought to contain people who might be 
impacted by the project (RPM 2010: 26), but the validators thought that the 
‘Project zone boundary should ensure that it encompasses the boundaries of 
the four land holder companies’, and should eliminate the possibility of an 
ILG land boundary ‘extending past the Project boundary’ (SCS 2011: 57). In an 
effort to comply with this peculiar requirement, the proponents now said they 
would give due consideration to ‘traditional boundaries that extend outside 
the project area and into the project zone’, and were apparently prepared to 
consider the residents of the larger project zone as people who might have use 
rights, if not ownership rights, within the FMA area (Hooper et al. 2011: 30–1). 
No attempt was made to count the number of extra people resident in this larger 
area,11 or to demonstrate that they had been made aware of their new situation.
The revised project document did not provide any additional information 
about the number of people who had traditional rights to make use of the 
carbon accounting area in ways that might detract from the amount of carbon 
contained within it, but the former threat of prohibition was replaced with 
8  www.climate-standards.org/category/projects/oceania/ (viewed April 2015).
9  www.pacificforestalliance.org/ (viewed April 2015).
10  For some unknown reason, no buffer zone was created on the western banks of the Leonard Schultze 
River, which constitutes the western boundary of the FMA area.
11  The project proponents have consistently represented the resident population of the FMA area alone as 
being 7696 in 2000 (RPM 2010: 33; Hooper et al. 2011: 39). In the absence of a detailed breakdown of this 
figure, I am unable to explain the discrepancy between this number and my own calculation (Table 8.1).
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a risk assessment and mitigation matrix (Hooper et al. 2011: 100–9). The 41 risks 
evaluated in this section of the document included such things as ‘population 
growth’, ‘agricultural pressure’, ‘hunting of endangered or threatened species’, 
‘small scale clearing of land’, ‘regular burning of grasslands’ and ‘access to areas 
fundamental for meeting basic needs of the local community’. But apart from 
the possible impact of hunting on biodiversity, none of these was considered as 
problematic as risks like ‘ILG leadership struggle’, ‘lack of knowledge and skills 
in business administration’, ‘inappropriate use of funds’, ‘financial benefits not 
shared equally’, or ‘slow delivery of the project’. Most of the risks identified in 
the matrix would be offset by a mixture of ‘awareness and monitoring’ activities 
on the part of local ‘community stewards’ (ibid.). But the auditors thought 
that these activities would have to be framed by ‘an appropriate methodology 
for the identification of impacts on the community’ (SCS 2011: 66), as well 
as a ‘community monitoring plan’ (ibid.: 68). The revised project document 
therefore includes another new section on social impact indicators that is 
remarkable mainly for its observation that the biggest impact of the project on 
the local people is likely to be ‘the identification of the true landowners and the 
subsequent distribution of benefits to them’ (ibid.: 158).
In their own process of consultation with local communities, the validators 
discovered a popular belief that an unequal distribution of benefits to ILGs 
resulting from the unequal size of their landholdings would probably lead to 
conflicts that might (or might not) be resolved in many different ways (SCS 2011: 
C-20). One might imagine further scope for conflict if the distribution of benefits 
did not match the distribution of customary rights to exploit the natural 
resources in the carbon accounting area. But Stephen Hooper shied away from 
the idea that benefits should be matched to impacts or opportunity costs:
It has also been agreed by the landowners and documented in the PDD [that] 
all funds emanating from the Project will be distributed equally amongst all 
landowners. That is every man and woman over 16 years of age will share 
equally. This we believe is a fair system. Payments will be made directly to 
the Incorporated Land Groups and not through Hunstein Range Holdings. 
(SCS 2011: C-7)
The reference to HRH reflects the well-documented local ‘awareness’ of its 
previous failure to distribute benefits in an equitable manner (SCS 2011: 11). 
The  statement as a whole implies that this failure would henceforth be 
compensated by payments of cash to each one of the 163 ILGs whose chairmen 
consented to the project at the end of 2009, the amounts of which would vary 
in proportion to the number of their adult male and female members. But aside 
from a passing reference to compensation payments ‘in cash and kind’ in the 
project design document (Hooper et al. 2011: 156), the general presumption was 
that direct benefits to local communities would take the form of employment 
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with the REDD project itself and a set of specific ‘social and infrastructure 
projects’ approved by the board of the ASF (ibid.: 118). There is no way the 
REDD project would produce 163 jobs. A much smaller number of local workers 
would apparently be employed by one or other of the four new landowner 
companies (ibid.: 113), and their executives would only achieve a voice on the 
ASF board through their membership of the HRH board (SCS 2011: B-5).
The validation process failed to clarify the nature of the property rights vested 
in HRH and the consequent rights of its directors to participate in the REDD 
project. The validators decided that the project was initially authorised by an 
agreement between HRH and Earthsky that dated back to May 2009 (SCS 2011: 22), 
and Hooper then agreed to describe Earthsky as the ‘project originator’, which 
had appointed RPM to develop and manage the project on its behalf (ibid.: 63). 
At the same time, the validators said that they agreed with RPM that HRH was 
‘the current legal entity that has been recognised through the PNGFA and the 
PNG Supreme Court as having the resource rights to the FMA and are therefore 
a significant Project stakeholder’ (ibid.: B-5). However, there is no evidence 
that the PNG Supreme Court or any other court had vested these rights in 
HRH, and any decision along these lines would be totally inconsistent with the 
Forestry Act, which clearly states that an FMA is an agreement by ILGs — not 
a landowner company — to transfer timber harvesting rights to the PNGFA.
Jackson Yagi’s claim for compensation had been based on the failure of the 
PNGFA to convert the FMA area into a logging concession from which he and 
other landowners might derive some material benefit. Hooper himself told 
the validators that the REDD project was conceived as part of an ‘out of court 
settlement’ of this legal dispute (SCS 2011: 72). What was at stake here was 
not the ownership of the timber resources (or the forest carbon) in the FMA 
area, but the degree to which the declaration of the Hunstein Range WMA 
justified the PNGFA’s failure to grant a timber permit to a logging company. 
The circumstances of the settlement are unclear,12 but proponents of the REDD 
project needed to prove that the WMA had been invalidated in order to acquire 
the magical substance known to the world of carbon trading as ‘additionality’. 
In other words, they had to make a case that the FMA, or more specifically 
the carbon accounting area, would have been logged in the absence of their 
project (ibid.: 63–5). If the National Forest Board was to take the existence of 
the WMA as evidence that some local landowners had never consented to the 
FMA, and use this as a pretext for not granting a timber permit, there would be 
12  According to Leggett (2009: 46), it was the Department of Environment and Conservation that settled 
the HRH claim in 2007, but a commission of inquiry into the Department of Finance determined that HRH 
received the first payment in respect of its claim in 2005 (GPNG 2009: 4041).
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no additionality.13 Since that was the board’s position before Jackson Yagi made 
his claim against the state, it was essential for the project proponents to award 
him a victory of some sort (ibid.: 14). But how could that be reconciled with the 
need to secure the support of all the local landowners? Stephen Hooper had two 
solutions to this problem. One was to wash his hands of it by refusing to become 
involved in ‘local level politics’ and insisting that ‘the structure and make up of 
representative companies must be determined by the people living in the villages 
on a daily basis’ (ibid.: C-4). The other was to make an arrangement for the PNG 
Electoral Commission to supervise the democratic election of the boards of each 
of the four — which now became five — new landowner companies within six 
months of project validation, and to require that each of their boards have two 
representatives on the board of HRH.14 Jackson Yagi told the validators that he 
was happy with this arrangement (ibid.: 58).
If these measures promised to deliver a new sense of joint ownership among the 
local landowners, other measures were taken to enlarge the circle of support from 
national stakeholders. Although WWF representatives declined an invitation to 
be involved in a further round of community consultation in August 2009, one 
of the organisation’s national employees later took leave from his job to identify 
gaps in the state of landowner awareness (SCS 2011: C-3). A local NGO, Partners 
with Melanesians, was engaged to be the project’s dispute resolution authority 
(ibid.: 24), and both organisations were invited to join an independent review 
body to advise the ASF’s board of trustees (ibid.: C-7). Martin Golman’s critique, 
which the validators ascribed to a ‘degree of professional jealousy’ (ibid.: B-3), 
was quickly muted when the forests minister, Belden Namah, expressed his 
own support for the project in August 2010 (ibid.: 64). Although Namah then 
crossed the floor of parliament to become leader of the opposition, his erstwhile 
support was sufficient for work on the April Salumei project to be funded in the 
PNGFA’s budget for 2011.
This meant that Wari Iamo and the OCC began to look somewhat isolated 
in their public denial of support for the project. The validators sought to 
neutralise this source of opposition by suggesting that Iamo may not have been 
the executive director of the OCC when he published his adverse advertorial in 
July 2010 (SCS 2011: 33), while Stephen Hooper argued that the project did not 
need support from the OCC anyway, so long as it had the backing of the prime 
minister, the forests minister and the local MP (ibid.: 63). Iamo was certainly 
the secretary of the Department of Environment and Conservation (DEC), and 
13  At one point in their report, the validators seem to have thought that the WMA was still officially 
recognised but had somehow been excluded from the carbon accounting area (SCS 2011: 73), but there is 
nothing in the REDD project design document to support this notion.
14  A fifth landowner company was established in September 2010 because of a split between two sets of 
land groups in the WMA that had formerly been shareholders in Niksek Samsai Resources Ltd (SCS 2011: C-5).
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there was no doubt that he had been appointed as the acting executive director 
of the OCC when Theo Yasause was suspended, which meant that the OCC had 
looked like a branch of the DEC since July 2009. If he no longer occupied this 
extra position in July 2010, then it seems rather strange that he chaired the 
multi-stakeholder workshop convened in Port Moresby’s Hideaway Hotel in 
February 2011 to endorse the National Programme Document (NPD) (that would 
release US$6.4 million from the UN Collaborative Programme to implement the 
first, three-year phase of PNG’s ‘REDD+ readiness roadmap’ (UN-REDD 2011). 
The  managing director of the PNGFA informed this meeting of his agency’s 
intention to implement the April Salumei project as a pilot project, but he did 
not chair the meeting, nor was the project mentioned in the NPD.
This was just one moment in an ongoing struggle between the PNGFA and the 
OCC (or DEC) for control of the forest carbon policy process. Local environmental 
NGOs made an unaccustomed alliance with national forestry officials in this 
struggle because they saw the reformed version of the OCC as a puppet of 
Kevin Conrad and the group of highly paid foreign consultants whom he had 
introduced to this process immediately after the Copenhagen climate change 
conference at the end of 2009 (Lang 2010b; Babon 2011; Filer and Wood 2012; 
Babon et al. 2014). Supporters of the April Salumei project were reluctant to 
endorse the NPD while there was no prospect of an end to this form of foreign 
interference. Their wish was granted sooner than they might have expected. 
In August 2011, Michael Somare was ousted as prime minister. His replacement, 
Peter O’Neill, appointed Belden Namah as his deputy, restored him to his former 
portfolio, and put him in charge of the OCC as well as the PNGFA. Shortly 
after his appointment, Namah announced the dismissal of Kevin Conrad from 
his position as PNG’s climate change ambassador on the grounds that he had 
little or no knowledge of the ‘culture, tradition and lifestyle of the people’, 
and therefore could not deal with ‘landowner issues’ (Waima 2011). Meanwhile, 
the foreign consultants had already disappeared because their contracts had 
expired or their fees had not been paid. Wari Iamo retained his position as 
acting head of the OCC for the time being,15 but ceased his pursuit of the case 
against April Salumei.
In the months that followed, the project monitoring plan was finalised (PFA 2012), 
a new study was undertaken to assess the feasibility of attaining compliance 
with the Voluntary Carbon Standard (Green 2012), and some additional work 
was done on the measurement of local carbon stocks. For some unknown reason, 
the Voluntary Carbon Standard Feasibility Assessment added 100,000 hectares 
to the size of the net forest production area (Green 2012: 5), but  it did not 
15  Like many other public servants, he resigned from office in March 2012 in order to contest the forthcoming 
national elections. He was not elected.
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provide any new information about the customary landowners. One interesting 
feature of this report was the inclusion of a new organisation chart in which 
the chairmen of the five landowner companies would be members of a new 
body called the April Salumei Working Group, whose interaction with project 
management would not be mediated by the board of HRH (ibid.: 8). It was 
also stated that local landowners would ‘receive a minimum of 60% of all sale 
proceeds directly’, and that this ‘paradigm shift to landowner involvement and 
payments’ had been authorised by the national government. While there was no 
evidence of any sales proceeding, two motor boats and K200,000 had apparently 
been delivered to the working group to ‘kick start local community activities’ 
(ibid.: 9).
All this happened before the national elections in the middle of 2012. Thereafter, 
Peter O’Neill retained his position as prime minister, Tony Aimo retained his 
position as the local MP, while Belden Namah returned to his former role as 
leader of the opposition. The new minister of forests and climate change was 
another former forests minister, Patrick Pruaitch. Pruaitch is an ally of Michael 
Somare, who now became the governor of East Sepik Province and declared his 
support for the ruling coalition. The National Executive Council reiterated its 
own endorsement of the ASSFMP in December 2012. To celebrate this moment, 
Tony Aimo appeared on national television with the chairman of the April 
Salumei Working Group, the local project manager, and a king-sized replica 
of a cheque for K300,000 to be divided equally between the five landowner 
companies. At the same time, Aimo told a national newspaper that April Salumei 
would be ‘the biggest carbon trade project in the world to date’ (Anon. 2012b).
Conclusion
April Salumei is not in fact the only forest carbon project that was still alive in 
PNG in 2013. The PNGFA claimed to have four other ‘REDD+ pilot projects’ in 
the 2012 draft of its National Forest Plan (GPNG 2012a: 18), while five NGOs 
were said to have received grants from the Australian government to develop 
‘REDD+ demonstration activity concepts’ (Babon 2011: 5). However, April 
Salumei was the only survivor of the many projects that were being promoted 
back in 2008, and the only one that seemed to have any prospect of producing 
marketable carbon credits instead of simply being funded by the national 
budget or foreign aid. The other projects in the National Forest Plan all involved 
afforestation or reforestation or reduced impact logging, there was no detail on 
the activities being undertaken or proposed, and none of them was clearly tied 
to an area where the government had already acquired the timber harvesting 
rights without passing them on to a logging company.
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April Salumei’s survival in a process of natural selection may have something to 
do with her physical qualities. Her biodiversity values do not exceed those of 
any other forest area in PNG, but a good case can be made for them to exceed 
those of any other FMA area where logging has not yet been authorised. 
This was a case which WWF made to the government back in 1996, and a case 
which the REDD project proponents had been making more recently. The CCBA 
awarded the project a gold medal for ‘exceptional biodiversity benefits’, but 
not for exceptional climate or community benefits (SCS 2011: 55; Hooper et al. 
2011: 171).
April Salumei’s survival also had something to do with her status as a form 
of property and her claim to the magical power of additionality. The PNGFA 
was less convinced of its capacity to authorise logging in some of the other 
FMA areas because the original agreements with local landowners were even 
more questionable than they were in this case. Could it therefore be argued that 
the ASSFMP thrived on an exceptional level of local community support or 
an exceptional ability of external agents to mobilise community participation? 
There is not enough evidence to evaluate recent interactions between landowner 
representatives and outsiders like Stephen Hooper, but there is little reason to 
credit the effort made to produce ‘landowner awareness’ of the REDD project 
in 2009. That was surely a false start. If there had been an increase in local 
understanding and appreciation of the project since that time, the evidence 
suggests that it was far from being equally distributed among different groups 
of landowners. It is hard to imagine that a local ‘community’ that may now 
contain 5000 adult members (if one includes absentee landowners like Martin 
Golman) could possibly speak with one voice when they have 13 or 14 vernacular 
languages. The political, social and cultural fragmentation of the April Salumei 
area is a huge — and possibly insurmountable — challenge for a comprehensive 
demonstration of free, prior and informed consent (Anderson 2011; Leggett and 
Lovell 2012). The recent semblance of consensus may be due to a common but 
fragile sense of anticipation, which could either break down if the anticipated 
benefits fail to materialise or break down if they do materialise and are (thought 
to be) unequally or unfairly distributed.
Perhaps the level of community support has been less significant than the level 
of support from provincial stakeholders, including the local MP and the former 
prime minister. Theo Yasause also hailed from East Sepik Province, and there 
is no doubt that he showed greater enthusiasm for April Salumei than he did 
for any other REDD project proposal during his time in charge of the OCC. 
He also had good reason to think that Michael Somare — and therefore Kevin 
Conrad — would prefer to see PNG’s first REDD project developed in their own 
province. Yasause’s own preference no longer matters, but when Somare met the 
forest-friendly Prince of Wales on the occasion of his mother’s diamond jubilee 
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in November 2012, Somare proposed to honour the occasion by making East 
Sepik a REDD ‘demonstration province’ (Anon. 2012a). Conrad and Pruaitch 
were both in attendance to welcome this initiative. On the other hand, there is 
no evidence that April Salumei’s most active supporters made an effort to get 
Somare’s stamp of approval — let alone that of Conrad or the Prince — after 
Yasause was removed from office in 2009.
I think a stronger case can be made for the importance of support from a group 
of national stakeholders who are members of what I call the ‘conservation policy 
community’ (Filer 2005). As we have seen, the original members of this group 
were based at UPNG in 2008, but membership later expanded to include people 
employed in the Forest Research Institute, the PNG University of Technology, 
the Vision 2050 (long-term planning) branch of the Prime Minister’s Department, 
and one of the local NGOs that are affiliated with the PNG Eco-Forestry Forum. 
Most of the individuals in this group do not hail from East Sepik Province, 
but one thing they had in common was their opposition to Kevin Conrad’s 
control of the forest carbon policy process. Beyond that, they had a lukewarm 
relationship with the big international NGOs that had taken an interest in this 
process, despite (or possibly because) some of them were previously employed 
by these organisations. This might help to explain why WWF did not show 
much enthusiasm for the ASSFMP, even when foreigners like Stephen Hooper 
tried to gain its endorsement. As we have seen, the pursuit of ‘additionality’ 
entailed an attack on the validity of the WMA which WWF had previously 
tried to establish as a defence against the prospect of logging, but there was also 
a kind of resource nationalism at work in claims to ownership of April Salumei. 
In this respect, she became a stage from which her national supporters sought to 
fill the vacant space that Conrad should have left behind him.
It is hard to say whether the factors that explain the relative success of the 
April Salumei project to date will explain its continued success in future, or 
whether its further development will serve to clarify the relative importance 
of these different factors. It seems unlikely that this project alone will generate 
significant revenues if no further progress is made with the national ‘roadmap’ 
whose engineering is still vested in the OCC, but progress has been rather 
slow. In the two years after the UN Collaborative Programme agreed to spend 
US$6.4 million on PNG’s roadmap, the OCC only managed to produce a second 
draft of its Climate Compatible Development Policy (GPNG 2013a), a working 
draft of a Readiness Preparation Proposal (GPNG 2013b), and a draft bill for a 
Climate Change Authority Act. It managed to finalise a set of guidelines and 
an institutional framework for the official approval of REDD+ projects (GPNG 
2012b), including draft guidelines for securing free, prior and informed consent 
for such projects (GPNG 2013c), but it is not clear whether the April Salumei 
project has passed through this approval process or whether its endorsement 
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by the PNGFA and the National Executive Council has itself been counted as 
sufficient evidence of government authorisation. The Readiness Preparation 
Proposal says that project activities in the area ‘will be determined after a 
development option study’ (GPNG 2013b: 60). This is a type of study undertaken 
under the terms of the Forestry Act, and if another one is undertaken, it will 
be the third or fourth to be undertaken since the timber harvesting rights were 
first acquired by the state in 1992. The local landowners may have to wait a 
while longer for their carbon credits to be realised.
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9. Representational Excess in Recent 
Attempts to Acquire Forest Carbon 
in the Kamula Doso Area, Western 
Province, Papua New Guinea
MICHAEL WOOD
The rainforests of Papua New Guinea (PNG) have long been regarded as 
containers of still to be revealed mysteries and wonders. One persistent theme 
in representations of these rainforests is the lack of visibility that is found inside 
the rainforest. Another highlights the need for some unique kind of vision, 
typically provided by science, that would reveal its underlying logic and 
structure. A third theme is that what the forest ultimately reveals contributes to 
its own conservation and reproduction.
Charles Lane Poole, one of the region’s earliest and most influential professional 
foresters, noted that describing the type of forests found in PNG was:
… not easy. The large buttresses that certain trees have at the base of the boles, 
the hanging lianas, the aerial gardens that cover the upper branches of the tall 
trees, all tend to distract and make a comprehensive view or description difficult. 
Add to these the thick stand of young trees which makes it hard to see stems of 
the trees more than half a chain away, and some idea of my difficulty in giving a 
general view of this type of forest may be obtained. (Lane Poole 1925: 6)
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However, once this limited visibility was supplemented by scientific vision 
that moved the observer away from aesthetics, ‘beautiful excrescence’ and 
other forms of excess, and into the realm of forestry expertise, a certain forest 
structure could be observed. According to Lane Poole, treating the forest as a 
resource — timber — allowed for a specific clarity of vision:
The complexity of the forest is much reduced when it comes to examining it from 
a purely forestry stand point. The often beautiful excrescence of the scene must 
be overlooked while the main thing — timber — is examined … Once this is 
determined on, the forest becomes a simple matter to describe, for it now consists 
of three storeys of trees — the top one, about 100–120 feet high, is composed 
of trees from 7-ft girth upwards; the second of trees 5 feet in girth 50 to 75 feet 
high; and the third of trees 30 feet high. (Lane Poole 1925: 6)
Despite this clarity, the diversity of species, and their spatial dispersal, prevented 
easy estimation of timber resources. More recently the ability to estimate how 
much rainforest currently exists, or will exist, in PNG after industrial logging 
has become a standing feature of policy debates concerning ‘sustainable’ forestry 
(Nadarajah 1993; Filer et al. 2009; Shearman et al. 2009, 2010).
Supplementing these concerns of foresters, conservationists and botanists about 
the definition of sustainable logging in PNG, biologists have often found the 
animals living in the PNG rainforest difficult to see, describe and measure. As a 
result, the PNG rainforest remains full of excitingly unknown animals. One of 
Australia’s more prestigious newspapers, The Age, ran a story entitled ‘PNG 
rainforests reveal 200 new species’ (7 October 2010). The article celebrated the 
‘spectacular variety’ and beauty of the animals discovered by scientists working 
in mountain forest. The organisers of the expeditions hoped that their findings 
would contribute to the conservation of this type of forest. The implication 
was that PNG forests could reveal even more species diversity on a similar scale 
and that such biodiversity was intrinsically valuable. Such diversity could 
apparently, by itself, create conservation effects for the rainforest.
Another, rather different, conjunction of rainforest, media representations and 
conservation effects has emerged from the idea that PNG forests contain vast 
and measurable (Bryan et al. 2010; Fox et al. 2010) amounts of marketable forest 
carbon. As outlined in this chapter, while forest carbon had the astounding 
potential to avoid the destruction of PNG’s rainforests, actual attempts to create 
productive conjunctions of forest carbon and conservation often involved illegal 
activities that were highly contested and easily overturned.
The story I tell of these politics primarily involves forest originally controlled by 
Kamula (and Doso) speakers in the lowlands of Western Province, PNG. While 
aspects of the events outlined highlight illegalities in the attempts to transfer 
property to new actors, and corporate structures that apparently represent the 
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Kamula and other communities, what I highlight is the way the media became a 
vehicle for political struggle over the development of marketable forest carbon. 
Given the absence of any legal framework in PNG for asserting property claims 
to forest carbon or its sale, the media and spectacle became an important way 
of creating, representing and also destroying contractual-like relationships that 
took the place of more formal ways of making people accountable to each other.1
Stories from Wawoi Falls about the Origins of 
Carbon Trading in the Kamula Doso Region
Many Kamula people apparently first became aware of a market for carbon when 
a group of businessmen and supporters visited Wawoi Falls during the 2005 
Independence Day celebrations. Wawoi Falls is a place with a good airstrip 
where a number of landowners of the Kamula Doso concession reside. Among 
the visitors were a large American and the son of then prime minister Michael 
Somare. In addition there may have been someone called ‘Steve Dore’ (a possible 
reference to the company Independent Timber and Stevedoring (IT&S), 
discussed below).2 According to one story, the party arrived in a helicopter 
owned by the former prime minister Sir Julius Chan.
Wisapiye Susupiye, a director of the landowner company Tumu Timbers 
Development Pty Ltd (commonly known as Tumu Timbers), also arrived and 
talked about a carbon sink company and how this business may be difficult to 
organise because the World Bank had left PNG. Despite the departure of this 
powerful bank,3 some Kamula from Wawoi Falls told me that the presence of 
the American — a ‘white skin’ from a country more powerful than Australia — 
was an excellent feature of the proposal. They made the point that the ‘ways’ 
of Australians and Americans were far better than the Malaysian–Chinese 
management of the Wawoi Guavi logging concession. According to some Kamula, 
the American, and his supporters like Susupiye, had indicated that everyone 
working on the project would eat in the same mess. This was very different 
to the situation at Kamusi, the headquarters of the Wawoi Guavi concession, 
where only expatriates and a very small and select group of nationals could 
eat together. There was also talk of how bank accounts were to be opened in 
Australia for landowners, of creating good roads and putting ‘medicine’ in the 
rivers to ensure there was no pollution. Susupiye and the American reported that 
1  Some of this phrasing derives from Fay (2013).
2  A United States company, Independent Timber and Stevedoring, had about one third of the shares in 
IT&S. But in April 2010, Hilo Investments, an Australian company, acquired 7 million shares in PNG IT&S. 
Who is behind Hilo is currently unclear.
3  For some Kamula the World Bank might be linked to One World Government — an apocalyptic and 
devilish political regime that could precede the return of Christ.
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the minister of forests had been paid K6 million for supporting the extension of 
the Wawoi Guavi into the Kamula Doso area. They also said that now there was 
no support within government for Rimbunan Hijau (the owners of the Wawoi 
Guavi concession) to be given rights to Kamula Doso’s timber via the extension 
of the Wawoi Guavi concession.4 At the time this statement was made there 
were in place a series of legal challenges to the decision by the PNG Forest 
Authority to authorise this extension.5 While the outcome of these challenges 
was not yet known, people at Wawoi Falls understood that the American was 
proposing a useful alternative to logging by Rimbunan Hijau, a company whose 
track record in the Wawoi Guavi concession was well known at Wawoi Falls 
and a frequent source of complaint. People also understood that Steve Dore’s 
alternative proposal had something to do with carbon trade. But over the next 
two years no new developments of this carbon proposal were reported. And it 
later became clear that IT&S was mainly interested in linking large-scale logging 
with road building and the acquisition of long-term leases over vast amounts of 
customary land in Western Province (Mirou 2013: 385–531).
Moves to create commodified forest carbon in PNG as a potential alternative to 
logging were spurred by global policies promoting REDD (reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation) schemes. However, between 2000 
and 2005 a series of subjudicial reports on the mismanagement of PNG’s forest 
sector highlighted major difficulties in government regulation of the sector 
(Ombudsman Commission of PNG 2002, 2004; The 2003/2004 Review Team 
2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d). Evidence also emerged that accessible primary 
forests might be logged out within 20–30 years (Filer et al. 2009; Shearman et al. 
2009). If the government could not regulate the forestry sector on a sustainable 
basis it was unlikely to be able to implement policies that would create effective 
REDD schemes (Melick 2010).
A great deal of evidence suggesting that PNG was unprepared for carbon 
trading came from the activities of Nupan Pty Ltd during the period 2007 
until 2010. This company was led by Kirk Roberts, who was interested in 
developing carbon projects throughout PNG, including Kamula Doso. Nupan 
seems in 2007 to have established a working relationship with Mr Kond, of Koo 
Management. Mr Kond had apparently influential connections via his position 
as vice president of Prime Minister Somare’s political party. Kond’s role was to 
‘liaise with and advise the PNG government’ on Nupan’s behalf to ensure Nupan 
4  For background on the extension of Wawoi Guavi into Kamula Doso see the Ombudsman Commission of 
PNG’s (2002, 2004) reports and that by the PNG Forestry Review Team (2001). For details on the Wawoi Guavi 
concession see Independent Forestry Review Team (2001, 2003) and the reports of the 2003/2004 Review Team 
(2004a, 2004b, 2004c, 2004d).
5  And in July 2010 the National Court found that the Forest Management Agreement between the 
landowners and the state was invalid. This agreement gave the state rights to ‘manage’ the timber in the 
Kamula Doso concession.
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had access to sites containing carbon. Nupan also established an arrangement 
with an Australian-based company — Carbon Planet — that would broker the 
carbon credits to the global markets.6
Figure 9.1 outlines how Nupan mapped its proposed Kamula Doso project. 
While there are problems with the locations of places, the map broadly indicates 
that the proposed carbon project completely overlapped with the proposed 
Kamula Doso logging concession.
Figure 9.1 Nupan’s version of the Kamula Doso concession.
Source: Tumu Timbers Development Limited (2010: 21).
6  Viewed at www.carbonoffsetsdaily.com/news-channels/global/broker-paid-k200000-for-carbon-%E2
%80%98consultancy%E2%80%99-15695.htm. In April 2008 another company, Forest Top, also became 
involved in attempts by Carbon Planet, Nupan and Koo Investments to develop carbon projects in PNG 
(personal communication, Ilya Gridneff, Port Moresby, 16 July 2009). I was for a brief period a consultant to 
Carbon Planet (Wood 2009).
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Figure 9.2 Carbon credits from Kamula Doso issued by the Office 
of Climate Change for the benefit of Nupan Pty Ltd.
Source: PNG Office of Climate Change and Carbon Trade.
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During 2008 something like a working relationship developed between Nupan, 
Carbon Planet and the PNG Office of Climate Change (OCC).7 This culminated 
on 3 November 2008. Theo Yasause, director of the OCC, signed a certificate 
that represented a million tonnes of carbon credits derived from the Kamula 
Doso concession (Figure  9.2). The certificate gave the beneficiary — Nupan 
— ownership of these credits that were said to ‘mature’ on 1 January 2012. 
In retrospect this was probably the high point of that relationship and the 
beginning of the end of any serious likelihood that Nupan’s Kamula Doso carbon 
project could be realised.
While the credits were called ‘voluntary carbon credits’, they were also said 
to derive from the ‘United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) under Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) initiative’. However, at the time the certificate was signed, no such UN-
authorised REDD initiative existed and nor did any UN-regulated market for 
REDD carbon credits exist. But a post-Copenhagen version of such a market was 
expected to have emerged by the ‘maturity’ date.8 The certificate was a claim 
to the existence of carbon credits and implied that Nupan already had rights of 
ownership in such credits. The certificate was also a promise that in the future 
— on maturity — REDD-compliant credits would exist. But since the certificate 
also mentioned voluntary credits it seems Roberts was allocated rights to sell 
into this market as well. The credits were neither authorised, nor constrained, 
by any specific state legislation regulating their definition or sale. Their creation 
was possibly just rather silly. But given the certificate’s elaborate design it may 
have been a spectacularly naive attempt to assert state authorisation or even a 
deliberate attempt to defraud — assuming anyone could be found to take the 
document seriously.
As a consequence, it has proved hard for anyone to provide a rational 
explanation of why the certificate was produced beyond the ‘capture’ of Nupan 
and OCC officials and the thrill of the spectacle they were creating. Jim Johnson, 
of Carbon Planet, used talk of symbols to explain the documents as something 
less than real, as standing for something else beyond the money they appeared 
to contain:
… there are in existence a group of certificates issued by OCC to Nupan for 
Kamula Doso. They are not real certificates. They are symbolic to the fact that 
Nupan is recognised by OCC as rightful developer to the landowners of Kamula 
Doso. (natashaloder.blogspot.com, 6 June 2009)
7  This office was also known, at various times, as the Office of Climate Change and Carbon Trade and the 
Office of Climate Change and Environmental Sustainability. In this chapter I will refer to it as the Office of 
Climate Change (OCC).
8  Loder has noted that 14 per cent of the forest carbon traded on voluntary markets in 2009 was based on 
promises to deliver REDD credits (natashaloder.blogspot.com, 6 June 2009).
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Dr Yasause also adopted a similar response. He presented the credits as 
representing a provisional copy of an original that perhaps did not yet exist. 
He implied that this ‘original’ could be brought into existence after proper 
consultations with a newly unified group of landowners:
Kirk Roberts of Nupan PNG had been working with the landowners of Kamula 
Doso and made representation to my Office. We issued an Interim copy of the 
Certificate dated 3 Nov 08, on the basis that they will undertake wide stakeholder 
consultation covering all landowners, provincial and local government before 
such project can be entertained. No documentation was submitted with proof 
that consultations were undertaken and the people are happy with possible 
carbon trade … Dr. Theo Yasause … has since became aware that not all 
landowners were involved in or supportive of the project being developed by 
Nupan. Since 3  February 2009 the OCC ceased to have any direct links with 
Nupan. (natashaloder.blogspot.com, 6 June 2009)
Even if little more than a speculative claim about some unlikely future state of the 
world, the possibility of carbon credits did help convey powerful material effects 
to some involved in their production. For his work for Nupan and Carbon Planet, 
in May 2008 James Kond was apparently paid K200,000 (A$85,000) by Carbon 
Planet. In addition, Carbon Planet paid some money to Kirk Roberts and his 
company Nupan (Ilya Gridneff, 24 September 2009, Australian Associated Press).9 
There was also some expectation that Carbon Planet would help the OCC develop 
regulatory policies and procedures. Further reiterating the value of these highly 
speculative transactions, in July 2009 Carbon Planet proposed a merger with an 
Australian company called ‘m2m Group’. Carbon Planet claimed to have some 
25 potential carbon trading projects in PNG that could generate A$1 billion a 
year (ibid.).10 While Carbon Planet made useful claims about its assets, Dr Yasause 
was sacked partly for issuing ‘fake’ credits for Kamula Doso and other carbon 
projects in PNG, and the OCC was moved from the prime minister’s office to the 
Department of Environment. As a result there was no immediate speculative boom 
in carbon credits derived from Kamula Doso, or from PNG generally.
Media Accounts and Rimbunan Hijau
The creation of the credits was subject to intense media scrutiny and critique. 
These stories positioned Kirk Roberts as a ‘colourful character’, ‘carbon cowboy’, 
‘carbon conman’ and ‘larrikin’. These terms, and associated stories of his earlier 
troubles with the law concerning doping of horses, suggested he was duping the 
9  Gridneff’s report is available at probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/More-bad-
news-from-Papua-New-Guinea-_-redd-monitor.pdf (viewed 8 May 2015).
10  This merger collapsed and Carbon Planet itself became bankrupt.
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people living in the Kamula Doso area. There was virtually no attempt to represent 
Kamula, or other land users, except as victims of a scam (and, more recently, as 
victims of coercion). Kirk Roberts became a useful representative of other carbon 
brokers operating in PNG and a broader signifier of what can go wrong with the 
commodification of ecological services through REDD schemes and carbon trading. 
The Nupan project indicated that attempts to construct an unfeasible market in 
carbon credits was, in PNG (and other parts of the world), likely to be intrinsically 
corrupt and corrupting (Lohmann 2009). The Nupan project also highlighted the 
possibility that capitalism, in general, or more specifically in Third World resource 
frontiers, deployed deception and spectacle as it its normal way of operating.
The dominant impact of the media was to deny the Kamula Doso carbon project 
any legitimacy and make it appear as an exemplar of the inability of a corrupt PNG 
government to effectively govern the new resource. In the lead-up to Copenhagen 
with intense debate about various proposals concerning REDD schemes (see 
Gabriel, Chapter 10, this volume), these stories about PNG’s carbon credit schemes, 
particularly concerning Kamula Doso, briefly gained some international significance.
The media played down the role of pre-existing timber interests which were also 
criticising Nupan’s carbon project. One example of intervention by such interests 
emerged in January 2009 when the ‘Kamula Doso Landowners’ group delivered a 
petition to the forests minister (then Belden Namah) that opposed any carbon trading 
and supported logging. A version of the petition was also apparently published in 
The National newspaper, owned by Rimbunan Hijau. Around the same time the 
petition was presented to the government, a lawyer working for Rimbunan Hijau 
had provided remarkably good advice about carbon credit schemes to the Kamula, 
especially to those Kamula who strongly supported Rimbunan Hijau. Copies of this 
advice, along with copies of media coverage about the OCC issuing fake carbon 
credits to Nupan, were circulating at Wawoi Falls when I stayed there in June 2009.
While there I came across a draft version of perhaps the same petition that was 
presented to the forests minister. The content partly derived from Rimbunan 
Hijau’s opposition to Nupan, but other ideas found in the draft derived from, and 
alluded to, local concerns about international governance (and the apocalyptic 
advent of Christ).11 The purpose of the petition was to prevent:
11  Rimbunan Hijau may be one source of this kind of thinking. Its newsletter of October 2009 has the 
headline ‘Climate Change: One-World Government Conspiracy’ over an article outlining Lord Monckton’s 
views on climate change (RH PNG 2010). But the petition writers may have also been thinking of local 
apocalyptic political theologies where a warming world, corruption and the appropriation of ‘good wind’ by 
Europeans are not radically unexpected phenomena. When Wisapiye Susupiye visited Lake Campbell with 
Kirk Roberts he found that some people there were quite explicitly concerned that the carbon project ‘will 
lead to the emergence of new money. People were thinking it is something to do with 666 and One World 
Government. This is because they are uneducated’ (from notes of a conversation in English with Wisapiye 
Susupiye, 15 December 2009). This kind of thinking was also reflected in reports from people at Lake Campbell 
that while visiting there Kirk Roberts had clearly displayed a K1 million note.
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The proposed establishment of International Carbon Trade Network in Papua 
New Guinea and one of which is Kamula Doso FMA [Forest Management 
Agreement]. We believe the National Government may have endorsed the Carbon 
Trade Network internationally deliberately for two existing logging projects in 
Papua New Guinea without prior consent of customary landowners … What the 
government has done is absolutely erroneous and basically [a] deprivation of 
rights in management of our forests as rightful resource owners. … Our custom, 
tradition and legal rights must never be wrongfully motivated and manipulated 
by way of corruption and illegal engagement of foreign organization such as 
International Carbon Trade Network … (Kamula Doso Landowners, 19 January 
2009. Slightly corrected.)
The petitions, as signs of Rimbunan Hijau’s public concern, combined with the 
revelations of the ‘fake’ carbon credits, and indications (discussed below) of 
landowner conflicts over the control of the landowner company Tumu Timbers, 
added to the withdrawal of support from the OCC for Nupan’s project as a REDD 
demonstration scheme.
Nupan and Carbon Planet then started to place more emphasis on the Kamula 
Doso carbon scheme as linked to the voluntary market, rather than as part of 
any UN-sponsored transaction. But later, in August 2009, Dr Wari Iamo, acting 
director of the OCC, seemed to close down the voluntary market as a serious 
option:
Voluntary Carbon Agreements (VCA) are not currently supported by the 
Government as they fall outside formal REDD arrangements and are highly 
unlikely to deliver high carbon prices. PNG would be selling its forests cheaply 
by going down the VCA path. (The National 31 August 2009)12
Despite this setback, during 2009, the likelihood that Kamula Doso would be 
logged also diminished. Eco-Forestry Forum, in court over attempts dating back 
to 1999 by the PNG Forestry Board to treat the Kamula Doso logging concession 
as an extension of the neighbouring Wawoi Guavi concession owned by 
Rimbunan Hijau, secured a court injunction against the PNG Forest Authority 
from undertaking any activities related to Kamula Doso pending the outcome of 
the legal proceedings. In June 2009, Eco-Forestry Forum secured a further order 
from the National Court to specifically stop the OCC from taking any further 
12  However, Nupan’s capacity to claim some degree of government authorisation for trading credits on the 
voluntary market position improved within a month when Pius Ripason of the OCC wrote a letter to a strong 
supporter of Nupan. In this letter, dated 21 September 2009 and displayed on Nupan’s website, Ripason 
stated:
As for the voluntary market, we have no control over this venture because OCCES has no legislation 
or law to cover voluntary market on customary land. Consent to participate in [the] voluntary market 
on customarily land can be arranged or agreed upon between resource owners and developers which 
ever suits your ILG and the developer. It is the resource owners or ILGs who grant permission/
consent to the chairman of the ILG or some one of their nominee to act on their behalf to consult 
with a developer.
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steps to issue rights over the forests of Kamula Doso. The Department of Lands 
was also given an injunction. In April 2009 the Department of Lands gazetted 
a 99-year Special Agricultural and Business Lease on behalf of the landowner 
company Tumu Timbers, over all the land in the Kamula Doso concession area. 
The lease, organised by IT&S rather than Nupan, allows for virtually any activity 
on the land and could constitute a way of engaging in forestry by avoiding the 
requirements of the Forestry Act 1991. It makes the control of Tumu Timbers a 
very valuable resource for any developer interested in the Kamula Doso area.
Nupan’s Use of Media
Along with attempting to maintain its exclusive control of Tumu Timbers, 
Nupan also had to respond to mainstream media criticism of the fake carbon 
certificates and the project generally. During 2009 to 2010, Nupan placed 
large amounts of material on its website.13 Kirk Roberts, representing Nupan, 
intervened in internet discussions and made himself, and his supporters, 
available for numerous interviews. Officials from Carbon Planet were also active 
on the internet in responding to criticism of their involvement in PNG’s carbon 
credit schemes.14 Roberts used his website to demonstrate the existence of 
contracts and agreements between himself and his supporters. For each project 
he was promoting in PNG, landowner groups who supported his carbon projects 
received a variant of the following kind of letter:
Mr. Wisa Susupe, July, 2009
KAMULA DOSO FMA Block 1;2;&3 FMA
Welcome Sir!
It is our great pleasure to welcome you and acknowledge your fellow Vice 
Chairman and Directors of Tumu Timbers Development Limited …
We acknowledge receipt of your Board Minutes confirming our appointment, 
and assure you that we have, on your behalf, and with the help of the People of 
Kamula Doso, now completed all the Corporate, Legal, Government, and Social 
responsibilities required of us as your appointed Power of Attorney, and that we 
will at all times continue to act in your best interests.
… We confirm that the independent verification process to enable your Project to 
be formally recognized under the UNFCCC guidelines for REDD Carbon Credits 
is now well underway.
13  This website, www.carbonowontok.org, has since been removed from the internet.
14  Viewed at www.carbonplanet.com/REDD_addressing_the_issues; www.thepunch.com.au/articles/
medias-carbon-confusion-is-grist-for-the-lumber-mill/. These websites have been removed from the internet.
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The decision you have all made to preserve your beautiful forests from logging 
and other destructive activities is a brave one, and we salute your intention to 
maintain your Forests in the interests of providing Mother Earth with ‘A breath 
of fresh air’.
We salute you and thank you for your trust.
Yours sincerely,
‘Roberts’ 
Kirk William Roberts 
CEO / Chairman 
Nupan (PNG) Trading Corporation Limited.15
Along with posting on his website such written expressions of agreement, 
Roberts also posted video recordings of village-based rituals of welcome and 
talk (the latter usually by Roberts), but sometimes covering local expressions of 
support. In these videos local support was also presented through an emphasis 
on images of local ‘traditional’ ritual (which at Lake Campbell was paid for by 
Roberts). This emphasis on local culture deployed a style of representation 
similar to that used by Greenpeace (2004a, 2004b), which often portrays people 
from the Kamula Doso region in traditional dress, opposed to logging, whereas 
Roberts presents tradition as partly constituting an authentic agreement to the 
carbon project while also suggesting that the carbon scheme could conserve 
culture as well as rainforests. It seems that Roberts regarded these rituals of 
agreement, and their circulation into the global media via Nupan’s website, as 
more than epiphenomenal to the ‘real’ politics of carbon and considered them 
as equally crucial sites for the creation of carbon markets. Roberts’s more formal 
relations with state officials, landowners and companies were secured through 
texts vesting power of attorney in Roberts and in letters of support. However, 
while Greenpeace imagery rarely includes images of its activists, Roberts was 
presented in the Nupan videos as the key focus of the event, often becoming 
part of the tradition, while at the same time being sufficiently different to act 
as a powerful embodiment of local interest and support for the carbon project.
Video recording landowner agreement to carbon trading was sometimes 
explicitly defined in reference to a larger, often global, audience. According 
to Roberts, the landowners, especially if they agreed to carbon trading, would 
apparently become global celebrities. But the kind of effect often created in the 
video actually reduced that global significance to something more ephemeral, 
like ‘fame’. In a video, for a time placed on his website, Kirk Roberts is shown 
explaining to residents of Somokopa how such global fame was one benefit of 
his carbon credit scheme. He said:
15  www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/kmdso-july.pdf (viewed 8 May 2015).
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It’s very, very important that we do not let logging come in and kill all the forests 
and your beautiful land. We have been travelling around all the villages in the 
Western Province and in the Kamula Doso district. Just to let you know what 
we have been doing … Now we are getting very serious. Very close to finishing. 
Everybody in the world is very interested. These cameras are now recording 
this story and these meeting places to put on an international website for the 
whole world to see. All your faces will be in the world. In the world’s eyes. And 
everybody will know this village. And know your support in regards to carbon 
trading. And you will be famous (applause).16
But as this transcript suggests, some of the videos — especially those concerning 
Kamula Doso — mainly involve recording Roberts as the central figure in the 
story rather than the residents. What the Kamula Doso videos best record was 
Roberts himself talking and, at times, explaining his own ideas about global 
fame. His own centrality in the videos undercuts any easy understanding of 
landowner support.
The emphasis on Roberts may have derived from his video team adopting 
certain conventions and content evident in mainstream conservation media 
productions (Igoe 2010; Igoe et  al. 2010). According to Igoe and colleagues 
(2010: 493), these productions ‘portray celebrities, corporate leaders, and high 
profile conservationists as a heroic vanguard in the struggle to save the planet’. 
The idea that Roberts might be a heroic vanguard is made explicit in Evolution, 
a professional film made for Carbono Wontok and Nupan.17
Evolution is a composite of all the videos taken at the sites of Nupan’s various 
carbon projects. The voice-over presents Kirk Roberts as an ‘infamous’ hero in 
the struggle against logging:
Right now just one man and a whole community stands between the rapacious 
loggers and the rainforest. His name is Roberts and in recent times he has become 
infamous for the relatively innocent activity that the ignorant and ill informed 
mainstream media have taken great delight in blowing out of all proportion. But 
Roberts understands the power of the people to decide their own future. And 
for several years he has been trying to educate and inform landowners village by 
village of the potential to save their rainforest and helping to save the world.18
Whatever heroic attributes were attached to Roberts by this film, they were 
perhaps limited by the unique understanding of PNG conveyed to the audience 
in the introduction to the film:
This is the story of a mystical country you probably have never heard of. If you 
have heard of it chances are you do not know exactly where it is. It is the story 
16  vimeo.com/9149934 (viewed 20 January 2015).
17  The film was made by Lauren Horner and Morgan Smith with ‘concept’ by Jessica May Lyla.
18  vimeo.com/9617496 (viewed 20 January 2015).
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of a culture that started over 9000 years ago and throughout all that time it has 
managed to keep its identity and culture intact. Against all the odds in spite [of] 
modernization, commercialization and computerization, PNG has managed to 
maintain its traditional values — the family, the village, the clan … Even when 
they venture out to the relative civilization of their major cities they take their 
culture with them in the form of wontok. Wontok means one talk in pidgin.19
The influence of Nupan’s media productions was also limited by the fact that 
they did not really attract much of an audience. One internet site where the 
Nupan videos are stored indicated the number of viewings of some of those 
videos by late 2011 (Table 9.1).
The last three videos in Table 9.1 relate to the Kamula Doso area. The number of 
plays indicate that very few people watched these videos.20 So these attempts 
to use media failed to create much global celebrity status for Roberts, his 
supporters, or for Nupan. But direct uploading from the Nupan website is not 
the only way of viewing Roberts’ videos. In early December 2009 Al Jazeera’s 
program People & Power ran a story on ‘Carbon Cowboys’ in PNG. It contains 
many excerpts from videos made by Nupan and a copy on YouTube registered 
4,079 viewings.21 It seems unlikely that such numbers made Roberts or the 
landowners ‘globally’ famous.
Table 9.1 Number of viewings of selected Nupan media productions, 2011.
Name of video Date uploaded Number of plays URL
Evolution 21 Feb 2010 131 vimeo.com/9617496
ILG Signing Ceremony (Part 1) 2 Feb 2010 21 vimeo.com/9056479
ILG Signing Ceremony (Part 3) 31 Feb 2010 33 vimeo.com/9120963
ILG Signing Ceremony (Part 4) 1 Feb 2010 19 vimeo.com/9122721
ILG Signing Ceremony (Part 5) 2 Feb 2010 21 vimeo.com/9149934
Kirk Roberts — Somongapa 
Village — 8 October 2009
30 Oct 2009 12 vimeo.com/7343655
Lake Campbell Sing Sing — 8 
October 2009
8 Nov 2009 14 vimeo.com/7498955
Somongapa Sing Sing — 8 
October 2009
5 Nov 2009 16 vimeo.com/7464175
Source: YouTube.
Roberts also used print journalists to promote his case for the development 
of carbon sinks on the voluntary market. In October 2009 a journalist with 
PNG’s Post-Courier visited the Kamula Doso area with Roberts, a video crew, 
19  vimeo.com/9617496 (viewed 20 January 2015).
20  My own repeated viewings may be counted here.
21  Viewed at www.youtube.com/watch?v=LCzGIsKEw48&feature=player_embedded. The number of hits 
on the site was noted on 1 November 2011.
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and a scientist who was presented as an international verifier of carbon credits.22 
The journalist offered readers a vision of the landscape that might be equivalent 
to a print media wide shot. Typically taken from the air, the long shot involves 
stretches of nature ‘so vast and exotic that they cannot fail to suggest unlimited 
possibilities’ (Nugent cited in Igoe 2010: 382). But the journalist’s description 
suggests he was in the highlands rather than the lowlands of Western Province:
Over the next two days we visited three small tribal villages in the Kamula 
Doso Project area — Awaba, Lake Campbell, and Somogopa, only accessible by 
light aircraft, and then only on a good day weather wise. The mountains tower 
above five thousand meters in every direction and the clouds are often sitting 
just a few hundred metres above the ground, making for some interesting flying 
conditions!23
The mountains are actually 20 kilometres away from Lake Campbell and 
some 80 kilometres from Awaba. Following Tsing (2005:  68) on spectacular 
accumulation’s links to resource frontiers, we could say the journalist’s portrayal 
asked his readers to see a magical landscape that did not exist — or at least not 
in the way he implied.
The journalist went on to paint a vivid picture of landowner support for 
the Nupan project in the rather flat country surrounding the three places 
they visited. In the process he creates some enthusiastic, and extraordinarily 
numerous, ‘local people’:
The obvious question we all had was how much did the local people know about 
Carbon Trading, and we were constantly surprised by both the quality and 
depth of the answers, and the penetrating questions we were asked in turn.
What did we think about the village; why did the media attack PNG so much; 
and why is the Carbon Trading Project taking so much time.
… Lake Campbell was a beautiful location, this time a thousand people had 
walked in for the ceremony, and the welcome and positive reinforcement for 
Carbon Trading was evident.24
22  probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/More-bad-news-from-Papua-New-Guinea-
_-redd-monitor.pdf (viewed 8 May 2015).
23  probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/More-bad-news-from-Papua-New-Guinea-
_-redd-monitor.pdf (viewed 8 May 2015).
24  probeinternational.org/library/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/More-bad-news-from-Papua-New-Guinea-
_-redd-monitor.pdf (viewed 8 May 2015).
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Stories of Competing Kamula Links with 
Developers and More Media Excess
While Nupan was attempting to create these spectacular images of landowner 
support for the carbon project, its primary supporters — the executive of Tumu 
Timbers — fragmented. This fragmentation was due to opportunities provided 
by IT&S. While IT&S probably lacked the expertise and capital itself to undertake 
logging in PNG, it had since the mid-2000s an interest in the development of 
the Kamula Doso area. During this time, one aim of IT&S was to develop a road 
(the ‘Trans-Papuan Highway’) that would run from around Kiunga to just south 
of Nomad, and continue south towards Balimo and Kawito. The intention was to 
undertake logging in areas adjacent to the road. The logging was to be organised 
through Timber Authorities. By 2007, IT&S had formalised the interest of the 
executive of Tumu Timbers in such a project and the two companies agreed to 
create a joint venture company known as Pisa American Lumber Ltd.25
In 2008 Tumu Timbers started dealing with Nupan and in late October agreed 
to appoint Nupan as preferred developer of a carbon project in Kamula Doso. 
In the process of making this agreement, Tumu Timbers vested power of attorney 
in Kirk Roberts. However, IT&S quickly re-established working relationships 
with some board members of Tumu Timbers. In November 2008, the board of 
directors of Tumu Timbers revoked its agreement with Nupan, and in January 
2009 Tumu Timbers board members also rejected dealings with Carbon Planet.
But by March 2009 some of the Tumu Timber directors resumed their relationship 
with Nupan. By then, chairman Wisapiye Susupiye and other directors 
accompanied Kirk Roberts, James Kond and representatives from Carbon Planet 
on a trip to the Kamula Doso area to gain the endorsement of landowners. On the 
same day the team visited Awaba and then Wawoi Falls. According to my sources 
at both places, relevant incorporated land group chairmen were paid K500 to 
sign a document that apparently endorsed Nupan as the preferred developer 
of Kamula Doso as a carbon project. At Wawoi Falls a more public meeting was 
held and again most incorporated land group chairmen signed this document. 
However, at Wawoi Falls they came under sustained attack from supporters of 
Rimbunan Hijau who argued against choosing carbon as a development option. 
25  Pisa is the name of a mountain in Kamula territory. Its conjunction with ‘America’ suggests what many 
landowners would regard as a highly desirable alliance between powerful Europeans and the Kamula. While 
Tumu Timbers secured the lease–leaseback agreement over the project area (Kamula Doso) it was also obliged 
to lease to Pisa ‘the whole of the Project Area for the purpose of logging and taking of timber and associated 
purposes’ (joint venture agreement between Tumu Timber and IT&S, cited in Mirou 2013: 523).
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They argued that the proposed carbon trade had no legislation regulating its 
operation, and that middlemen such as Roberts, Kond and Susupiye would be 
the main beneficiaries.
Despite criticisms of carbon development from people at Wawoi Falls, and 
despite the fact that Susupiye never returned to Wawoi Falls, the documented 
support gained from his visit there, and to other villages, enabled him to hold 
a meeting of Tumu Timbers in Port Moresby that officially approved changing 
Tumu Timbers’ development strategy from its previous approval of the ‘FMA 
and Agriculture TA’ (when it supported IT&S) to a carbon credit project.26 
The  meeting also re-endorsed Kirk Roberts as the developer of the carbon 
project with Koo Management endorsed as PNG project coordinator for Nupan.
The significance of these continual shifts in who apparently had control of Tumu 
Timbers increased dramatically once people became aware of a notice published 
in the National Gazette at the end of April 2009. This notice advised that Tumu 
Timbers had been granted a 99-year Special Agricultural and Business Lease 
over the 790,800 hectares making up the Kamula Doso timber concession.27 
Perhaps reflecting the new importance of controlling the lease owned by 
Tumu Timbers, on 6 June 2009 Abiliye Wape, who was a supporter of IT&S, 
was voted out of his role as acting chairman of Tumu Timbers. He and some 
of his supporters were charged by Nupan supporters with the ‘misconduct’ of 
maintaining contact with IT&S.
Further highlighting the importance of controlling Tumu Timbers and its special 
lease, on 18 June 2009 Wape and his supporters held their own meeting of Tumu 
Timbers at which they removed Susupiye and his vice chairman from the board. 
These changes, which made Wape chairman, were lodged with PNG’s registrar 
of companies, the Investment Promotion Authority, and then, so the story goes, 
the file was ‘restricted’ to prevent the Nupan supporters from gaining access 
to knowledge about their loss of control of Tumu Timbers. In addition, the 
supporters of IT&S gained a court order preventing prior chairman Susupiye 
from representing Tumu Timbers. The Nupan-supporting version of Tumu 
Timbers responded to Wape’s court injunction by asking the police fraud squad 
to investigate the possibility of charging Wape with fraud over the legality of 
his Tumu Timbers meeting. They also referred the IT&S lawyer to the PNG Law 
Society for misconduct as he had apparently been instrumental in calling the 
meeting of the Tumu Timbers Board that had reinstated Wape as chairman. And 
they apparently secured the support of the Investment Promotion Authority, 
26  Tumu Timbers Minutes of Special Meeting, held at Holiday Inn, Port Moresby, 6 June 2009. Copy in 
author’s possession.
27  This was one of many such leases that have been granted since the Somare government came to power in 
2002, and that now cover more than 5 million hectares of land (Filer 2011), but the lease to Tumu Timbers was 
and still remains one of the largest.
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which joined Susupiye as a co-defendant in the court hearings concerning 
Wape’s injunction against Susupiye. Apparently they did this because Wape 
had misrepresented to them the nature of the meeting that had reinstated him as 
chairman of Tumu Timbers. In June 2009 two boards of Tumu Timbers existed 
— one supporting IT&S and the other supporting Nupan. The disputing boards 
of Tumu Timbers then entered into court proceedings against each other.
As part of this ongoing dispute, in December 2009 Wape appeared on SBS 
television claiming to have been coerced by police into signing documents 
beneficial to Nupan. The story generated significant interest and Wape became 
an ‘Indigenous leader’ of the ‘Kamula Doso Peoples’ (Lang 2010). Wape’s story, 
in one case headlined as ‘Kidnapping Carbon Rights’, also became a story of 
carbon trading’s links with human rights violations. OneWorld UK carried the 
following headlines:
Carbon trading ‘a crime against humanity’
Carbon Markets Violate Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Threaten Cultural 
Survival
Indigenous Leader Kidnapped and Forced at Gunpoint to Surrender Carbon 
Rights for REDD in Papua New Guinea. (Lang 2010)
But around the time the story of Wape’s coerced consent first appeared on 
SBS, Nupan’s position strengthened. This culminated in December 2009 when 
mediation sessions between representatives from IT&S, Nupan, the Investment 
Promotion Authority, and Susupiye and Wape were held. During these sessions 
I was told by Nupan supporters that Wape made it known he would be prepared 
to withdraw his legal case if he was paid K6 million from Carbon Planet and 
Nupan. Around this time Nupan supporters also understood that Nupan would 
have access to ‘A$20 million’ as ‘mobilisation funds’ for the cost associated with 
the establishment of the Kamula Doso project. Wape’s request was not agreed 
to in the discussions, but the supporters of IT&S apparently withdrew the 
court action against Susupiye and the other Nupan-supporting board members. 
According to the Nupan supporters, Wape was paid K4,000 as a gesture of 
compensation and compassion.
In July 2010 Wape, by now far more supportive of Nupan’s carbon project, 
denied that he was ‘taken at gun point’ to support Nupan’s carbon trade project 
in the previous year. Instead, Wape said he was bribed to make this claim on the 
SBS television program:
Mr Wape was forced to issue the denial after the United Nations Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) brought up the matter about the SBS television 
program when the Kamulo Doso project was undergoing verification under the 
voluntary carbon standards [VCS] and climate, community and biodiversity 
alliance [CCBA]. ‘What happened,’ he said, ‘is that I requested a police escort 
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to the car, because of unrest in the village caused by loggers. I have already 
apologised to my village and to the board of Tumu Timbers some months ago, and 
for the UNFCCC to bring this up again at this time, in an attempt to create unrest, 
is both mischievous and irresponsible,’ Mr Wape said. He said as a director 
of Tumu Timbers, he was working towards finishing the first carbon trading 
scheme in PNG to be dual verified under the VCS/CCBA protocols. Managing 
director of Tumu Timbers … confirmed the statement by Mr Wape. (Post-Courier, 
8 July 2010)28
End Game and New Theft of Land?
Unfortunately for Nupan the verification process elicited a highly critical 
response from OCC director Wari Iamo and from the lawyers he commissioned 
to provide a legal opinion on Nupan’s property rights in carbon. Equally critical 
were a vast array of letters from land groups in the Kamula Doso region.29 But in 
September 2010 Nupan did succeed in mobilising public expressions of support 
from some sections of the PNG government. On 22 September Mr Singin, a legal 
adviser to the prime minister, indicated a degree of support for Nupan30 and the 
next day the then acting prime minister, and deputy prime minister, Don Polye, 
minister for works and transport, wrote a letter endorsing Nupan:
… in their endeavours to create and verify the first four (4) commercial voluntary 
carbon trading projects in PNG — namely Kamula Doso, East Pangia and Aitape-
Lumi … and Passismanua Inland forest concession areas … it is our view that 
the landowners have the inalienable right under customary, commercial and 
parliamentary laws to manage and do carbon trading project(s) that they may 
develop from their forest concession areas. Any government direction that relates 
to the people’s forests is suborned by the rights of the people through ILGs to 
decide that future.31
28  These easy shifts in Wape’s position left some observers surprised and somewhat injured. Brian Thomson, 
the journalist who had run the initial story of Wape’s coerced support on SBS News, tried to maintain the truth 
of his initial story: ‘The landowner concerned, Abilie Wape, came to my hotel willingly, knowing that I was 
investigating claims that landowners were being put under pressure to hand over the rights to the carbon in 
their forests. Abilie made the claims without co-ercion, encouragement or payment. It is quite clear to me that 
Abilie has since been put under pressure by someone to change his story. … I do not, and never have I, offered 
payment to anyone. The story published in the Post Courier is utterly false.’ (Viewed at www.redd-monitor.
org/2010/09/14/redd-projects-in-papua-new-guinea-legally-untenable/#response).
29  One response was by a man from Lake Murray who had been active in opposing Doso claims of ownership 
of the land around the gas field located in the Kamula Doso concession. The other letters all have exactly the 
same content and may have been organised by Rimbunan Hijau. Viewed at climate-standards.org.
30  Originally viewed at www.carbonowontok.org/, but this site has been disbanded. I have not been able 
to find another source for this material.
31  Originally viewed at www.carbonowontok.org/, but this site has been disbanded.
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Despite the ambiguous reference to the people controlling incorporated land 
groups corrupting government,32 Rimbunan Hijau apparently felt it needed 
to respond to what may have been a shift in the government’s position. 
Its  newspaper — The National — mobilised Kamula landowners supporting 
Rimbunan Hijau to report:
Landowners in the Kamula Doso region have reacted angrily to comments 
made by Deputy Prime Minister Don Polye in support of proposed voluntary 
carbon scheme (VCS) deals. Paul Sasae, chairman of landowner company Wawoi 
Temu Holdings Ltd and chairman of the Dawasi ILG, had publicly criticised 
the proposed carbon deals, saying that PNG’s ‘carbon cowboys’ have acted 
fraudulently … ‘The carbon project asks us to halt all forestry and agriculture 
for the next 40 years’ … ‘With no way to grow or buy food, what are we 
supposed to eat?’ Sasae said that his community’s situation had become more 
desperate since the cancellation of the Kamula Doso FMA. According to him, 
the cancellation was driven by a group of Western activists — not the wishes of 
local communities … According to Sasae … the cancellation of the FMA would 
effectively mean the loss of a potential 1,600 jobs, local annual royalty payments 
of K8 million and investment worth more than K100 million, as well as improved 
local infrastructure.33
While such a response would not have been unexpected nor particularly 
troubling to Nupan supporters, far more worrying was that by around this 
time it appeared that Kirk Roberts was no longer in PNG and had effectively 
disappeared. Some stories suggested Roberts had acquired funds or commissions 
— possibly worth US$20 million — that had been deposited into a Hong Kong 
bank account. By late 2010 Tumu Timbers supporters were looking for other 
investors such as the Macquarie Bank (2008) and a New Zealand company linked 
to the husband of Maria Henderson whose mother, from Makapa village, has 
interests in land within the Kamula Doso area. In February 2011 Tumu Timbers 
terminated its relationship with Nupan:
Tumu Timbers Development Limited, a landowner company, terminated the deal 
after a board meeting found that carbon trade had no legal framework for trade. 
Chairman Wisa Susupie said they wanted to lease their land out for agro-forestry 
projects and sustainable logging after learning that carbon trade would never 
eventuate and that they were misinformed by Kirk William Roberts of Nupan 
(PNG) Trading Corporation Ltd. … Mr Susupie said they had no idea what 
carbon trade was like or if there was a legal framework in place to trade carbon 
in the world. (Post-Courier, 7 February 2011)
32  Polye’s statement uses the term ‘suborn’ — to induce a person to commit an unlawful or evil act; to 
commit perjury or procure testimony — in the place of ‘subordinated to’ or ‘derived from’.
33  www.pina.com.fj/print.php?print=news&o=8038583704cb515add66aaac231599 (viewed 8 May 2015).
9. Representational Excess in Recent Attempts to Acquire Forest Carbon in the Kamula Doso Area
231
The vacuum left by the end of Nupan’s carbon scheme was quickly filled by 
IT&S, whose lawyer visited Wawoi Falls in January 2011. Apparently the lawyer 
indicated the IT&S project would result in a fully sealed road from Kiunga to 
Wawoi Falls and from Wawoi Falls to Balimo. A consensus emerged from the 
meeting at Wawoi Falls to support this proposal while also allowing Rimbunan 
Hijau to log the remainder of Kamula Doso. This compromise was made because 
people understood Rimbunan Hijau would never build any permanent roads. 
The meeting also agreed to the IT&S lawyer’s call for a new board to be established 
for Tumu Timbers and suggested a strong supporter of Rimbunan Hijau should 
become the chairman. Another option apparently being explored by the PNG 
Forest Authority was for the landowner companies supporting Rimbunan 
Hijau and Tumu Timbers to combine and establish an interim board of a new 
‘mother’ landowner company that would have representatives from all existing 
landowner companies operating in the Kamula Doso area. This company, with 
advice from the PNG Forest Authority, may pursue the possibility of selectively 
logging parts of Kamula Doso while also using less viable areas as potential 
carbon credit schemes.
As these developments were being discussed, IT&S recruited some new 
Kamula supporters and in May 2011 organised for them to attend a ‘signing 
ceremony’ for the ‘Trans-Island Highway (stage two) road project agreement’ 
(The National, 24 May 2011). The governor-general of PNG, the minister for 
commerce and industry, and the deputy governor of Western Province also 
attended. The project involved linking Western Province via the Trans-Island 
Highway to the Hiritano Highway in Gulf Province that runs to Port Moresby. 
It was expected that logging would take place in the ‘first stage’ of constructing 
the Trans-Island Highway and it is possible that no second stage will eventuate. 
But given the recent recommendation by the commission of inquiry into 
Special Agricultural and Business Leases (Mirou 2013: 526, 385–531) that the 
special leases covering the Kamula Doso area be revoked, then assuming the 
PNG government enacts these findings, the whole project, like Nupan’s carbon 
credits from the OCC, may turn out to be largely illusory.
Conclusions
This chapter has looked at some of the factors that influenced the way Nupan 
Pty Ltd tried to assert persuasive property rights in carbon. Despite all the 
contingencies and conflicts that marked this project, it was part of a broader 
historical process that has increasingly linked the environment to financial 
devices and investments in ecological services and values (Igoe  2010:  3; 
Igoe  et  al. 2010:  496). Such ‘market-based’ conservation lays claims to 
ownership of emergent, partially defined, yet often apparently ‘intrinsic’, 
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values of the environment (such as carbon), while also ‘conserving’ these 
somewhat hypothetical ‘polymorphic’ values (Lowrey 2008: 70). Such projects 
seek to augment these values through various additional mediations, such as 
derivatives trading (that in the Kamula Doso could have been undertaken by the 
Macquarie Bank), and transform them into ‘capital of a more convertible and 
globally ramifying kind’ (Garland 2008: 62).
In different ways Rose (1994), Tsing (2005) and Igoe (2010) have argued that 
‘spectacle’, narrative and drama are crucial to these transformations of natural 
resources into forms of private property, capital accumulation and value 
creation. For Tsing (2005: 57), drama is an essential prerequisite of certain forms 
of accumulation, and Igoe (2010) argues spectacle mediates many forms of legal 
conservation. But given the absence of legal authorisation of any carbon markets 
in PNG, Nupan’s largely media-mediated project involved a speculative legality 
and largely fictitious property claims. Nupan was heavily reliant on an array 
of representational techniques — such as letters of support from government, 
stories in the print media, and the use of websites and videos to create 
convincing images of its control of carbon. Nupan also had powerful narratives 
of deforestation and global warming that, apparently, could only be ameliorated 
by developing markets for environmental services such as carbon sinks.
But as we have seen, Nupan was not particularly adept at the representational 
politics of project development and associated property claims. It was unable 
to control the interpretation of events associated with its project’s limited 
authorisation by sections of the state and landowners. The mainstream media — 
the primary source of critical material about Nupan’s project — transformed the 
project into a corruption narrative and undermined Nupan’s viability. But this 
critical coverage had its own limitations. It typically abstracted carbon from the 
region’s recent history of development and, as a result, minimised the influence 
of other developers competing for control over the Kamula Doso. The Kamula 
and other residents of the project area emerged mainly as ciphers for reified 
categories of understanding — they were ‘indigenous’, embedded in ‘custom’ 
and ‘victims’ of Nupan’s scam. The coverage often failed to acknowledge how 
Kamula actively supported various investors in the often exuberantly illegal, 
sometimes dangerous, wealth-creating politics of development in the Kamula 
Doso area. Also ignored by the global media were indications of how the Kamula 
made sense of Nupan’s carbon project by transforming elements of globally 
circulating carbon trading and climate change discourses into new definitions 
of their property interests in carbon (Filer and Wood 2012; Wood 2013).
Irrespective of the importance of these more distinctly Kamula understandings 
of the carbon economy, the Kamula’s development options are still dependent 
on what the government and companies such as Rimbunan Hijau and IT&S 
decide to do. However, as this chapter has stressed, there is no inevitability to 
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the realisation of any proposal concerning the future development of Kamula 
Doso’s forests. But moves to create forms of wealth from within Kamula Doso, 
and privatise, or in Kamula terms, ‘steal’, such assets, will no doubt continue.
In 2014 VISTA Trading Ltd announced on the internet the existence of the 
Kamula Doso Virgin Rainforest Project. Surrounded by beautiful images of forest 
from more temperate regions than those found in the Kamula Doso area, the 
site presents Kamula Doso Block 1 as the ‘Paradise Forest’ of PNG, as ‘pristine’ 
rainforest, covering an area of 268,400 hectares that could be a REDD scheme. 
What might happen to Blocks 2 and 3 of Kamula Doso is not indicated. But we are 
assured ‘supporting the Kamula Doso project helps conserve native rainforests 
and protects biodiversity on a massive scale as well as local communities’. 
VISTA no longer exists on the internet. This may reflect the increasingly limited 
life span of PNG-based carbon credit projects constituted largely as media 
spectacles. But despite such passing visions of the timber in the Kamula Doso 
concession, this timber, now perhaps freer from media distortions, is still not 
definable as a sustainable resource.
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10. ‘Evergreen’ and REDD+ 
in the Forests of Oceania
JENNIFER GABRIEL
Forests, Conversions and Climate Change
Any global agreement on climate change will impact on how we manage our 
forestry operations. If we are to sustain our industry into the future, we must 
stay alert and aware of these developments. Most importantly, we must respond 
by making our case to Governments and business partners around the world. 
If we don’t, the future of our industry will be in peril. (Tiong Hiew King 2008)
Throughout most of industrialised history, forests have been worth more felled 
than standing. Countries in the developed world, including Australia, New 
Zealand, United States, Canada and Europe have clear-felled around half of 
the world’s primary forests to plant agricultural crops, create urban centres, 
extract wood for construction or burn timber as fuel. In response to the 
international demand for timber and timber products, most deforestation in 
the twentieth century has occurred in developing countries, which collectively 
harbour around half of the world’s remaining natural forest. In the twenty-
first century, predictions of global warming have led to a new way of seeing 
forests as repositories of carbon. In the climate change ‘crisis’, the maintenance 
of existing forests as well as increasing forest coverage is touted to make an 
important contribution to the mitigation of global warming, but this potential 
is yet to be realised (Nabuurs et al. 2007; Capoor and Ambrosi 2008). From a 
governance perspective, the international climate regime is playing a dominant 
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role in influencing environmental and developmental policy internationally 
(Maguire 2010: 5) and is opening up spaces for critical change in ‘sustainable 
forest management’ (SFM).
To illuminate how this focus has generated new possibilities for change in 
Oceania’s forestry industry, I first situate the idea of climate change within 
the immense institutional, managerial and surveillance apparatus focused on 
the regulation of atmospheric emissions. I then show how the ‘triple-interface’ 
(Boykoff 2010: 397) of science, policy and media is being utilised by governments, 
industry and corporate interests to leverage support for developmental 
objectives. Finally, I outline Rimbunan Hijau’s responses to climate capitalism 
and highlight local strategies of resistance that open the company to external 
scrutiny.
The Idea of Climate Change
The ecological problem of industrialisation is not new, and its negative effects 
on nature have been debated for the past 150 years. Icons of the ecological 
dilemmas facing the world have ranged from deforestation in European 
countries in the nineteenth century, wilderness conservation at the beginning 
of the twentieth century and resource depletion in the 1970s (Hajer 1996: 247). 
Anxieties about artificially induced climate change and species extinction date 
back to the mid-1700s, thus the current awareness of a global environmental 
threat is largely a reiteration of a set of ideas that had reached full maturity 
over a century ago (Grove 1990: 14). What is new in the twenty-first century is 
the positioning of global warming as ‘the greatest known challenge facing the 
world’ (Hunt 2009: 1). As repositories of carbon, forests are seen as timely assets 
(Ferry and Limbert 2008) that can save the world from ‘ecological apocalypse’ 
(Ecological Internet 2011).
Climate change is an idea that has served many purposes and continues to do 
so (Hulme 2009). The idea of scientific mastery over climate for the global good 
first appeared in the closing paragraph of Ellsworth Huntington’s 1915 book 
Civilisation and Climate. In reflecting the scientific ideals of the Enlightenment, 
Huntington wrote, ‘If we can conquer climate, the whole world will become 
stronger and nobler’ (Hulme 2009:  21). Two decades earlier, the first official 
explanation of how carbon dioxide can act as a greenhouse gas was provided in 
1896 by the Swedish scientist Svante Arrhenius (Houghton 2004: 17). It wasn’t 
until the mid-twentieth century that the first monitoring of increasing levels of 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere began, followed by a series of studies carried 
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out by the United States Department of Energy in the 1970s raising concerns 
about possible global warming (Lohmann 2006: 35). This marked the beginning 
of the discursive construction of global climate change.
In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 45/53 
on the ‘Protection of global climate for present and future generations of 
mankind’ (Lutken and Michaelowa 2008: 1), which led to the formation of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) — the largest international 
scientific assessment of climate change. Although the IPCC signalled that 
the ‘science is settled’ on global warming (IPCC 2007), its critics regard the 
science advice of the IPCC as ‘politically cast’ and thereby fundamentally 
flawed (Carter 2010: 26). The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) formalised the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which expired in 2012. 
The protocol’s core aim was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere 
in order to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate 
system’ (UNFCCC 2008: 3). As a regulatory mechanism, the Kyoto Protocol not 
only created the justification for the commodification of the atmosphere, but 
also inspired new forms of activism and sites of scientific, economic, social and 
political conflict.
‘Air Money’, REDD and REDD+
The Melanesian term ‘air money’ or ‘sky money’ has come to symbolise the 
mystique of capturing carbon dioxide (Wood 2011). Mystique is also attributed 
to the ways in which anthropogenic contributions to climate change have been 
calculated (Kellow 2007: 47), with computer models predicting future climate 
scenarios according to the assumptions programmed into them (Carter 2010: 21). 
These predictions have generated detailed economic forecasting and policy 
creation around the role of forests in reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation (REDD).
REDD first emerged in the UNFCCC negotiations over accounting rules for 
the impact on carbon sinks of changes in land use, particularly afforestation, 
reforestation, deforestation and forest management (Articles 3.3 and 3.4 of the 
Kyoto Protocol). In the Kyoto Protocol, a decision was made to exclude carbon 
emissions from tropical deforestation. Countries met their Kyoto targets primarily 
through national measures, but were also offered an additional means of meeting 
targets by way of three market-based ‘emissions trading’ schemes known as the 
carbon market, clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation.
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The mechanism known as joint implementation enabled Annex B parties1 with 
an emission-reduction or limitation commitment to earn emission-reduction 
units from an emission-reduction or emission-removal project in another Annex 
B party, each unit equivalent to one tonne of carbon dioxide (UNFCCC 2010).2 
Credits from avoided deforestation were excluded due to the challenges and 
uncertainties of quantifying forest-sector emissions (‘leakage’), which could 
potentially weaken the overall strength of the climate regime. Moreover, 
developing countries were concerned that a plan to reduce deforestation 
would threaten their sovereignty over land-use decisions and right to develop. 
An eligibility criterion was ‘additionality’, which required that reductions in 
emissions must be additional to any that would occur in the absence of the 
certified project activity (Kyoto Protocol, Article 12[5]).
The CDM allows industrialised countries to earn carbon credits from reforestation 
and afforestation projects in developing countries. The idea encapsulated in the 
CDM is that carbon markets will provide an efficient system for reducing global 
emissions and drive investment towards the cheapest reductions. By 2008, this 
mechanism had not greatly favoured forestry projects. Only one afforestation 
project had been approved out of the 1016 CDM projects, but approximately 
100 more were in preparation (UNFCCC 2008). By 2010 there were 5,600 
projects in the CDM pipeline, of which 2801 were registered and 56 others 
awaiting registration (UNFCCC 2011). Of these, only 14 were afforestation and 
reforestation projects, and another 2 were seeking registration. Only one CDM 
project combined carbon emissions credits with reforestation (ibid.).3 By 2013 
there were 6,838 CDM projects registered, with only 7 described as afforestation/
reforestation projects.4 By 2015 just 2 of the 7,644 registered projects were 
listed as afforestation/reforestation projects.5 ‘Free-trade’ advocates believe that 
the responsibility for the effective failure of CDM in facilitating afforestation 
and reforestation projects lies primarily with the rules for ‘additionality’, 
which diminish financial incentives for undertaking CDM projects (World 
Growth 2010).
1  Annex B countries include the main European Union member states, Australia, Japan, Russia and the 
United States. Thirty-nine industrialised countries are listed in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
2  As of 2010, there were 197 active joint implementation projects (UNFCCC 2010).
3  Bolivia (Project 2510).
4  India (Project 2345), China (Project 2700), Chile (Project 3338), Uruguay (Project 3845), Brazil (Project 
3887), Congo (Project 4176), Uganda (Project 4653).
5  Brazil (Project 3887) and China (Project 9563); cdm.unfccc.int/index.html (viewed June 2015).
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Forests only became pivotal to reducing global emissions in December 2005 
when, at the United Nations Conference of the Parties in Montreal, the Coalition 
for Rainforest Nations,6 led by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica, proposed 
the inclusion of carbon finance for reducing national rates of deforestation. 
The initial proposal was limited to reducing carbon emissions from deforestation 
(RED) but was expanded at Bali, in December 2006, to include forest degradation 
(REDD) (Karousakis and Corfee-Morlot 2007; IUCN 2008; Miles and Kapos 2008). 
Representing the members of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations, Kevin Conrad, 
who was lauded as a ‘hero of the environment’ (Stiglitz 2008) and a ‘champion 
of the earth’,7 tabled the idea of paying for the conservation of forests. Conrad 
issued a bold challenge to the United States: ‘If, for some reason, you’re not 
willing to lead, leave it to the rest of us, and please get out of the way’ (Stiglitz 
2008). A year earlier in January 2005, Conrad persuaded Michael Somare, then 
prime minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), to call for the establishment of a 
coalition for rainforest nations, which he did in a speech to the World Leaders 
Forum at Columbia University (Filer 2011b).
In principle, REDD enables developing countries to receive financial payments 
from developed countries for reducing national deforestation rates below 
a baseline level prior to 1992. With little objection from the international 
community, REDD became the financial mechanism adopted at Bali to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. 
The inclusion of REDD in a post-Kyoto framework was widely accepted by the 
international political community because it provided a way for developed 
countries to offset carbon emissions and enabled developing countries with 
large forestry resources, such as PNG, to receive payments for conservation.
Following the widespread acceptance of the principles of REDD as a carbon 
mitigation measure at Bali, the response of developing countries, including 
Africa and Malaysia, shifted towards a defensive attitude for their forestry 
industries. Africa demanded that REDD encompass clear recognition of the role 
of commercial forestry in development and conservation (World Growth 2009), 
while Malaysia’s submission on REDD argued for a critical distinction to be 
made between ‘deforestation’ and SFM:
Malaysia … feels that the definition of deforestation needs to be broad enough 
to cover the various levels and patterns of forest degradation. This is important 
6  The Coalition for Rainforest Nations includes Bangladesh, Belize, Bolivia, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Republic 
of the Congo, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Suriname, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay, Vanuatu and 
Vietnam (Wainwright et al. 2008).
7  www.unep.org/champions/laureates/2009/conrad.asp#sthash.YR9Jt1WC.dpbs (viewed June 2015).
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as any level of degradation exists on the continuum between completely sound, 
protected forests and complete deforestation. As such, a pattern of continued 
forest degradation will contribute significantly to a net increase in emissions, 
eventually culminating in complete deforestation and should therefore be 
differentiated from sustainable forest management. (MNRE 2007)
This emphasis on graduated deforestation seems to imply that anything less 
than complete deforestation may constitute SFM; however, the International 
Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) principles for sustainable tropical forest 
management include the wider political, social and economic criteria without 
which sustainability is probably unattainable. Lobbying for SFM as a mode of 
carbon management was pursued by global neoliberal institutions such as the 
ITTO, which issued a statement at Bali outlining its commitment to advancing 
as quickly as possible the full implementation of SFM in the tropics ‘including 
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, carbon 
sequestration through restoration, thus contributing to addressing the issue of 
climate change’.8 As a result of industry lobbying and political pressure from 
developing countries such as Malaysia, paragraph 1(b)(iii) of the Bali Action 
Plan included the provision for the ‘sustainable management of forests and the 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks’ (UNFCCC 2007) — this is the moment 
when REDD+ emerged. The critical text for the ‘plus’ in the Bali Action Plan, 
which attempted to bridge the long-standing tensions between conservation 
and development goals, appears after the semicolon:
Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks in developing countries (UNFCCC 2007).
The inclusion of forest conservation in an international voluntary agreement 
to address the impacts of global warming was driven by estimates from British 
economist Lord Stern, who attributed more than 18 per cent of global carbon 
emissions to deforestation (Stern 2006: xxv). According to free-trade lobbyist 
Alan Oxley of World Growth, independent research by United States-based 
consultants Winrock International (commissioned by the World Bank) estimated 
that deforestation accounts for only 6–8 per cent of global emissions (World 
Growth 2009). Broadening the definition of ‘forests’ to include plantation 
forests, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nation’s State of 
the World’s Forests 2011 (FAO 2011: 3) claimed that globally, the overall rate 
of deforestation is slowing,9 partly due to a transition from deforestation to 
8  Statement by Emmanuel Ze Meka, Executive Director of the ITTO at the High-Level Segment of the 
Thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC – Cop 13/CMP 3, Bali, Indonesia, 3–14 December.
9  The FAO found that global deforestation and loss of forests from natural causes (‘while still alarmingly 
high’) has ‘decreased from an estimated 16 million hectares per year in the 1990s to around 13 million hectares 
per year in the last decade’ (FAO 2011: 3).
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afforestation in the Asia–Pacific region, where plantation forest area increased 
by 2.85 per cent annually over the past decade (ibid.:  9).10 According to the 
FAO this was accompanied by an increase of around 1.92 per cent (from 2000 
to 2010) in the global area of forest designated primarily for the conservation of 
biological diversity (ibid.: 10).11
Climate Capitalism and Industry Lobbying: 
From Bali to Copenhagen and Beyond
As the Conference of Parties travelled from Bali (2007) to Copenhagen (2009), 
the UNFCCC attempted to garner consensus for the replacement to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Negotiators drafted and redrafted the policy text for REDD, 
determined to produce a coherent vision for the international community 
and generate a set of norms and practices that would govern national carbon 
emissions. However, these forums also afforded opportunity for free-trade 
advocates and industry lobby groups to present arguments in support of the 
role of industrial forestry and plantation development to be included in global 
warming solutions. Powerful industry organisations leveraged on the FAO 
definition of ‘forests’, arguing that industrial plantations should qualify as 
forest conservation projects as long as they do not contribute to a net increase 
in national carbon emissions. Consensus-building for industrial plantations was 
a strategy of the global timber industry. Among the prominent and influential 
advocates for the industrial forestry sector was Alan Oxley, managing director 
of international trade consultants ITS Global, an Australian public relations 
company. ITS Global has been commissioned by Rimbunan Hijau since 2006 
to counter the ongoing campaign by Greenpeace (2004, 2006) and other non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) against industrial logging in PNG. Oxley is 
a former diplomat who held a position on Australia’s Foreign Affairs Council as 
Australia’s envoy to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the predecessor 
to the World Trade Organization in the late 1980s.12 Oxley describes himself as 
‘one of the world’s leading experts on globalization and international trade’ 
and is the founding chairman of ‘World Growth’, a free-market NGO based 
10  ‘This was primarily due to large-scale afforestation efforts in China, where the forest area increased by 
2 million hectares per year in the 1990s and by an average of 3 million hectares per year since 2000. Bhutan, 
India, the Philippines and Viet Nam also registered forest area increases in the last decade’ (FAO 2011: 9).
11  The FAO claims that the area of forest designated primarily for conservation of biological diversity in 
Asia and the Pacific increased by 1.8 per cent from 2000 to 2010 (FAO 2011: 10, Table 9).
12  Alan Oxley is currently chairman of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Study Centre at the 
Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University, Australia.
Tropical Forests of Oceania
244
in Washington DC, producing targeted industry research, particularly in areas 
such as Malaysia and PNG, with a direct bearing on international trade issues 
linked to oil palm and timber production.
World Growth uses high-impact international business media to disseminate 
pro-industry ‘solutions’ to leaders of developed and developing countries, and 
draws upon moral arguments about progress and growth to justify its lobbying:
World Growth believes that helping the developing world realize its full potential 
is one of the great moral aims for those of us fortunate to live in the wealthy 
developed world (www.worldgrowth.org).
Oxley’s use of multimedia to mobilise contested scientific claims in support of 
plantation forestry and the need for adaptation through further deforestation 
(‘alternative land use’) relies largely on the language of uncertainty and risk 
management. During the international climate negotiations, his outspoken views 
on pro-development solutions to global warming reached international business 
audiences and government leaders via Bloomberg, CNN, CNBC, The Wall Street 
Journal, International Herald Tribune, SBS World News Australia, Jakarta Post, 
Business Times and The New York Times, as well as high-impact trade journals. 
The intense international media campaign mounted by World Growth attempted 
to undermine the fundamental principles of REDD as a conservation strategy 
and questioned the ethics and motives of some of the largest environmental 
lobby groups including Greenpeace International and WWF (World Wide Fund 
for Nature). Although World Growth’s campaign against the green movement 
relentlessly targeted the agendas of international environmental organisations,13 
Oxley’s critique of institutions that limited growth in developing countries also 
extended to the World Bank (World Growth 2011b) and the United Nations:
We are frequently opposed by other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
who are ideologically unreceptive to free enterprise and skeptical of the merits 
of economic growth. Along with NGOs we face challenges at major multilateral 
institutions such as the United Nations which too often promote one-size-fits-all 
policy responses to problems. (Chairman’s Message, worldgrowth.org)
In October 2010, Oxley’s pro-development stance drew strong criticism from 
eminent members of the scientific community. In ‘An Open Letter about 
Scientific Credibility and the Conservation of Tropical Forests’, Laurance et al. 
(2010) alleged that ITS Global and World Growth ‘have at times treaded a thin 
line between reality and a significant distortion of facts’ (ibid.: 1). Particular 
criticism was directed at Oxley’s lobbying support for Rimbunan Hijau, 
which was described as a ‘predatory corporation’ (ibid.). Oxley attacked the 
article’s credibility, claiming it ‘simply re-counts — almost source for source 
13  See worldgrowth.org/category/research/ (viewed June 2015).
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— Greenpeace’s failed campaign to shut down the PNG forest industry from 
last decade’ (ITS Global 2011a). Oxley staunchly defended the PNG forestry 
industry and his client, Rimbunan Hijau:
Laurence et al. throw a litany of accusations against PNG’s forest industry — 
specifically one company, Rimbunan Hijau — and align it with the country’s 
myriad social and environmental problems: corruption, violence, poor 
development indicators, deforestation and weak governance. The implication 
is that without the forest industry in Papua New Guinea, the country would 
somehow magically be free of corruption, deforestation and other ills. Anyone 
who has set foot in Papua New Guinea would be acutely aware of the absurdity 
of this. (ITS Global 2011a)
Around this time, PNG was emerging from a ‘carbon cowboy’ fiasco (see Wood, 
Chapter 9, this volume), which had caused a media sensation two years earlier and 
brought the PNG government into disrepute at the much anticipated Copenhagen 
Climate Talks. Leading up to the UNFCCC conference at Copenhagen (COP15), 
touted as a crucial event in the negotiating process, dichotomising discourses 
of ‘conservation’ and ‘sustainable development’ had generated serious conflicts 
between countries of the North and the South. By the time world leaders met 
in Denmark in 2009, scientific uncertainty and conflicting value claims had 
created irreconcilable differences in the positions adopted by developed and 
developing countries. The bitterness and scepticism that bedevilled the talks 
became exasperated by a leaked draft agreement from the European Union, 
which called for a total halt to deforestation by 2030. This evoked further 
anger from the tropical countries at the North’s failure to commit to dramatic 
emissions reductions. The subsequent result in the Copenhagen Accord was 
the removal of all targets for deforestation and a much weakened language on 
safeguards. An earlier draft contained a target for reducing deforestation by at 
least 50 per cent by 2020, but as a result of the leaked European Union proposal, 
deforestation targets were removed from the negotiating text (Lang  2009). 
The  accord firmly endorsed REDD+ with an emphasis on SFM consistent 
with long-term sustainable land management (Verchot and Petkova 2009). 
Governments of the world’s biggest palm oil producers, including Malaysia, 
swiftly rejected proposals put forward by global environmental groups to 
exclude the expansion of oil palm plantations in REDD+ projects.
A year later, in December 2010 at the climate change negotiations at Cancún in 
Mexico, the UNFCCC further endorsed the option for developing countries to 
conserve their forests and receive payments for avoided deforestation and the 
enhancement of carbon stocks (REDD+). Emission credits could also be granted 
for the use of ‘green technology’ developed through the CDM. In addition 
to having no binding commitments to curb deforestation, the inclusion of 
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plantation forests as an internationally endorsed modality of carbon capture and 
storage was one of the most controversial inclusions in the Cancún Agreement. 
In COP 16, Cancún 2010, the final decision on REDD+:
Encourages developing country Parties to contribute to mitigation actions in 
the forest sector by undertaking the following activities, as deemed appropriate 
by each Party and in accordance with their respective capabilities and national 
circumstances:
(a) Reducing emissions from deforestation;
(b) Reducing emissions from forest degradation;
(c) Conservation of forest carbon stocks;
(d) Sustainable management of forest;
(e) Enhancement of forest carbon stocks.14
The agreement emphasised the need to ensure at national and community levels 
that REDD+ ‘complements restoration, poverty alleviation and adaptation’ 
and ‘promotes and operationalizes safeguards and accountability’ (IISD 2011). 
These  priorities couple the ideals of SFM with the free-market principles of 
ecological modernisation.
REDD and Ecological Modernisation
In 2011, as developing countries began committing voluntary targets to 
reduce greenhouse gases and participate in international REDD programs to 
cease deforestation and reshape their economies as ‘low carbon’ economies, 
Alan Oxley released a study by World Growth which argued that conservation 
strategies such as REDD will impoverish the poor and put biodiversity at risk 
(World Growth 2011a).
The sentiments expressed by Oxley are closely echoed in Rimbunan Hijau’s 
(PNG) pro-development discourse, which draws upon principles of ecological 
modernisation to champion economic growth and global trade over conservation 
strategies:
The economic consequences of global warming mitigation strategies currently 
proposed will probably be worse than the effects of global warming itself. 
Therefore, adaptation and resiliency strategies should be considered as a more 
cost-effective alternative. In addition, ‘no regrets’ strategies that will provide 
benefits from greater economic growth whether global warming proves to be a 
problem or not, should be adopted at once. (RH PNG 2010: 4)
14  Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancún from 29 November to 
10 December 2010, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. (unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2).
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Ecological modernisation theorists argue that forest destruction and 
biodiversity loss can be reversed by developing flexible liberal institutions 
which foster sustainable capitalism through the restructuring of the state 
towards participatory policy making. Rather than a withering of the role of the 
state in environmental governance, the introduction of favourable conditions 
for collaboration with civil society, environmental groups and the public 
sphere is expected to transform responsibilities, incentives and roles to the 
market, reorienting the state to serve as a coordinating function with other 
sectors in support of forests (Mol 1995: 46–7). Ecological modernisation, which 
has dominated or been deployed by industry advocates in political debates 
concerning global ecological objectives (Hajer  1996:  249), strives to achieve 
a balance between environmental sustainability and economic development. 
Ecological modernisation is increasingly articulated in the principles of SFM. 
For example, in the past decade the discourse of SFM has gradually shifted from 
‘forest management by exclusion’ to ‘management by inclusion of stakeholder 
groups’, and ‘sustained yield timber management’ has become ‘sustainable 
forest ecosystem management’ (Kant and Lee 2004). Such ecosystem-based 
terminology (some would call rhetoric) is underpinned by concepts such as 
‘system’, ‘relationships’, ‘interconnectivity’, ‘community’, ‘uncertainty’, 
‘adaption’, ‘precaution’ and ‘inclusivity’, which now permeate natural resource 
management discourses (Gale and Haward 2011:  46). In the international 
regulation of SFM, Maguire (2010: 288) argues that the design of REDD+ ‘is the 
first global instrument to embrace the ideas behind environmental justice in the 
forest context’.
According to Kant and Lee (2004: 215), there are two dominant features of SFM 
under a REDD framework which offer potential for moving towards a more 
sustainable future in Oceania’s forests and local communities. First, REDD can 
include the recognition of multiple forest values, beyond the customary timber 
values, including non-timber products, value of eco-services and indigenous 
values (ibid.). Second, SFM under REDD+ may accommodate the preferences 
of multiple stakeholder groups, such as local communities and environmental 
groups in forest management decision making (ibid.). The problem of ecological 
modernisation–influenced SFM development under the framework of REDD+ is 
that it is designed to be implemented in a classical top-down approach, starting at 
government level and ending with the integration of rural communities living in 
or around the forests. Thus, stakeholder participation is the last consideration in 
project implementation, and although safeguards are being negotiated to ensure 
that forest actors have a reasonable share in the economic benefits, the capacity 
to enforce compliance depends on the SFM system established at the national 
level. This means that SFM implementation largely relies on voluntary corporate 
commitments to ‘best practice’ standards in natural resource management. 
In climate capitalism, the rhetoric of SFM has acquired authority and served 
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particular social interests, and is increasingly becoming institutionalised within 
organisational structures and practices that attempt to legitimise the expansion 
of corporate capitalism.
Rimbunan Hijau: REDDish Transformations 
in Green Capitalism
In its home state of Sarawak, Malaysia, Rimbunan Sawit Berhad (a publicly 
listed company majority owned by the Rimbunan Hijau Group) is one of the 
leading palm oil producers and processors of crude palm oil and oil palm 
seeds, with approximately 93,500 hectares of land in Miri, Kuching and Sibu 
(Sarawak).15 ‘Sustaining Wellness’ is the slogan on its annual reports for 2013 and 
2014 (RSB 2013, 2014). Adopting a policy of ‘Developing Smart Partnerships’ 
(RSB 2009: 9), Tiong Hiew King, (then) executive chairman, focused on equity 
acquisitions in integrated oil palm plantations in Sarawak. Rimbunan Sawit’s 
‘group vision’ is to be one of the leading integrated oil palm companies in the 
Asia–Pacific. Much of the demand for palm oil is being generated by the global 
demand for alternative energy sources, such as biofuel. In the 2008/09 financial 
year the group increased its land area by 53.86 per cent (RSB 2009). This was 
followed in the 2009/10 financial year with equity acquisition of 11 plantation 
companies, and a plantation estate with commercial rights.
In tandem with its ‘group mission’ to enhance stakeholder value, Rimbunan 
Sawit deploys the language of climate-friendly development to assert its 
commitment to nature:
One of our commitments to the nature is the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) project in RH Plantation Palm Oil Mill. The project will recover methane 
caused by the decay of biogenic matter in the effluent stream. Methane recovered 
will be used to generate electricity for the mill and vicinity plantations. The 
project will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an economically sustainable 
manner and is expected to reduce carbon dioxide equivalent by 20,002 tons 
per year. Zero burning during land development is practised to ensure minimal 
carbon emission. Besides, biological control is practised for pest management to 
reduce the dependency on pesticides. Empty fruit bunch is used as much [mulch] 
in plantations in order to recycle the nutrients present. This helps to reduce the 
dependency on chemical fertilizers. (RSB 2009: 10–1)
15  In 2013, the production area was 36,867 hectares, an increase of 1,739 hectares from 2012. The group’s 
oil palm–planted area was 54,659 hectares (RSB 2013). In 2014, the group’s oil palm–planted area increased to 
57,182 hectares (RSB 2014).
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Another of Tiong Hiew King’s majority-owned public companies in Malaysia, 
Subur Tiasa Holdings, says it has championed ‘eco-friendly’ practices and 
adopted SFM because of its ‘love of forests and wood’:
We love forests. We love wood.
Our heart for habitat compels us to commit not just to practice Sustainable Forest 
Management but to spearhead a comprehensive strategy that strives to ensure 
the sustainability of the environment. (suburtiasa.com.my/csr/the-wood-spa/)
Claims to SFM and commitment to tree planting (for sustainable supply) are 
positioned in Subur Tiasa’s investment discourse as reflecting the ethical 
orientation of its director Tiong Ing, who is described as a ‘zealous lover of the 
habitat’:
Simply put, we plant trees. We plant significantly more trees than we log. Thirty 
times to be precise (as of 2010). It is unrealistic to ignore the continual demand 
for wood as a material for very practical needs. Extensive research is also being 
carried out to ensure proper conservation of our forests.
Selected indigenous species are being planted and rapid-growing exotic species 
are planted in areas designated for Industrial Tree Planting. Island Corridor 
Planting is also practised to reduce the burden bore by the environment and to 
preserve biodiversity which is at Subur Tiasa’s heart.
To accelerate and ensure our sustainable growth in today’s competitive business 
environment, we have partnered with our major shareholder, Rimbunan Hijau 
Group, to invest in our wood treatment strategy that is fronted by none other 
than our Managing Director, Dato’ Tiong Ing, a zealous lover of the habitat. 
(suburtiasa.com.my/csr/the-wood-spa/)
In New Zealand, Rimbunan Hijau’s sister company Ernslaw One16 (the fourth-
largest forestry plantation owner in New Zealand) promotes its investments as 
being carbon neutral:
Ernslaw One has over 25,000 ha of post-1989 Kyoto compliant forests, making it 
one of the largest owners of post-1989 forests in New Zealand … The forests are 
spread throughout New Zealand, and comprise two species, Radiata pine and 
Douglas fir … Radiata pine is clearfelled anytime from age 25 onwards, whereas 
Douglas fir is from 45 years. This means that when Ernslaw One starts harvesting 
the Radiata pine in approx 2022, the Douglas fir will still be growing and will 
cover any carbon liability that may occur. Similarly, when the Douglas fir is 
being harvested, the Radiata pine will be growing. Ernslaw One can thus manage 
their forests for timber production, as well as ensuring that no liability arises 
for any carbon that is sold from the forest. (ernslaw.co.nz/carbon-sequestration/)
16  Ernslaw One’s major shareholder is the Tiong family, headed by Tiong Hiew King.  
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Drawing on plantation experience in New Zealand as well as in Malaysia, 
Rimbunan Hijau is moving towards investing in plantations in PNG. The company 
has been testing plantation species for suitability in Western Province (RH PNG 
2009). In the proposal subtitled ‘An Initiative by Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) Group 
Demonstrating Its Continued Commitment to Sustainable Forest Management in 
Papua New Guinea through Reforestation’ (RH PNG n.d.), the matrix of benefits 
specified carbon sequestration as one of the ecological benefits (Table 10.1).
Table 10.1 Rimbunan Hijau’s matrix of benefits from plantation forestry.
Social Ecological Economic 
Employment Carbon sequestration Timber production 
Recreation Wildlife Carbon trade 
Taungya system Aesthetic Diversification of local economy 
Fuelwood Landscape and biodiversity 
restoration
Recreation, tourism, harvesting and 
marketing of minor forest products etc.
Source: RH PNG (n.d.: 19).
Deploying the language of climate-compatible development, Rimbunan Hijau 
(PNG) promotes the creation of timber plantations in PNG as effective carbon 
sinks (‘enhanced stocks’):
Plantation appears to be a good source of ‘carbon sink’… As Laarman and Sedjo 
(1992) rightly stated, ‘just as climate affects forest, forests are able to affect 
climate — if deforestation puts carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, reforestation 
takes it out’. McLaren further showed that 1-ha of radiata pine plantation in 
New Zealand absorbs 24 tons of carbon annually or a total of 24 million tons of 
carbon annually from New Zealand forest alone. Similarly, Houghton and Skole 
(1990) estimated that 100–200 million hectares of developing or growing forests 
would absorb 1 billion tons of carbon. This further indicates that a growing 
forest plantation will absorb more CO2 for its growth, thus reducing the level of 
CO2 in the air. (RH PNG n.d.: 19)
Through plantation production, Rimbunan Hijau sees itself as making 
a significant contribution to PNG’s carbon mitigation efforts:
The Company as part of its Corporate Environmental responsibility will 
commission an independent 3rd Party to Study Silvicultural Investments in 
Carbon Accounting/Abatement and further through its Reforestation & Forest 
Management practices will calculate forest carbon contributions to the regional 
& global carbon cycle. This however will also benefit Papua New Guinea in its 
efforts for carbon trading because in order to buy or sell a good or service, it 
needs to be quantified. And to quantify, we need to understand how to measure 
forest ecosystem carbon dynamic & carbon budgets which are certainly essential 
to the development of carbon markets and the company is willing to undertake 
this as a pilot project. (RH PNG n.d.: 19)
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Rimbunan Hijau’s expressions of ‘concern’ for the global environment, and its 
social commitments to the nation, have failed to win the support of non-profit 
civil society organisations, including PNG’s Eco-Forestry Forum, which has 
consistently adopted an adversarial stance against the company. In 2009, the 
Eco-Forestry Forum rejected Rimbunan Hijau’s offer to sponsor 500 mangrove 
trees for World Environment Day because of a court case brought about by the 
forum which (successfully) challenged the legal extension of Rimbunan Hijau’s 
logging concession ‘Kamula Doso’ in Western Province. Rimbunan Hijau’s PNG 
public relations manager opined: ‘So much for battling the global climate change 
and environment sustainability war’ (RH PNG 2010: 3).
As Benson and Kirsch (2010:  45–6) have cautioned, strategies used by 
corporations to manage or neutralise critique, including idioms of ethics, health, 
environmentalism and corporate responsibility, generally promote business as 
usual. It is also the case, however, that when corporations claim to be ‘ethical’ 
and ‘sustainable’ it opens up spaces for public scrutiny and critique:
RH is a significant contributor to the nation’s economic and social wellbeing. 
RH  works closely with landowners, communities, NGOs and government 
agencies as part of its operations … RH also takes the environment seriously. 
RH  is Papua New Guinea’s industry leader on environmentally responsible 
and 100  per  cent legal management of forests … RH has prided itself on an 
economically, environmentally and socially sustainable future for Papua New 
Guinea. (rhpng.com.pg)
Rimbunan Hijau’s claims of corporate social responsibility have not yet resulted 
in a ‘politics of resignation’ (Benson and Kirsch 2010), and the company’s 
attempts to legitimise its corporate power within PNG have largely failed, but 
Rimbunan Hijau has continued its attempt to counter negative representations 
through a reliance on orthodox economic understandings of ‘development’, 
‘growth’ and ‘global equity’ (Gabriel and Wood, forthcoming). A Foucauldian 
critique (Lattas 2011) would suggest that the company’s use of discourses, linked 
to SFM, corporate social responsibility and ecological modernisation, involves 
the pragmatic deployment of knowledge for the primary goal of governing 
subjects (landowner groups) and their subjectivities.
In terms of contributing to climate change solutions, Rimbunan Hijau lobbyist 
Alan Oxley promotes palm oil plantations as more efficient carbon sinks than 
natural forests:
Palm oil is also very greenhouse friendly. Properly managed, plantations absorb 
more carbon dioxide than natural forest. (Oxley 2009)
To pursue oil palm development in PNG, Gilford Limited, a Rimbunan Hijau 
subsidiary, is seeking to secure long-term tenure property rights in East New 
Britain through a highly controversial Special Agricultural and Business 
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Lease (SABL) that bypasses forestry laws and enables deforestation through the 
clear-felling of primary forests. The granting of SABLs allows customary land 
(including primary forests) to be legally converted into agricultural development 
on land which is leased from landowners for up to 99 years. For this reason, 
SABLs have been described as a mechanism for modern ‘land grabs’:
It is a moot point whether the companies interested in the acquisition of such 
land in PNG have any genuine interest in its agricultural potential, or whether 
they are simply looking for new ways to log PNG’s native forests (Filer 2011a: 2).
The extent of the current land grab is staggering, involving almost 5 million 
hectares of customary land (11 per cent of PNG’s total land area) (Filer 2011a: 2). 
In 2010, the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research raised 
concerns that SABLs were purely a means of accessing saleable timber resources 
in the guise of agricultural (oil palm) development: ‘there is little evidence that 
these proposals will lead to viable palm oil production’ (Nelson et al. 2010: 11). 
In 2013, an academic study concluded that a large-scale land grab was occurring 
in PNG under the guise of oil palm (Nelson et al. 2014).
Through the SABL mechanism, Rimbunan Hijau is establishing an ‘integrated 
rural development project’ in East New Britain Province, involving timber 
and palm oil plantations. Ivan Lu, executive director of Rimbunan Hijau’s 
PNG operations, claims that the rural development project that will lead its 
expansion into the palm oil sector in PNG will contribute some K800 million 
(US$300 million) in royalties, payments, levies and other community funding, 
as well as providing transport and social infrastructure to local communities 
(ITS Global 2011b). Although Rimbunan Hijau asserts that the majority of 
landowners support the land reform (Anon. 2011), other landowners fear the 
loss of control of land for more than three generations, which they believe 
could have devastating consequences (Chandler 2011). Some landowners assert 
that the Pomio SABL was fraudulently obtained and that many of the names 
purporting to approve the lease on behalf of landowners were local children 
(including a 3-year-old). Other names were said to belong to deceased villagers 
(Post-Courier 2011).
In October 2011, the Pomio SABL in East New Britain became the centre of 
international condemnation following allegations of police brutality and 
corporate complicity. Disgruntled landowners from Pomio filed a lawsuit with 
the Centre for Environmental Law and Community Rights (CELCOR) against 
Rimbunan Hijau and the state in the proposed Sigite Mukus Integrated Rural 
Development Project, accusing them of fraudulently depriving landowners of 
their customary land for a logging project. One of the plaintiffs, Paul Pavol, 
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who had been leading the protest, claimed that many locals were angry because 
the leases were granted without the approval of the majority of traditional 
landowners:
We have never given consent, we did not say yes, we want oil palm, and we did 
not even sign any documents. I think we are going to lose all the land [44,000 
hectares] for 99 years, that’s three generations. (ABC Radio Australia 2011)
The police were flown into Pomio on Rimbunan Hijau’s commercial aircraft 
Tropic Air (between 3 and 6 October 2011) in alleged retaliation, and a number 
of people were reportedly intimidated and beaten with fan belts and sticks, and 
police locked young men in shipping containers (Post-Courier 2011). Pictures 
of placards were distributed anonymously via email condemning Rimbunan 
Hijau’s presence in Pomio (John 2011).
In its formal response, Rimbunan Hijau defended the integrity of the State and 
the independence of the PNG constabulary:
The majority of the land owners support the palm oil projects. The recent 
attempts by this few disgruntled land owners with assistance from NGOs, whom 
do not support any form of development to derail and stop this very important 
project, was refused by the National Court recently. The royal constabulary 
(of PNG) is very independent and high integrity institution of the state of Papua 
New Guinea and we welcome the comments of acting police commissioner Tom 
Kulunga.
We regret this constant unverified adverse media release by (a) non-government 
organization hell bent (on) generating adverse publicity in order to keep their 
anti-government campaign alive for domestic and international donors. It is very 
much regretted and it is not helpful for a country that is seeking to develop its 
resources sustainably which is much needed. (Rheeney 2011)
The commission of inquiry into the granting of SABLs found that in the Pomio 
SABL, no legal representation of the landowners was provided during the signing 
of the sublease agreements, and executives of Gilford Limited appeared to have 
given the sublease documents to the executives of the landowner companies 
without any proper explanation or advice of its contents: ‘RH is no small 
player in the forestry business. You treated this very lightly’, the commissioner 
told the company representatives. He added he has not seen equity for the 
landowners: ‘Unfortunately, this is not reflected in all the agreements we have 
seen’ (Tiden 2011).
Close scrutiny of the current position of the palm oil industry in PNG further 
casts Rimbunan Hijau as a rogue player if it uses the SABL mechanism for oil 
palm development without adhering to the principles of the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO). As Filer (2011a:  22) has pointed out, the two 
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companies responsible for PNG’s entire palm oil exports (New Britain Palm Oil 
Ltd and Hargy Oil Palms Ltd) comply with the standards of the RSPO, pledging 
that their actions, directly or indirectly, do not contribute to the clearance of 
native forests, especially in high-conservation areas. Therefore, if Rimbunan 
Hijau chooses to continue its plans to develop oil palm plantations in PNG 
through the SABL mechanism, it needs to decide whether it supports corporate 
social responsibility standards set out by the RSPO and embraced by PNG’s 
largest palm oil exporters, or whether it will pursue the agenda of its lobbyists 
and the PNGFIA (PNG Forest Industries Association) in supporting forest 
clearance for palm oil production.
Clear-felling of forests for agriculture is also at odds with the draft PNG Climate 
Compatible Development Policy 2013–15, which aims to ‘reduce deforestation 
and forest degradation in commercial agriculture and forestry activities and 
promote afforestation/reforestation on marginal lands’ (OCCD 2013).
Under the ITTO definition, Rimbunan Hijau cannot claim to be practising SFM 
while adopting an adversarial position in dealing with sections of the community, 
PNG’s established oil palm industry (which complies with RSPO guidelines), as 
well as the international community which opposes SABLs because they are seen 
to be outside best practice. Although Rimbunan Hijau (PNG) says it is genuinely 
interested in improving corporate practice by introducing incremental reform 
through green technology, verification schemes and community engagement, 
it  is yet to develop collaborative relationships with environmental or social 
justice NGOs. In this sense the company has adopted a largely defensive position 
with broader civil society.
Concluding Remarks
Despite Rimbunan Hijau’s claims of social and environmental responsibility, 
including a commitment towards a greener future, the company’s involvement 
in PNG’s highly controversial land-use scheme (SABL) has exacerbated the 
perception that it is still engaging in unethical commodity production.
In May 2015, four years after the policy board of the United Nations Collaborative 
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in 
Developing Countries (UN-REDD) approved the National Programme Document 
which set out how the PNG government proposed to achieve a state of ‘REDD 
plus readiness’ within three years (Filer 2011b), forestry minister Douglas 
Tomuriesa announced that the REDD+ mechanism in Papua New Guinea is 
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‘ready for business’. He added that PNG is prepared to utilise the forests for 
REDD programs, which includes the conservation of land for REDD credits 
(Dateline Pacific 2015).
Signalling a move towards SFM, the National Executive Council has endorsed 
a total ban on log exports by 2020 (ibid.). However, PNG’s policy and laws 
regarding REDD processes must also address fundamental issues of land tenure, 
ownership, prior informed consent and equitable benefit sharing.  Corporate 
investment will need to complement domestic efforts and contribute towards 
enhancing SFM and sustainable development by becoming more transparent, 
more equitable and more accountable to local resource users.
To adhere to the principles of SFM embedded in REDD+, Rimbunan Hijau will 
need to work in tandem with approaches that seek to achieve global ecological 
sustainability and support a low-carbon economy nationally, while avoiding 
measures of social control that alienate sections of the community and broader 
civil society. This is line with Strategy 1 (7.4.2) of the draft PNG Climate 
Compatible Development Policy 2013–15:
Encourage investments in natural capital such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
water and mineral resources that promotes sustainable development and respect 
for community rights and livelihood whilst safeguarding national interest 
(OCCD 2013: 36).
A key idea of SFM under ecological modernisation theory is that markets for 
‘ethical commodities’ can improve the ability of the private sector to internalise 
the environmental costs of production. Through branding and market 
differentiation, ethical commodities have the potential to produce economic 
rent (Guthman 2002, 2004), which provides a means for compensating for best 
practice in social and environmental management, while redistributing profit to 
rural communities. In terms of SFM, the success of multifunctional integrated 
approaches to climate capitalism such as REDD+ relies on establishing cooperative 
partnerships between landowners, governments, companies and non-profit civil 
society organisations — these are all ‘brand-building’ exercises that can redefine 
forestry values and impact corporate brands positively. Although opportunities 
for reform are made possible through such schemes, it is questionable whether 
they will bring about productive change in corporate approaches to social and 
environmental relationships in host countries such as PNG. As multinational 
companies such as Rimbunan Hijau compete for market share in the newly 
emerging international governance regime for forests, evidence of voluntary 
compliance with socially and environmentally sustainable development is 
increasingly necessary to demonstrate global standards of corporate social 
responsibility which require business activities to be compatible with robust 
social, environmental and ecological safeguards.
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The persistence of international critique, social and environmental campaigns, 
and landowner resistance groups indicates that the ongoing presence of 
Rimbunan Hijau in the forests of Oceania will increasingly be defined by 
its ability and willingness to deliver outcomes defined by local perspectives 
and desires, as well as national and global objectives. Instead of deploying 
ecological-modernist discourse as a strategy to dilute the political impulse for 
environmental reforms (Hajer 1995), a commitment to thinking outside the 
borders of ecological modernisation to provide tangible and equitable benefits 
will need to be part of Rimbunan Hijau’s strategy in order for it to deliver on 
its promises of corporate social responsibility and SFM. This broader strategy 
will need to include addressing the power imbalances between industry and 
landowners.
I have argued that in the expanding frontiers of global climate capitalism, new 
models of corporate forestry management in PNG are being challenged by the 
politics of ‘friction’ (Tsing 2005), which include ongoing forms of participatory 
politics. An increased focus on the use of corporate and industry discourse to 
influence the policy networks of Oceania’s forestry industry may contribute to 
new opportunities for holding corporations accountable to their promises.
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